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ABSTRACT
KURT VONNEGUT, MODERNITY, AND THE SELF:
A GUIDE TO “THE GOOD LIFE”
Josh Simpson
April 15, 2022

What are people for? This is a question Kurt Vonnegut raises in his first novel,
1952’s Player Piano. Over five decades later, when he concludes a career with 2005’s A
Man Without a Country, he is still asking, “What is life all about?” (66). These are the
central questions for Vonnegut, and his novels, short stories, essays, interviews,
correspondence, and commencement addresses offer a singular, life-long attempt at an
answer. In this dissertation I offer a reading of Vonnegut not just as a writer concerned
with philosophical questions, but rather, on a deeper, more personal level, as a
philosopher of the self. Vonnegut offers a unified, coherent, and systematic
philosophical worldview, one in which purpose, foma, aesthetic experience, and
community are non-negotiable elements for “the good life.” By bringing Vonnegut’s
thought and work into conversation with Camus, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and diasporic
theory, a goal of this dissertation is to explore Vonnegut’s work in philosophical,
anthropological, cultural, and individualistic terms. The good life for Vonnegut is
ultimately one in which the individual is able to say “yes” to existence in the midst of
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modernity. Purposelessness, embarrassment, hopelessness, shame, and loneliness are
serious philosophical problems for Vonnegut, and his work represents a systematic
attempt to come to terms with and ultimately (hopefully) work through them, not just for
his readers, but as this dissertation will illustrate, for himself as well.
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INTRODUCTION
A guy walks into the restroom of a New York City pornographic theater…
The above scene, which takes place in the middle of 1973’s Breakfast of
Champions, could easily serve as the set-up for a great one-liner, especially in the hands
of a writer like Kurt Vonnegut. Interestingly, and, I would argue, tellingly, Vonnegut
takes this absurd moment of potential low comedy and does something else entirely.
While washing his hands, Kilgore Trout happens to glance over, and under a roll of paper
towels he discovers someone has written in the wall, “What is the purpose of life?”
“Trout plundered his pockets for a pen or pencil. He had an answer to the question. But
he had nothing to write with, not even a burnt match. So he left the question unanswered,
but here is what he would have written, if he had found anything to write with:
To be
the eyes
and ears
and conscience
of the Creator of the Universe,
you fool (67-8).
The Joycean undertones here are deliberate. As Vonnegut writes in the prologue to
Timequake, Trout “has been my alter ego in several of my other novels” (xv). Much like
Stephen Dedalus, who at the end of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man sets off as an
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exile from Dublin to “encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to
forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race” (224), Trout (and as
such, Vonnegut himself) undertakes a significant journey of personal and cultural
discovery within Breakfast of Champions. Trout (and Vonnegut) are exiles as
well…with a critical difference. While Stephen’s task is one of creation, Vonnegut’s is
one of destruction. As he explains in the preface, “I think I am trying to clear my head of
all the junk there …I’m throwing out characters from my other books, too. … I think I
am trying to make my head as empty as it was when I was born onto this damaged planet
fifty years ago” (5). He adds, “I have no culture, no humane harmony in my brains. I
can’t live without a culture anymore” (5). At stake within this novel is Vonnegut’s
attempt to discover a culture which is worth being part of, and more importantly, a life
which is worth affirming.
Vonnegut inarguably raises philosophical questions within his work. Even his
most commercial efforts, namely the short fiction written primarily to “finance the
writing of the novels” (Monkey House xiv), address philosophically complex topics such
as the subjectivity of truth, physician-assisted suicide, overpopulation, and governmentmandated sterilization.
With this dissertation, I intend to offer a reading of Vonnegut as a philosophical
novelist, a writer who over the span of fourteen novels, one full-length play, multiple
short stories, and hundreds of articles, interviews, and public addresses, offers a unified,
coherent, and systematic worldview. In a 1973 Playboy interview, when asked to expand
on the personal burden of “living without a culture,” Vonnegut responds, “All my books
are my effort to answer that question and to make myself like life better than I do”
2

(Conversations 109). A careful study of Vonnegut’s work reveals the emergence of a
personal philosophy, an individual attempt to come to terms with life. In the Nietzschean
tradition, Vonnegut is a philosopher of the self, and I offer a reading of his work as a
continually-developing personal philosophical system, one which culminates in 1997’s
Timequake, his final and most experimental novel. Ultimately, I argue, Vonnegut creates
a guide to a “good life” in modernity, one based on foundational principles of resistance,
self-deception, artistic creation, and community.
Upon exploring the relationship between Vonnegut’s fiction and non-fiction, what
emerges is a portrait of the author whose work acts as a singular attempt to make sense of
life, not just for readers, but more directly, for himself. “Any creation which has any
wholeness and harmoniousness” he writes in Slapstick, “was made by an artist or
inventor with an audience of one in mind” (17). For Vonnegut, I intent to illustrate, this
audience was himself. I argue that this is precisely why Vonnegut becomes the
underlying character and the unifying element imbedded within his own fiction, from the
1966 preface to the second edition of Mother Night on.
Two important recent studies which explore Vonnegut’s work through the lens of
both philosophy and critical theory are Todd F. Davis’s Kurt Vonnegut’s Crusade, or,
How a Postmodern Harlequin Preached a New Kind of Humanism (2006) and Robert T.
Tally Jr.’s Kurt Vonnegut and the American Novel: A Postmodern Iconography (2011).
Davis is the first to treat Vonnegut as a literary philosopher, an artist whose novels “often
take the form of parables” (7). Specifically, Davis charts Vonnegut’s “desire to enact
change, to establish patterns for humanity that will lead to the construction of better
realities for the world” (6), ultimately resulting in “a new kind of fiction, a paradigm of
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postmodernity that allows the author to struggle with philosophical ideas concerning our
condition” (7). Davis argues, and rightly so, that Vonnegut is, above all, a novelist (or, to
use his term, a “literary pragmatist”) deeply committed to social change.
Tally, taking a different philosophical approach, focuses largely on Vonnegut’s
novels, which he suggests “represent literary experiments conducted in order to provide a
comprehensive image of American experience in the postmodern condition of the late
twentieth century” (xii). An important term which Tally introduces to Vonnegut studies
is “misanthropic humanism,” which he defines as “the fundamental sense that human, alltoo-human behavior inevitably leads to ruin” precisely because “the fundamental problem
with people is people” (10).
While this dissertation will into enter into critical conversation with these texts (in
addition to classic and contemporary Vonnegut criticism) I will be proposing an
alternative reading. Davis, of course, is correct in addressing the broad social
implications and the transformative social thrust inherent in Vonnegut’s fiction, and Tally
is equally correct in his assertions that Vonnegut intentionally charts the ever-changing
(post)modern human condition through the twentieth century. That said, what has yet to
be fully explored is Vonnegut’s deep commitment to and celebration of the individual
within a philosophical context. In its totality, Vonnegut’s work offers a guide to
affirming life on an individual level.
In the chapters which follow, I will also be addressing the critical dilemma which
Vonnegut found himself in for much of his career…and which continues to serve as the
central challenge to his literary legacy. In a 1992 letter to Jerome Klinkowitz, Vonnegut
states that he is reminded “why so many critics educated as gentlemen at prep schools
4

and then old, elitist colleges and universities dislike my work. Gentlemen know of the
void, but do not speak of it lest they alarm the lower classes, who might run amok”
(Letters 349). Vonnegut’s response here is altogether in keeping with his problematic
view of academic criticism, and it highlights another complicated facet of Vonnegut’s
work—his instant quotability. To be fair, he is easy to quote because he’s so damn
quotable. Many of his best one-liners—“So it goes,” “God damn it, you’ve got to be
kind,” “Everything was beautiful, and nothing hurt,” “Life is no way to treat an animal”
among countless others—are snappy, Twitter-ready soundbites. Frequently, these oneliners are so catchy because they are so funny. In “Funnier On Paper Than Most People,”
Vonnegut explains that “an advantage of a writer’s having a joke-making capability is
that he or she can be really funny in case something really is funny,” a skill he finds
“most contemporary American novelists” are capable of. “The problem,” he goes on to
explain, is that jokes deal so efficiently with ideas that there is little more to be said after
the punch line has been spoken. It is time to come up with a new idea—and another
joke” (Palm Sunday 166). What’s problematic here is not Vonnegut’s humor or his
instant quotability but rather his career-ranging tendency of using (and at times
overusing) the one-liner as a mode of philosophical expression. A careful reading of
Vonnegut in his totality, however, reveals a fuller picture of his philosophical system at
work.
The philosophy of literature as a study in and of itself is an emerging field.
Recent series such as Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature and Open Court’s
Popular Culture and Society offer starkly-contrasting approaches to the ways in which
literature and culture can be viewed from philosophical perspectives. Since 2018, the
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Oxford series has issued provocative and insightful texts offering myriad perspectives on
philosophical aspects of such canonical texts as Hamlet, Emma, Crime and Punishment,
Ulysses, and The Trial. For over two decades now, Open Court’s series has served as a
reminder that in popular culture virtually anything, from Woody Allen to The Simpsons
to (evidently) KISS, can lend itself to philosophical analysis. Vonnegut’s work is, as
Robert Scholes suggests, “a difficult case for elitist criticism to confront” (45), and the
resulting dilemma is that his work is a bit too popular and commercial for the Oxford
series yet a bit to literary and academic for the Open Court series. In part, what I intend
to do in this dissertation is challenge such binary thinking, illustrating how Vonnegut’s
work is alternatingly both literary and pop culture.
Chapter one, “On Purpose, or Saying “Yes” to Life in the Midst of the Absurd”
focuses on the quest for personal meaning and purpose which recurs in Vonnegut. Using
Camus’ suicide question as a starting point, from his earliest work on, Vonnegut accepts
the absurdity of life in modernity, and like Camus, views rebellion and revolt as acts
which render life meaningful. Where Vonnegut differs from Camus, and this is the leadin to Nietzsche and the next chapter, is that even purposefully futile rebellion can render
life meaningful. Death or defeat are absolute certainties for nearly all of Vonnegut’s
characters, but what makes life worth living is not an overcoming so much as a
commitment to revolt.
“Truth and Foma in a Necessary Sense: The Value of Perspectival Illusion in
Modernity” will focus on Nietzsche and truth/self-deception and how “harmless” lies are
necessary to make life bearable in Vonnegut’s fiction. The central Vonnegut texts
explored here will be Cat’s Cradle, Slaughterhouse-Five, and Galapagos. As for
6

Nietzsche, I’m working closely from “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” The
Gay Science, and Beyond Good and Evil. Vonnegut differs from Nietzsche significantly
in this way—rather than viewing the herd as something which should be overcome on the
path to becoming a free spirit or an ubermensch, Vonnegut is an advocate for rendering
herd life meaningful, and I will illustrate the ways in which Vonnegut identifies more
with the herd than with the Zarathustras of the world.
Chapter three, “Better Living Through Art: Vonnegut and The Transformative
Nature of Aesthetic Experience,” will examine Vonnegut’s advocacy for the importance
of the arts in the context of Schopenhauer’s notion of art as being a tool to
transcend/escape the will/self. I will be focusing on Vonnegut’s non-fiction here,
particularly his commencement speeches and interviews, where he repeatedly encourages
others to create as a way to “make your soul grow.” Also, Bluebeard and Deadeye
Dick are important novels in that they focus on individual transcendence through art.
Finally, in chapter four, “’Lonesome No More!’: Vonnegut’s Extended Family
Model As Existential Diasporic Community,” I will focus on Vonnegut’s 1970 trip to
Biafra and the impact that it had on his post-Slaughterhouse-Five output. I’m interested
in exploring the Biafran influence on Vonnegut’s creation of the “Artificial Extended
Family,” and how what Vonnegut actually creates and champions is ultimately a type of
metaphoric diasporic community that unifies the post-Slaughterhouse-Five novels,
reaching culmination with Timequake.
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Over the course of six decades, Vonnegut produced a wide-ranging body of work,
and his early formulaic short fiction differs radically from his later experimental,
metaphysical novels. In another sense, though, what unites his work is a singular focus.
In 1952’s Player Piano, Vonnegut’s first novel, when the Shah of Bratpuhr encounters
EPICAC XIV, a supercomputer capable of solving any problem from the vantage point of
being “dead right about anything” (117), the Shah has but one question for this electronic
oracle: “Would you ask EPICAC what people are for” (320). Forty years later, in a 1999
interview with William Rodney Allen and Paul Smith, while lamenting the increasingly
prominent influence of television on daily life, he asks, “But again it raises the question
of what human beings are supposed to do with their time, anyway? What are people
for?” (Conversations 307). Simply put, this is the question which Vonnegut spent a
lifetime attempting to answer, the fruits of which offer a unique philosophical view of the
good life in modernity.
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CHAPTER I:
ON PURPOSE, OR SAYING “YES” TO LIFE IN THE MIDST OF THE ABSURD
Vonnegut offers up one of his most personal revelations at the beginning of
Slapstick: “This is the closest I will ever come to writing an autobiography,” he writes.
“It is about what life feels like to me” (1). What unifies Vonnegut’s diverse body of
novels, short stories, essays, and plays is his perpetual inward gaze. At his best, he is
capable of powerfully universalizing the personal, and in a feat of Tralfamadorean
proportions, speak directly to readers across time and place.
As an illustration, I’d like to open with three vignettes, intentionally drawn from
the beginning, middle, and end of Vonnegut’s career:
•

From 1955’s “The Kid Nobody Could Handle.” Jovial band director George M.
Helmholtz realizes the reckless futility in his belief that happiness can be achieved
in the material realm, grabs his prized possession, a trumpet formerly owned by
John Philips Sousa, and violently smashes it against the edge of a table. As
Vonnegut paints the scene: “A terrible blasphemy rumbled deep in him, like the
warning of a volcano. And then, irresistibly, out it came. ‘Life is no damn good,’
said Helmholtz. His face twisted as he fought back tears and shame” (Welcome to
the Monkey House 282).
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•

From 1973’s Breakfast of Champions: Just before this particular textual moment,
Vonnegut writes himself into the novel, and then Vonnegut the character enters
into conversation with Vonnegut the novelist:
“This is a very bad book you’re writing,” I said to myself behind my [mirrored
sunglasses].
“I know,” I said.
“You’re afraid you’ll kill yourself the way your mother did,” I said.
“I know,” I said. (198)

•

From 1997’s Timequake, Vonnegut’s final novel: “That there are such devices as
firearms, as easy to operate as cigarette lighters and as cheap as toasters, capable
at anybody’s whim of killing Father or Fats [Waller] or Abraham Lincoln or John
Lennon or Martin Luther King, Jr., or a woman pushing a baby carriage, should
be proof enough for anybody that, to quote the old science fiction writer Kilgore
Trout, ‘being alive is a crock of shit’” (3).

These three passages share a particular philosophical perspective, each revealing what
life “felt like” for Vonnegut 1) as a struggling writer with a large family to support, 2) in
the midst of immense critical and commercial success, and 3) at the close of his career, at
a time when his legacy was in debate. Transcending the personal, however, they also
pointedly illustrate what life too frequently feels like in modernity as well.
My goal in this chapter is to offer a reading of five texts—Player Piano (1952),
The Sirens of Titan (1959), God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater (1965), Happy Birthday,
Wanda June (1971), and Hocus Pocus (1990)—which yields Vonnegut’s answer to the
10

question Trout encounters on the men’s room wall—what is the purpose of life? Indeed,
I suggest that this is the central question which is at the core of Vonnegut’s fiction, one
which he explores both explicitly and implicitly in all of his novels. I select these five
texts because they offer Vonnegut’s most direct attempt at providing a cohesive answer
to this question. For Vonnegut, if life is to have any meaning at all, the individual must
have a specific sense of purpose. As we shall see in chapter two, this purpose need not
necessarily be based in reality. The problem for Vonnegut and his characters is that the
modern world—that is, a world of global war, genocide, industrialization, ever-expanding
technology, environmental destruction, and atomic annihilation—is not inherently
conducive to human life. Like Camus, Vonnegut suggests that modernity is governed by
absurdity. Also like Camus, Vonnegut’s fictions are frequently as philosophical as they
are literary. His principle interests lie not in telling his readers how to live but instead, by
challenging commonplace notions of truth, beauty, morality, justice, and time, how to
find their own answers to life’s most challenging questions. An individualistic sense of
purpose is a foundational prerequisite not only for the good life, but for life in general. In
Vonnegut’s world, however, purpose is something which must be negotiated on a
personal level in the midst of the absurd; it is far from inalienable.
Camus, Absurdity, Resistance, and Suicide
In A Man Without a Country, the last book Vonnegut published during his
lifetime, he quotes Camus’ well-known assertion that “There is but one truly
philosophical problem, and that is suicide” (8). This passage is particularly important
because it establishes Vonnegut’s familiarity with Camus. For both writers, the question
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of suicide is central, and even though they arrive at different conclusions, the question
must first be addressed.
Camus lays the framework for his view of the absurd in 1942’s The Myth of
Sisyphus, and then spent the rest of his writing life offering examples which expand and
deepen the meaning of his initial philosophical perspective. Joseph Ward offers a
particularly insightful reading of Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus by establishing numerous
parallels between Camus’ view of the absurd, the tenets of Rational Emotive Behavioral
Therapy, and two of Vonnegut’s later novels—Deadeye Dick and Hocus Pocus. As he
argues in “Following in the Footsteps of Sisyphus: Camus, Vonnegut, and Rational
Emotive Behavioral Therapy,” “Camus’s existential philosophy of the absurd, and his
corresponding belief in an individual’s ability to achieve happiness through acceptance, is
expressed in REBT’s emphasis on awareness of life’s absurdities, unconditional
acceptance of unalterable reality, and the rejection of any irrational beliefs that would
impose absolutist conditions on what should or must be” (82). I would argue, however,
without minimizing the value of acceptance, that for Camus, existence is and must be an
act of resistance and rebellion. Acceptance, as Ward shows, can be empowering. At the
same time, it can also lead to and result in resignation. In a chaotic, godless universe, life
is entirely devoid of meaning; each individual must therefore negotiate the paradox of
birth in the midst of cosmic indifference. “In a universe suddenly divested of illusions
and lights,” Camus writes, “man feels an alien, a stranger” (The Myth of Sisyphus 6). For
Camus, this inherited alienation is what gives shape to life. “This divorce between man
and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity (The Myth of
Sisyphus 6).
12

What Camus advocates in The Myth of Sisyphus is the necessity of what he terms
metaphysical revolt, which is an act of affirming life in the midst of absurdity. “That
revolt gives life its value. Spread out over the whole length of a life, it restores its
majesty to that life” (55). For Camus, saying yes to life, even with “the certainty of a
crushing fate” (54) requires rebelling against the absurdity which “stands at the center of
experience” (22). Herbert R. Lottman, whose Albert Camus is regarded as the definitive
biography, points out that much of The Myth of Sisyphus’ power stems from just how
personal the essay is. “At times it seems veritable autobiography, a portrait of the artist
as a young man. When the book opens …one can imagine that one is reading Camus’
journal” (258). Indeed, Oliver Todd suggests the stakes of The Myth of Sisyphus can be
summed up with a single question: “How should we live?” (142). More broadly, I’d
suggest this question as at the center of Camus’ fiction as well.
Examples of the absurd and rebellion abound throughout Camus’ novels.
Meursault’s senseless act of violence in The Stranger and the Mother’s unknowing
murder of her son, Jan, in Cross Purpose serve as metaphoric representations of the
random horrors which are inherently part of the human condition in the midst of
absurdity. Yet it is The Plague which offers Camus’ most fully realized example of
resistance and revolt. As we know all too well post(?) COVID, pandemics serve as
reminders of just how absurd life can truly become at a moment’s notice. For Camus,
what matters most is not what happens—because anything can happen—but how the
individual reacts in the face of absurdity.
In The Plague, the bubonic outbreak which mysteriously appears in Oran has no
specific point of origin. It simply exists. It happens because it can. Any attempt at
13

finding meaning as to why, a task undertaken by Father Paneloux in the novel, is futile.
In the face of absurdity, for Camus, the only possible recourse is the one taken up by
Doctor Rieux, “fighting against creation as he found it” (114). “I have no idea what’s
awaiting me,” he explains,” or what will happen when all this ends. For the moment I
know this: there are sick people and they need curing” (114). It’s the why, not the how,
which gives life meaning for Camus. In Albert Camus: A Very Short Introduction, Oliver
Gloag suggests that Rieux “keeps on tending to his patients with no hope of curing them”
(59), which is absolutely true. Such perseverance in the face of certain defeat is the fate
of us all. In this sense, Doctor Rieux in The Plague is much more the typical Camusean
hero than Meursault in The Stranger. Rieux challenges the absurd; Meursault resigns
himself to it entirely. If Rieux’s mantra could be reduced to “there are sick people and
they need curing” (114), Meursault’s can best be summed up as “it’s not my fault” (3, 18,
19, etc.) his only response to a world he can’t begin to understand.
The philosophical justification for Rieux’s actions are offered in The Rebel,
illustrating how Camus’ fiction and non-fiction enter into continual conversation. After
rather brazenly proclaiming “I believe in nothing and that everything is absurd,” Camus
writes, “Rebellion is born of the spectacle of irrationality, confronted with an unjust and
incomprehensible condition. But its blind impulse is to demand order in the midst of
chaos, and unity in the heart of the ephemeral” (10). In Vonnegut’s fiction, order is
created through a sense of individual purpose.
Before attempting to answer “What is the purpose of life?,” Vonnegut first must
reconcile a much more philosophically complex question: “Is life worth living?” This is
a problem he addresses with considerable care. Aside from the firebombing of Dresden in
14

1945 which he would chronicle two decades later in Slaughterhouse-Five, no single event
impacted Vonnegut’s life as profoundly as his mother’s suicide. In And So It Goes,
Charles Shields offers the following account of her death: “Kurt was awakened by [his
older sister] Alice early Sunday morning, Mother’s Day. Something was wrong with
mother, she said. Together, they went quietly into her bedroom, where Kurt bent over his
mother … Edith Vonnegut, age fifty-six, was dead from an overdose of sleeping pills”
(53). Three factors are worth noting here, each of which adds additional layers of pain to
the horrific tragedy. 1). At the time of her suicide, Vonnegut was visiting home while on
leave before shipping out to join the Allies overseas. His mother’s suicide served as
preface to his WWII experiences as a POW, and he carried her recent loss all the way to
Dresden (Shields 52). 2). Vonnegut discovered his mother’s body, which understandably
had lasting consequences on him. 3). Edith Vonnegut chose to take her own life on
Mother’s Day of all days.
The following passage from Palm Sunday humorously reveals the influence his
mother’s suicide had on him:
As for real death—it has always been a temptation to me, since my mother solved
so many problems with it. The child of a suicide will naturally think of death, the
big one, as a logical solution to any problem, even one in simple algebra.
Question: If Farmer A can plant 300 potatoes an hour, and Famer B can plant
potatoes fifty percent faster, and Farmer C can plant potatoes one third as fast as
Farmer B, and 10,000 potatoes are to be planted to an acre, how many nine-hour
days will it take Farmers A, B, and C, working simultaneously, to plant 25 acres:
Answer: I think I’ll blow my brains out. (277-8)
Suicide is a possibility never far removed in Vonnegut’s fiction, and while he never
romanticizes the act, he nevertheless understands its allure. Nowhere is this seen more
clearly than in Breakfast of Champions. “Yes, suicide is at the heart of the book,” he
explains in a 1973 interview with David Standish. “It’s also the punctuation mark at the
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end of many artistic careers. I pick up that punctuation mark and play with it in the book,
come to understand it better, put it back in the shelf but leave it in view” (Conversations
108). The following year, in his preface to Wampeters, Foma & Granfalloons, Vonnegut
recounts a fan letter he received from a 12-year old reader who had just finished reading
Breakfast of Champions: “Dear Mr. Vonnegut. Please don’t commit suicide” (xix).
If suicide plays an important role in Vonnegut’s fiction, it is because, like Camus
before him, he sees it as the central question. He even suggests that most people agree,
and this view influences his work. As he states in a 1980 interview with Robert Musil,
“The most horrible hypocrisy or the most terrifying hypocrisy or the most tragic
hypocrisy at the center of life, I think, which no one dares mention, is that human beings
don’t like life. They pretend to like it some … But life is, for most people, a very terrible
ordeal” (Conversations 232). Perhaps Vonnegut’s greatest singular achievement as an
artist, and the one which most accounts for his enduring popularity, is his ability to help
put this “terrible ordeal” into perspective. This is the impulse which helps define even the
most commercial of his short fiction, and from his first novel onwards, it serves as his
singular focus.
Robert Zaretsky’s two excellent recent studies—2010’s Albert Camus: The
Elements of a Life, and its companion, 2013’s A Life Worth Living: Albert Camus and the
Quest for Meaning—explore the impact of Camus’ thinking on modernity. They also
reveal just how much of himself Camus used in his writing and the extent to which “they
have become guides for the perplexed” (Elements 7). This is an approach Vonnegut too
would adopt in his work. When Zaretsky writes, “He was a moralist who insisted that
while the world is absurd and allows for no hope, we are not condemned to despair; a
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moralist who reminded us that, in the end, all we have is one another in an indifferent and
silent world” (Life Worth Living 8), he just as easily could have had Vonnegut in mind.
Player Piano: “A Book About What Could Be”
Written in 1946 while he was struggling to find both his voice and his market as a
short story writer, and years before his first novel, Vonnegut’s letter to Don Matchen
outlines his chief philosophical concern, both as an artist and as a human being: “To
speak in terms of humanity, in terms of change engendered by compassion and yearning
for a better life on earth for the human species, is to incur the fury of those fortunate few
who are wonderfully well-off … under the system as it now stands” (Letters 18). It’s
important to note that during the early years of his career, two Vonneguts were at work,
often simultaneously. On the one hand, Vonnegut had a family to support and a
spiritually-deadening publicist’s job at General Electric he was trying to escape, so he
churned out volumes of short stories, or, as he refers to them, “mild but popular form[s]
of entertainment” (Bagombo Snuff Box 2) for the magazine market of the 1950s. “Say
what you want about me, I never wrote for a magazine called The Woman’s Home
Companion, but there was a time when I would have been most happy to” (Bagombo
Snuff Box 4). If his assessment of the vast majority of his short fiction, particularly that
which was gathered by Peter Reed in 1999’s Bagombo Snuff Box, is a bit too
uncharitable, we must remember that Vonnegut did agree to have the collection of early
work published. He might not have been particularly proud of these stories, but he
wasn’t necessarily embarrassed by them either.
The novels are a different matter altogether. Vonnegut himself freely
acknowledges the distinction between his short fiction and his more ambitious works in
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the preface to Welcome to the Monkey House, referring to the stories as “the fruits of Free
Enterprise” (xiv). While I disagree with those critics who rather unfairly gloss over the
short fiction in their work for this very reason, I readily acknowledge that Vonnegut is a
writer much better suited for the long-form the novel provides. Player Piano, written at
the same time he was mass-producing short stories for the slicks, serves as a case in
point.
“This book is not a book about what is,” Vonnegut writes in the foreword, “but a
book about what could be.” This statement, which serves as the opening sentence of his
first novel, also acts as a preface of sorts for his lengthy career, and it could just as easily
be attached as a prefatory remark at the beginning of any of his novels, all of which, to
varying degrees of success, can be read on the level of personal and societal warnings as
to what “could be” if we aren’t careful. Player Piano is situated in a near future, ten
years after a Second Industrial Revolution has radically changed the quality of life in the
modern world for the masses. A rigid divide separates the thinkers and the doers, and
post-revolution, there is little work—or use—for manual laborers. Largely, they have
been replaced by machines and gadgets which were designed by the managers and
engineers, who themselves have assumed elevated positions in a damaged, post-human
society. Paul Proteus is the novel’s central character, and while he is a distinguished
manager with a promising future at Illium Works, “He didn’t feel important or brilliant at
the moment, nor had he for some time” (1). Paul’s personal transformation is central to
the narrative, and it grows out this initial sense of anxiety and unrest.
In Understanding Kurt Vonnegut, William Rodney Allen astutely points out the
ways in which Player Piano satirizes both “corporate life in the 1950s” (20) and the anti-
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communist movement (32), and these contemporary critiques are central aspects of the
novel. Philosophically, however, it is also a deeply existential novel. The malaise which
dominates the world of the novel is ironic because at no point in history have there been
so many resources available for making life as easy as possible. Indeed, technology has
improved the quality of life for the masses, and in doing so, it has displaced them. In The
Clown of Armageddon, Peter Freese perceptively suggests, “human beings cannot live
without some kind of meaning and sense of purpose, and consequently the characters of
the novel are continually haunted by the one, all-important question—what are people
for?” (94).When Paul attempts to express to his wife, Anita, his feelings of guilt and
shame for developing the machine which leads the eventual unemployment of Rudy
Hertz, she asks, “Is he starving?” “Of course not. Nobody starves” (37) he replies, and
while this settles the matter for Anita, Paul is sensitive enough to see the larger
philosophical implications of his work. Food, shelter, and gadgetry are not adequate
trade-offs for a sense of dignity and purpose.
In the novel, Vonnegut creates a deeply-divided society in which the options are
to become either an engineer or manager, a calling only granted to the select few, to
develop a skill in an area which is so specialized that it can’t be adequately performed by
a machine, or to join the “Reeks and Wrecks.” As he explains, “those who couldn’t
complete economically with machines had their choice, if they had no source of income,
of the Army or the Reconstruction and Reclamation Corps” (25). The latter is the only
option available to the bulk of the population, and as such, it’s really not much of an
option at all. Social mobility is all but extinct, and the rags-to-riches-style success stories
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which have long been central to the American success narrative have become as
preposterous as fairy tales.
I emphasize America because Vonnegut is intentionally lampooning his own
culture. Throughout the novel, the plot is intercut with a parallel narrative, that of the
Shah of Bratpuhr, who travels to America “to see what he could learn in the most
powerful nation on earth for the good of his people” (19-20). When the Shah visits the
home of Edgar R.B. Hagstrom to see how an average member of the Reeks and Wrecks
lives, readers are afforded a glimpse into the daily life of an everyman, one which is
loaded with top-of-the-line appliances and conveniences. Of course, these gadgets are
not enough to make life meaningful, or even bearable. “Listen, it’s the world,” Edgar
tells his wife, Wanda, in a scene which mirrors Paul’s earlier conversation with Anita.
“Me and the world. I’m no good to anybody, not in this world. Nothing but a Reek and
Wreck, and that’s all my kids’ll be, and a guy’s got to have kicks or he doesn’t want to
live … I’m no good, Wan, no good” (167).
Paul’s heroism lies in the eventual acceptance of his own role in creating a world
overrun with Edgar Hagstroms. “In order to get what we’ve got,” he begs Anita to
realize, “we have, in effect, traded these people out of what was the most important thing
on earth to them—the feeling of being needed and useful, the foundation of self-respect”
(175). The epiphany, though, comes too late, and while Paul’s attempt at revolution is
ultimately futile, what matters is that he tries. “If only it weren’t for the people, the
goddamned people, always getting tangled up in the machinery” (332) Paul’s friend and
mentor Ed Finnerty utters at the end of the novel, yet his rhetorical complaint is
triumphantly celebratory. It is, after all, the people who matter most. What makes the
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world so inhospitable is those in charge often forget this fact, in Vonnegut’s fiction and in
our own world.
Gregory D. Sumner explores Player Piano’s autobiographical antecedents and
calls the novel “a commentary on the scientifically engineered future Vonnegut saw
being born every day at the GE lab” (22) where he was employed during the 1950s.
Likewise, Ginger Strand contextualizes the booming GE culture which Vonnegut is
satirizing. By the early 1950s, General Electric’s best inventors had become “too
spellbound by their shiny, mechanical toys, too enthralled by their exciting new science
to consider its effect on real human lives” (206). Perhaps the singular most important
achievement of Vonnegut’s first novel is that it transcends satire and gets at a much more
universal philosophical truth—a clear sense of purpose is a necessity, not just for the
good life, but for life on any terms. While he would return to this theme in many of his
most important later novels (including Cat’s Cradle and Slaughterhouse-Five), Player
Piano remains an essential work, largely because it first poses the very questions
Vonnegut would spend the rest of his career attempting to answer.
Finding Purpose in The Sirens of Titan and God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater
Vonnegut’s second novel reveals an important shift in focus. Player Piano
addresses the corrupting power of institutions, the implication being that the good life is
possible through societal change. With The Sirens of Titan and God Bless You, Mr.
Rosewater, Vonnegut turns his attention to the individual, suggesting that purpose amidst
the chaos of uncertainty is a personal matter, one which should not…and one which
cannot… be dictated by the world outside of self. Both novels are central to
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understanding Vonnegut’s systematic view of life, and my goal here is to explore the
individual search for purpose which frames both novels.
The Sirens of Titan is deceptively complex and highly ambitious, in both its scope
and its attempt to offer a self-contained, unified world view. It is here that Vonnegut
offers his first systematic view of human existence, and in doing so, he provides a much
more cohesive answer to the question of “what are people for?” than in Player Piano.
“Everyone now knows,” he begins, “how to find the meaning of life within himself. But
mankind wasn’t always so lucky. Less than a century ago men and women did not have
easy access to the puzzle boxes within them” (1). As in Player Piano, the setting remains
somewhat ambiguous, but the predicament is the same—life has become utterly
meaningless.
“Malachi Constant of Hollywood, California, the richest American” (5) serves as
the novel’s protagonist, yet as Vonnegut points out, “money, position, health,
handsomeness, and talent aren’t everything” (7). Much like Paul Proteus, Malachi is illat-ease in affluence. Unlike Paul, though, he knows exactly what he wants: “a single
message that was sufficiently dignified and important to merit his carrying it between two
points” (12). Importantly, it’s not the message Malachi yearns for but rather a role in
“carrying” that message. In other words, purpose, not truth, is what he seeks.
Every fifty-nine days, Winston Niles Rumfoord, who, along with his dog, Kazak,
has become lost in an intergalactic chrono-synclastic infundibula, materializes briefly on
earth, and his appearances are regarded with a sense of religious wonder. People travel
from all over in order to witness his miraculous materializations, and the gatherings often
turn violent. As one angry member of the crowd tells Malachi, just before he meets

22

Rumfoord for the first time, “We’ve got a right to know what’s going on!” As Vonnegut
explains, the gatherings result from “a seeking after clues by the living as to what life was
all about” (39) The fact that the gathering in question takes place in the shadow of a giant
billboard which proclaims “LET’S TAKE A FRIEND TO THE CHURCH OF OUR
CHOICE ON SUNDAY!” illustrates the inadequacies of religion at providing the
answers to life’s questions.
In Sanity Plea: Schizophrenia in the Novels of Kurt Vonnegut, Lawrence R. Broer
presents a compelling argument that The Sirens of Titan is a warning of a possible/likely
future and “to intensify our awareness of the madness of our present lives” (29). In the
“now” of the novel, madness certainly reigns supreme, due in large part to life’s overall
meaninglessness. Perhaps the most illustrative example of the novel’s general spiritual
tone comes from Ransom K. Fern, President of Magnum Opus Corporation. “You go up
to a man, and you say, ‘How are things going, Joe?’ And he says, ‘Oh fine, fine—
couldn’t be better.’ And you look into his eyes, and you see things really couldn’t be
much worse” (66). As he interprets the human predicament, “When you get right down
to it, everybody’s having a perfectly lousy time of it, and I mean everybody. And the hell
of it is, nothing seems to help much” (66). After delivering a letter to Malachi from his
father, one which was written years before with the instructions that it be opened only in
the event on an emergency, Fern implores, “If the letter seems to cast the vaguest light on
what life might be about, I would appreciate your telephoning me at home” (83). Fern’s
damning flaw, like so many characters in the novel, is passivity. Vonnegut suggests that
meaning and purpose must be actively created rather than passively sought.
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In this midst of this broad social ennui, Rumfoord’s attraction is that his
intergalactic accident allows him to exists inside and outside time, and as such, he can see
all time periods at once: “When I ran my space ship into the chrono-synclastic
infundibula, it came to me in a flash that everything that ever has been always will be,
and everything that ever will be always has been” (20). When he tells Malachi that he
will travel to Mars, Mercury, and Titan, he is not offering a prophecy; he is explaining
what happens in a different moment. What Malachi yearns for is a sense of usefulness,
not freedom, and rather than fighting against the inevitable, he prepares for a new life.
On Mars, Malachi has his brain cleaned, a customary procedure conducted on all
new recruits in order to make them obedient Martian soldiers. For all practical purposes,
Malachi Constant has been erased. The younger soldiers refer to him simply as “Unk,”
which becomes his new identity. While on Mars, he meets Boaz, a commander in the
Martian Army, and through a complicated series of events, they end up stranded in a cave
deep beneath Mercury’s surface, where they are imprisoned for three years. It is here that
Boaz discovers a sense of usefulness which for the first time gives his life meaning. The
cave is inhabited by thousands of completely unintelligent kite-shaped creatures know as
harmoniums, and during his captivity Boaz forms a deep bond with these creatures, so
much so that he becomes “God Almighty” (204) to them. He is unable to communicate
with these creatures, but this doesn’t bother him in the least. Their feeble helplessness
endears them to him, and as their metaphoric God, he devotes himself completely to their
safety and happiness.
Years later, once Unk discovers a way out, Boaz is forced to make a decision—he
can either escape or remain entombed with the harmoniums. As he explains, “I found me
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a place where I can do good without doing harm, and I can see I’m doing good, and them
I’m doing good for know I’m doing it, and they love me, Unk, as best they can. I found
me a home” (217). Among the harmoniums, Boaz has found a way to be of use, and in
doing so, he’s discovered a clear purpose for his life, something which makes existence
meaningful.
Eliot Rosewater finds himself caught in a similar philosophical situation in God
Bless You, Mr. Rosewater. Like Malachi, he is extremely wealthy, yet he makes the
mistake, at least initially, of thinking the world’s problems can be solved financially. His
aimless wanderings in search of purpose through the first section of the novel are viewed
by his family (particularly his wife and father) as eccentric, but when he begins
suggesting “how the government ought to divide up the wealth of the country equally,
instead of some people having more than they could ever use, and others having nothing”
(38), he becomes a threat to the family fortune of which he is heir.
In time, Eliot discovers meaning: “I’m going to care about these people,” he says,
referring to the citizens of Rosewater County, Indiana. “I look at these people, these
Americans, and I realize that they can’t care about themselves any more—because they
have no use. The factory, the farms, the mines across the river—they’re almost
completely automatic …I’m going to love these discarded Americans, even though
they’re useless and unattractive. That is going to be my work of art” (43-4). Eliot’s
greatest gift to the people of Rosewater County is actually listening to them. He
establishes the Rosewater Foundation for the sole purpose of helping others, and in doing
so he acknowledges their worth. The citizens of Rosewater County, like the Reeks and
Wrecks, have no purpose, and the dignity which Eliot shows them produces miraculous,
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almost magical, results. Diana Moon Glampers revels, “Dawn Leonard had boils for ten
years, and you cured ‘em. Ned Calvin had that twitch in his eye since he was a little boy,
and you made it stop. Pearl Flemming came and saw you, and you threw her crutch
away. And now my kidneys have stopped hurting, just hearing your sweet voice” (78).
Eliot’s genuine compassion makes him a frumpy savior of sorts for the inhabitants of
Rosewater County, the land of “shithouses, shacks, alcoholism, ignorance, idiocy, and
perversion” (48).
Both Eliot and Boaz are self-appointed messianic figures. They create
communities of compassion which provide meaning for themselves and others. In this
sense, the Rosewater Foundation is a reimagining of Boaz’s cave experience. Kilgore
Trout, who makes his debut in God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, sums up Eliot’s
accomplishment as such: “If one man can do it, perhaps others can do it, too. It means
that our hatred of useless human beings and the cruelty we inflict upon them, for their
own good need not be parts of human nature. Thanks to the example of Eliot Rosewater,
millions upon millions may learn to love and help whomever they see” (269). Finally,
Eliot’s greatest achievement is not discovering a purpose for life but inspiring others to
do the same, on their own terms.
Happy Birthday, Wanda June: Learning to Say “Yes”
Player Piano and The Sirens of Titan, Vonnegut’s first two novels, raise serious
questions about the meaning of life, and God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater illustrates how a
fulfilling life can be a work of art.

All three works directly address the perquisite

conditions necessary for living the good life. In the sections which follow, I will be
exploring two later works: 1971’s Happy Birthday, Wanda June and 1990’s Hocus
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Pocus, both of which take up the same philosophical questions in radically different
ways. It’s important to note at this point that between these two sets of works, Vonnegut
published Slaughterhouse-Five in 1969, and the success of that novel would prove
simultaneously liberating and limiting.
At the time of Slaughterhouse-Five’s publication during the Vietnam War,
Vonnegut’s anti-war novel hit an exposed societal nerve, particularly within the
counterculture movement. Indeed, Vonnegut became not just a successful writer; he
became an overnight sensation. Shields explains that as early as the summer of 1969,
young people from across the country began making pilgrimages to Vonnegut’s Cape
Cod home, just to catch a glimpse of their new hero (255-6).
Artistically, Vonnegut found himself in a bit of a Foucaultean paradox. For the
first time in his career, he was both wealthy and internationally famous, which allowed
him the freedom to write without concerning himself with sales. At the same time, fame
made Vonnegut’s name synonymous with a set of conventions readers would expect for
the rest of his career. In “What is an Author?,” Foucault addresses the impact authorial
presence has on texts, noting, “an author’s name is not simply an element of speech (as a
subject, a complement, or an element that could be replaced by a pronoun or other parts
of speech). Its presence is functional in that it serves as a means of classification” (1627).
The downside of Vonnegut’s fame is that his fiction became a classifiable genre unto
itself. Tellingly, Vonnegut’s response was to abandon novel writing, at least
temporarily, and turn to drama.
Over the years, 1971’s Happy Birthday, Wanda June has received little serious
critical attention, a fact which can be attributed largely, it seems, to two points: 1): it
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remains the only major full-length work by Vonnegut to go out of print (until Dell’s 2020
reissue), and 2) as a play, it is regarded as something of an anomaly among his other
novels, short stories, and essays. William Rodney Allen dismisses the work altogether,
referring to it as Vonnegut’s “most embarrassing artistic failure” (142). I intend to argue
that Happy Birthday Wanda June is not only a major work, one which is deserves far
more attention than it has received to date, but on a deeper level it also serves as one of
Vonnegut’s most life-affirming works. By the end of the play, Harold Ryan undergoes a
profound change, one which shatters his perceptions of what life is and allows him to
discover a radically new purpose for existence.
In his introduction, Vonnegut explains that Happy Birthday, Wanda June is
actually a rewritten version of a play he wrote years before titled Penelope, which was
inspired by both The Odyssey and prevalent mid-century views of masculinity. “Ernest
Hemingway was still alive and seemingly well. So I felt free to imagine a modern
Odysseus who was a lot like that part of Hemingway I detested—the slayer of nearly
extinct animals which meant him no harm” (viii). The curtain opens on Penelope,
Harold’s wife, who matter-of-factly informs the audience, “This is a simple-minded play
about men who enjoy killing—and those who don’t” (1). Her husband, we learn, has
been missing for eight years, his plane having disappeared over the Amazon Rain Forrest
while in search of diamonds and riches. In the interim, Penelope has raised their young
son, Paul, on her own. In Harold’s absence, his “presence” has dominated the home,
filling young Paul’s mind with fantasies of what his father must be like. These lofty
paternal expectations are starkly contrasted by Penelope’s two suiters—Herb Shuttle, an
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impressionable vacuum cleaner salesman, and Norbert Woodly, a sensitive, intellectual
physician—both of whom Paul finds intolerable and pathetic.
If Happy Birthday, Wanda June has a shortcoming, it is one of characterization.
Harold, Herb, and Dr. Woodly are, at their core, exaggerated stock characters, giving the
play an almost allegorical feel at times. To unpack the rather obvious metaphor, Herb
Shuttle is a stand-in for commerce, Norbert Woodly represents contemporary male
sensitivity and scientific (in this case, medical) progress, and Harold Ryan is an over-thetop caricature of the absolute worst masculine qualities, pure chauvinistic ID. He is a
blood-thirsty, brutal, crass, violent, perpetually horny blowhard with no redeemable
qualities. These caricatures are offset by Colonel Looseleaf Harper, Harold’s sidekick.
He is a broken man, a victim of perpetual grief. Life became alien to him after he
dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki during WWII, killing 74,000 men, women, and
children instantly. When asked about his role in this atrocity, all he can do is fidget and
mumble, “I dunno, boy. It was a bitch” (2-3). In the opening chapter of SlaughterhouseFive, Vonnegut is apologetic about the “short and jumbled and jangled” nature of the
novel, yet he has little choice since “there’s nothing intelligent to say about a massacre”
(24). Perhaps Looseleaf Harper is best understood as the personification of this
incommunicability.
Harold’s homecoming is disastrous because there’s nothing else it could be.
Odysseus he is not. Penelope’s suitors are too incompetent to deserve a seat at her table,
but then again, so is Harold. When read as an allegory for modernity, the play reveals
that humanity is deeply flawed, and this, of course, is a nihilistic sentiment Vonnegut will
explore in much bleaker terms in his later fiction.
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The central problem all Wanda June’s characters face is their own lack of a clear
purpose. They neither resist nor rebel. I wholeheartedly agree with Stanley Schatt that
the most morally courageous character in the play is Penelope (138), yet she too is
profoundly flawed. In the eight years her husband has been away, she has been unable
adjust to life without him, and the suitors she invites into her life are kinder, for sure, but
overall not much better. When Harold returns, like Odysseus he manages to easily drive
out the suitors, but in doing so, he also drives out Penelope. His purpose in life is to
maintain the stereotypical notions of masculinity by acting as he feels a man is supposed
to act. This can best be seen when he forces a gun into the hands of his young son and
exclaims, “Welcome to manhood, you little sparrowfart! Load that gun” (172). All of
Harold’s beliefs and actions are clichéd, yet they lend a structure to his life by offering
him a part to play. In that sense, all the world really is a stage to Harold Ryan.
What’s remarkable about Happy Birthday, Wanda June is the change which takes
place in the final act. The case could be made that the majority of Vonnegut’s characters
are largely static. Change is always a possibility in Vonnegut’s world, of course, but with
a few notable exceptions, most of the men and women he writes about are too weary and
too damaged by life to open themselves up to its possibility. Penelope asks one small
request of her husband upon his return: “I want you to tell me that you loved me once. I
mean it! I must have that, and so must Paul. Tell him that he was conceived in love …
Tell us both that somewhere in our lives was love” (166). For the first time in the play,
and perhaps his life, Harold’s confidence is shaken. Vonnegut writes, “Harold
experiments inwardly with responses of various kinds, obviously saying them to himself,
directing himself with his hands. Nothing quite satisfies him.” Finally, all is he able to
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mutter is, “Testimonials of that sort are—are beyond my range. I don’t do them well”
(166). In a single moment, Harold Ryan has finally encountered a task for which he is
inadequate.
In the final scene, Dr. Woodly returns for the confrontation which concludes the
play. The doctor refuses to be baited into a physical altercation, which is of course what
Harold wants because the physical realm is all he has ever known. Anything which can’t
be killed or fucked is beyond his comprehension. Dr. Woodly realizes this, and instead
attacks his sense of self. “You’re a clown. You’re a clown who kills—but you’re a
clown …Evolution has made you a clown—with a cigar. Simple butchers like you are
obsolete” (189). While Harold is fine being regarded as evil, he is unable to accept being
seen as silly, yet that’s what precisely what he is. His grand gesturing is absurd, and on
some level he has always known it. He’s devoted his entire life to unquestionably
serving ridiculous codes of clichéd masculinity, and these outdated codes have given his
life purpose. “I put a poison thought in your head,” Woodly adds as he concludes his
verbal assault. “Even now that poison is seeping into every lobe of your mind. It’s
saying, ‘Obsolete, obsolete, obsolete,’ and, ‘Clown, clown, clown’” (191).
During this exchange, Harold has held a loaded rifle, and when faced with the
realization that he is absurd, the broken man walks off stage. “Tell Penelope I loved
her—in my clownish way. And Paul. Tell him to be a healer,” he tells Dr. Woodly as he
exits. Realizing what is about to take place, and that given what has just transpired, there
is only one thing which a man like Harold Ryan could do, the doctor asks for the gun.
Seconds later, a shot rings out.
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Schatt interprets the gunshot as follows: “Vonnegut also deflates any trace of
Ryan’s heroism by having him go into another room to shoot himself in much the same
way that Hemingway’s death occurred. Unlike Hemingway, though, Ryan misses at
point blank rage” (138). He goes on to add, “It is only by showing him mishandle his
suicide that Vonnegut can ridicule everything the modern hero has come to represent”
(142). I’d like to offer a radically different interpretation of this scene. Harold, it seems
to me, doesn’t “mishandle” his suicide attempt, and Vonnegut doesn’t ridicule him.
Rather, Harold intentionally misses, and in doing so, says yes to a new life, one in which
he will be forced to change if he is to survive. Earlier in the play, when Colonel Harper
is lamenting his role in the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Harold assures him that it was
“the one direct, decisive, intelligent act of your life.” “It could have been,” Colonel
Harper responds, “if I hadn’t done it. If I’d said to myself, ‘Screw it. I’m going to tell all
those people down there to live,’” to which Harold replies, “They were enemies. We
were at war” (161-2). What makes Harold an ultimately redeemable character is that he
is able to do on a personal level what Colonel Harper could not, which is to choose life
over death.
The final words of the play are, “I missed” (199), and in uttering them, he is
referring to both the shot and his life. Life can begin again, but it will require a new
purpose, a sense of Camusian resistance. His relationships with Penelope, Paul, and
Colonel Looseleaf Harper may be irreparably damaged, but the possibility of
reconciliation is there. Harold may not be able to say “yes” to tomorrow, but at least he
is able to affirm life in the moment, and in Vonnegut’s world, that’s a victory of the
highest order.
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Hocus Pocus: A Study of a Life in Retreat
Eugene Debs Hartke, the protagonist of Hocus Pocus, has a good deal in common
with Harold Ryan. Both men have become victims of their own pasts. If such a thing is
possible, Gene is even more vicious in his military conquests, more dedicated to his
sexual exploits, yet neither are points of great pride. At the same time, neither are they
sources of shame. They simply were, and are, part of his story. The problem is that they
are the only parts that seem to matter much to him.
Hocus Pocus is written in the form of a severely disjointed autobiography. Like
Howard W. Campbell Jr. in Mother Night, Gene is awaiting trial. He is charged with
helping plan a prison break at the New York State Maximum Security Adult Correctional
Institution. While he is innocent of this crime, he is indifferent to clearing his name or
gaining his freedom, as life in “a country in such an advanced state of physical and
spiritual and intellectual dilapidation” (283) is hardly worth living.
If the texts previously discussed in this chapter can be read as studies on the
necessity of individual purpose, Hocus Pocus is an extended meditation on the damning
fruits of a purposeless existence. Susan Farrell observes, “Like many Vonnegut
characters, Hartke seems to be a prisoner of fate, locked in a downward spiral, a pawn of
history rather than a shaper of it” (Critical Companion 186). Joseph Ward places the root
source of Gene’s problem much closer to home, writing, “Unable to accept the absurdity
of his condition, he becomes a prisoner of his own mind” (89). What defines Gene,
however, is his lack of interest in making sense of the world and his place in it. Prison
for him is as much a spiritual metaphor as it is a physical realty, and in a Camusian sense,
he represents the life lived without resistance or revolt in the midst of absurdity.
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A recurring question, one which Gene ponders in depth throughout his life, allows
the reader to understand is existential predicament: “What is this place and who are these
people and what am I doing here?” (256). This is precisely the question he can’t get past,
no matter his station in life, whether it be serving in Vietnam, caring for his deranged
wife and mother-in-law, teaching at Tarkington College and the New York State Maxim
Security Adult Correctional Institution, acting as warden of Tarkington State
Reformatory, or finding temporary respite in the arms and beds of dozens of lonely
middle-aged women as baffled by life as himself.
Like Harold Ryan, for Gene life is neatly divided into two categories: killing and
fucking. Far from being at opposite ends of human experience, Gene draws no real
distinction between the two acts. At this center of this narrative is his attempt to compile
two lists, the first being the number of people he has killed and the second being the
number he has slept with. As he explains: “I have been wondering lately how many
human beings I actually killed with conventional weaponry. I don’t believe it was my
conscience which suggested I do this. It was the list of women I was making, trying to
remember all the names and faces and places and dates, which led to the logical question:
‘Why not a list of all you’ve killed?’ So I think I will” (152). When asked by his defense
attorney why he would bother, he responds, “To speed things up on Judgement Day”
before confiding, in all seriousness, that he would like to be buried with both lists just in
case there really is an afterlife and there actually is a Judgement Day (153). The fact that
the lists end up with exactly the same number of names in both columns only underscores
how equally adept he is at each.
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That’s not to say, though, that Gene is sociopathic. Far from it. His military and
sexual exploits are sharply contrasted by his years of service as an educator, first at
Tarkington College and then at the prison across the lake. In this capacity, he does his
best to expose his students to the truth, even when it is bleak. “I see no harm,” he
explains, “in telling young people to prepare for failure rather than success, since failure
is the main thing that is going to happen to them” (54). One of the qualities which makes
him such a wildly popular teacher is that he has long had the pretense kicked out of him
by life, and he is left with no sense of entitlement or superiority. The fact that Tarkington
College is founded on a commitment of service to students with severe mental
deficiencies and that most of the prisoners across the lake are illiterate and culturally
ignorant only reinforces his broken worldview: “the worst flaw [in the human character]
is that we’re just plain dumb. Admit it! You think Auschwitz was intelligent?” (238).
In many ways, Hocus Pocus remains Vonnegut’s most uncharacteristic work. For
his penultimate novel, and for the first and only time in his entire career, Vonnegut goes
to great lengths to intentionally distance his voice from and minimize his presence within
the narrative. In “The Death of the Author,” Barthes describes the creative phenomenon
which results in “the Author diminishing like a figuring at the far end of the literary
stage,” and by doing so, “the text is henceforth made and read in such a way that at all
levels the author is absent” (1467-8). In a Barthean sense, Vonnegut is
uncharacteristically dead in Hocus Pocus. He forgoes his standard personal introduction
and replaces it with a brief editor’s note, which he signs simply KV. Significantly,
Vonnegut relegates himself to an editorial position, and rather than acting as a creator, he
becomes a conveyer. He even goes so far as to describe his editorial choices regarding
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changes in spelling and capitalization. Yet, it is inevitably a personal novel as well.
Gene Hartke shares a good deal in common with his creator in a philosophical sense.
“That is how you get to be a writer, incidentally,” Vonnegut explains in Palm Sunday.
“You somehow feel marginal, somehow slightly off-balance all the time” (59).
“Sometimes,” he later adds, “I don’t consider myself good at life, so I hide in my
profession” (293). Hocus Pocus is the study of a man in full retreat from life. The trial
that Gene awaits is as metaphoric as it is literal, and his indifference to its outcome serves
as a chilling warning about the dangers of hiding in professions, in wars, in beds, and
from life itself. To return to the first words of Vonnegut’s first novel: “This book is not a
book about what is but a book about what could be.” If Player Piano is a warning about
the type of world we could one day inhabit, Hocus Pocus is a warning about the type of
person we could one day become.

Both Camus and Vonnegut ultimately found themselves in positions of revered
authority, roles both writers rejected. In Albert Camus: Elements of a Life, Robert
Zeretsky explains, “Camus’s writings have become guides for the perplexed—a status
that left Camus uncomfortable. ‘I speak for no one,’ he insisted. ‘I have enough
difficulty speaking for myself’” (7). Robert Short goes even further. “Vonnegut is us,”
he writes. “In many typical ways, Vonnegut, in his experience and thinking, has come
from where most of us have come and has gone through what most of us—in one way or
another—has gone through” 66). It is precisely this type of assessment which led to a
“circuit breaker” in Vonnegut’s head to blow in the early 1970s, effectively ending his
public speaking career at the time (Wampeters xiii).
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Player Piano, The Sirens of Titan, God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, Happy
Birthday, Wanda June, and Hocus Pocus are radically different works, each with a style,
tone, and point of view all its own. Yet they share the singular vision of a unique artist,
one who often struggles and bumbles through life like the rest of us, even as he writes
about it. Each text attempts to answer the question first raised by Camus and later by the
unknown graffiti artist whose work Trout encounters on the wall of the New York City
men’s room—what is the purpose of life? A 1972 letter to his first wife, Jane, written
recently after the couple’s separation, provides an intimate glimpse into Vonnegut’s
personal life. As he writes, at the end of a life together they found themselves “[…]in a
world we never made, in bodies we never asked for, with heads we only dimly
understand …” (Letters 189). In a letter he likely never imagined would one day be
published, Vonnegut provides a perfect description of what life feels like, for him and for
so many of his characters. On a basic level, the purpose of life is to find purpose, and to
create meaning where and when there is none. This is the foundation upon which the
good life is built, and it is a central principle at the heart of Vonnegut’s fiction. As we
shall see in the next chapter, self-deception can be both helpful and necessary in bringing
order to the chaos of existence.
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CHAPTER II:
ON TRUTH AND FOMA IN A NECESSARY SENSE:
THE VALUE OF PERSPECTIVAL ILLUSION IN MODERNITY
Entombed in a cave 116 miles beneath Mercury’s alternatingly fire-hot and icecold deserted surface, Unk and Boaz, two lost souls in Vonnegut’s The Sirens of Titan,
have little to live for, and even less to believe in. The possibility of escape seems remote
at best, and as days turn to months which then turn to years, both men have only illusions
to make existence bearable. As we’ve seen in the previous chapter, Boaz finds purpose
through messianic delusions of becoming “God Almighty” to the thousands upon
thousands of mindless, kite-shaped harmoniums which populate the desolate caves of
Mercury. Meanwhile, the deception which keeps Unk going is his belief that one day he
will be reunited with his wife, Bee, his son, Chrono, and his best (and only) friend, Stony
Stevenson. Unbeknownst to Unk, while under the control of a radio antenna which had
been planted into his skull on a Martian military base hospital, and which controls his
every action, earlier he had strangled Stony to death only to have the memory erased.
“Don’t truth me,” Boaz begs Unk, “and I won’t truth you” (205). Repeatedly in
Vonnegut’s world, to “truth” someone is the cruelest of all possible acts. There on
Mercury, the only thing which makes life bearable for Unk and Boaz is artifice, or,
simply put, illusion.
For Nietzsche, as for Vonnegut, illusion and self-deception play an important role
as well. Written almost a decade after the publication of the first volume of Human, All
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Too Human, Nietzsche’s backward-looking preface of 1886 offers the following
uncharacteristically vulnerable glimpse into his personal past : “Thus when I needed to I
once also invented for myself the ‘free spirits’ to whom this melancholy-valiant book …
is dedicated; free spirits of this kind do not exist, did not exist—but as I have said, I had
need of them at that time… (6). This is precisely the type of individualistic artifice,
based in illusion, to which so many of Vonnegut’s characters turn.
In this chapter, I will be focusing on self-deception and how foma, or “harmless”
lies, are frequently necessary to make life bearable in Vonnegut’s fiction. The central
texts I’ll be exploring are Cat’s Cradle, Slaughterhouse-Five, and Galapagos. As for
Nietzsche, I’ll be working closely with “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral
Sense,” Human, All Too Human, The Gay Science, and Beyond Good and
Evil. Vonnegut differs from Nietzsche significantly in this way—rather than viewing the
herd as something which should be overcome on the path to becoming a free spirit,
Vonnegut is an advocate for rendering herd life meaningful. Few Zarathustras exist in
Vonnegut’s world, and his message is written for not those atop the mountain, but rather,
for those of us who spend our lives in its shadow.
Vonnegut’s Nietzsche: Making the Best of the Toilsome Present
“Insofar as they want to alleviate the life of men, poets either turn their eyes away from
the toilsome present or they procure for the present new colours through a light which
they direct upon it from the past. To be able to do this, they themselves have to be in
many respects backwards-looking creatures”
Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human
“And Lot’s wife, of course, was told not to look back … But she did look back, and I
love her for that, because it was so human. I’ve finished my war book now. The next
one I write is going to be fun. This one is a failure, and had to be, since it was written by
a pillar of salt”
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Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse-Five
Much has been written about the influence of Twain on Vonnegut’s work, and
Vonnegut freely acknowledges his debt to the mustachioed master from Mississippi.
Philosophically, however, Nietzsche’s influence on Vonnegut’s work is unmistakable,
and one which is under-explored. From a critical perspective, I’d like to first establish
that Vonnegut was in fact familiar with Nietzsche’s work.
In a 1978 graduation speech at Fredonia College, Vonnegut offered the following
to the graduating class: “As for boredom: Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, a German
philosopher who died seventy-eight years ago, had this to say: ‘Against boredom even the
gods contend in vain.’ We are supposed to be bored. It is part of life” (Palm Sunday
168). Vonnegut also referenced Nietzsche in a Unitarian Universalist sermon he
delivered in 1986: “Nietzsche said, in effect, that only a person of great faith can afford to
be a skeptic.” Of particular importance here is Vonnegut’s accompanying comment that
this Nietzschean nugget “justifies the spiritual condition of myself, my Indiana ancestors,
and my children” (Fates 157). Loree Rackstraw, Vonnegut’s former student and longtime friend, further solidifies the philosophical underpinnings of Vonnegut’s work:
“While he shunned the notion of being an intellectual and denied that he’d been a serious
scholar of philosophers like Nietzsche or Goethe, he had read these writers, and their
philosophies did lurk beneath the surface of his own life and work” (Love as Always 64).
Another example of Vonnegut’s familiarity with Nietzsche can be found in his
voluminous correspondence. As he writes in a 1990 letter to Ben Hitz, “It wasn’t until I
was sixty-four that I came across a statement by Nietzsche that I could articulate why
committed Christians and Jews sometimes find me respectable: ‘Only a person of deep
40

faith can afford the luxury of skepticism’” (Letters 340). What’s important here is not the
quote itself so much as the way it reveals Vonnegut’s ongoing reading of Nietzsche’s
philosophy throughout his career as a novelist.
Paradoxically, Vonnegut’s most directly candid musings on Nietzsche come from
an obscure, seldomly-referenced Hustler interview titled “Kurt Vonnegut Visits a Strip
Club” which took place in The Gentleman’s Lounge in Lincoln, Nebraska on Vonnegut’s
69th birthday. To date, this interview is only available on Hustler’s website. While he
nibbles on cookies Kevin P. Simonson, the interviewer, stuffed in his coat pocket at
Vonnegut’s University of Nebraska lecture earlier in the evening, Vonnegut waxes poetic
on Nietzsche. Here, he offers the same quote about skepticism found in his letter to Hitz,
and when asked “What attracted you to Nietzsche?,” he responds, “Just random reading
and pulling the book off the shelf. I started reading him when I was about 35. He didn’t
have anything to do with the shape of my career because I was already fully established.”
At 35 Vonnegut’s career was admittedly “fully established” in the sense that he
was earning enough from his short fiction which regularly appeared in The Saturday
Evening Post and Collier’s (among other popular “slicks”) that he was able to quit his
public relations job at General Electric and devote his attention to writing full-time. He
refers to these shorter works as “the fruits of Free Enterprise” which he “sold in order to
finance the writing of the novels” (Monkey House xiv). At the moment he first
encountered Nietzsche, Cat’s Cradle was in a long period of gestation. Of the novels I
explore in this chapter, Cat’s Cradle, published in 1963, is the earliest. At the time of its
publication, Vonnegut would have been 40. However, a 1953 letter to Harry Brague
shows that Vonnegut was working on the idea for the novel a full decade earlier, when he
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was 30. In other words, he became a life-long student of Nietzsche precisely during the
completion of his first undisputed “major” work.
I would argue that Nietzsche’s influence extends far beyond Cat’s Cradle, and
informs most of his mature—and certainly all of his most philosophical—work.
Specifically, the problem Nietzsche inherited was how to make sense of the world after
the collapse of the Enlightenment project. As his madman famously asks in Book Three
of The Gay Science, “Do we still smell nothing of the divine decomposition?—Gods, too,
decompose! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!” Even more
important, however, is the madman’s next question: “How can we console ourselves, the
murderers of all murderers?” (120). This, I would argue, is the question which Nietzsche
spent his entire life answering, and if his often-contradictory edicts have a unifying
strand, it is in offering a systematic answer to this question—in modernity, how does the
individual affirm life? What is there to offer consolation?
A century later, Vonnegut inherited the same philosophical question, under
radically different circumstances. More to the point, Vonnegut was faced with the
following dilemma—how can the individual affirm life in a godless universe and in an
age where wholesale nuclear destruction is not only possible even likely? As he states in
a 1970 commencement speech at Bennington College:
I fully expected that by the time I was twenty-one, some scientist, maybe my
brother, would have taken a color photograph of God-Almighty…Scientific truth
was going to make us so happy and comfortable. What actually happened when I
was twenty-one was that we dropped scientific truth on Hiroshima. We killed
everybody there. And I had just come home from being a prisoner of war in
Dresden, which I’d seen burned to the ground…So I had a heart-to-heart talk with
myself. “Hey Corporal Vonnegut,” I said to myself, “maybe you were wrong to
be an optimist. Maybe pessimism is the thing.” I have been a consistent pessimist
ever since… (Wampeters 163).
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Pessimism aside, both Vonnegut and Nietzsche are staunchly anti-nihilistic. Keith Ansell
Pearson and Duncan Large regard Human, All Too Human as a particularly important
text, the first of a trilogy (followed by Daybreak and The Gay Science) which focuses on
the “free spirit” and reveals Nietzsche “coming to terms with what he regards as the end
of metaphysics” (153). It is in Human, All Too Human that he most fiercely rejects
nihilism as a response to modernity. Indeed, there is no greater single impediment to the
good life than nihilism for Nietzsche. Consider, for instance, his grave warning from
Beyond Good and Evil: “There may actually be puritanical fanatics of conscience who
prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain something to lie down on—and die. But this
is nihilism and the sign of a despairing, mortally weary soul—” (16). For Nietzsche, the
pursuit of absolute “certainty” is a fool’s errand, and clearly this is one of the most
postmodern dimensions of his work. Part of his philosophical project involves embracing
uncertainty without becoming “mortally weary”—that way, after all, lies despair.
Like Beyond Good and Evil, Cat’s Cradle also offers a pointed refutation of
nihilism. While on a trip to gather research for his book titled The Day the World Ended,
Jonah, the novel’s narrator, agrees to let a struggling poet named Sherman Krebbs borrow
his apartment. Krebbs, “a bearded man, a platinum blond Jesus with spaniel eyes” (77),
destroys Jonah’s apartment in a spree of “nihilistic debauch” (77), and in the process kills
Jonah’s cat, leaving a note around the dead animal’s neck—“meow.” No explanation is
given for the absurd carnage, which includes the following nonsensical message written
in lipstick on the wall above the bed: “No, no, no, said Chicken-licken.” There can be no
explanation. As noted in the previous chapter, the absurd is the inherited condition of
modernity, and Jonah learns what Billy Pilgrim ultimately discovers in Slaughterhouse43

Five—“there is no why” (97). The moment serves as a spiritual awakening for Jonah,
though, and after experiencing the ugly Dionysian debauchery Krebbs left in his wake, he
realizes that “nihilism was not for me” (78). Ultimately, it’s not until he is completely
willing to denounce nihilism that Jonah is able to find any sense of meaning in life, even
if that meaning is based on the harmless untruths of Bokononism.
The question which must next be addressed is which Nietzsche most informed the
philosophical dimensions of Vonnegut’s thought. Certainly, no English-language scholar
has done more to shape contemporary Nietzsche studies than Walter Kauffmann, who
argues that “in Nietzsche’s case, there is not even a basic agreement about what he stood
for” (3). Kaufmann ultimately uses the “will to power” as the organizing principle of
Nietzsche’s work, noting, “When Nietzsche introduced the will to power into his thought,
all the dualistic tendencies which had rent it previously could be reduced to mere
manifestations of this basic drive” (178). Kauffmann, then, offers a reading of a
particular Nietzsche, one which is sharply contrasted by Arthur Danto, who refuses to
acknowledge a single unifying strand which runs through Nietzsche, “whose books
themselves, except for their chronological ordering, do not exhibit any special structure
as a corpus” and in whose work “any given aphorism or essay might as easily have been
placed in one volume as in another without much affecting the unity or he structure of
either” (1). Throughout Nietzsche as Philosopher, Danto explores various thought
patterns which exist throughout Nietzsche which often clash but fail to systematize his
work.
More recently, many scholars use aesthetics as a point of entry into Nietzsche. In
both Nietzsche: Life as Literature and The Art of Living, Alexander Nehamas explores
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Nietzsche’s advocacy of approaching life as a work of art with the self-serving as both
the creator and canvas, while Alain de Botton’s The Consolations of Philosophy
examines Nietzsche as being largely preoccupied as “offer[ing] paths to fulfillment”
(243). In 2014’s Nietzsche of Art & Life, Daniel Came introduces the idea of “aesthetic
transfiguration,” which he defines as “the capacity of art to alchemize the meaningless
sufferings of mere natural existence into the aesthetically magnificent struggle that is
human life” (9), and then builds a strong case for it being one of Nietzsche’s most
significant achievements.
As for ways Nietzsche has been used as a lens for viewing Vonnegut, Robert
Tally’s Kurt Vonnegut and the American Novel: A Postmodern Iconography provides the
most thoughtful analysis to date. Tally devotes an entire chapter to Vonnegut’s
Slaughterhouse-Five and the ways in which the novel “combines form and content to
figure forth an ethics based on the principle of the eternal return” (70). Tally’s
exploration of Nietzsche’s eternal return is innovative in that it offers a radically new way
of reading Vonnegut from a philosophical perspective. He suggests that “Billy, like
Nietzsche, understands this theory (Tralfamadorian space time or the eternal return),
properly understood, is liberatory inasmuch as it frees one from the fear and loathing of
life itself” (75). My goal in this chapter is to offer a parallel reading of SlaughterhouseFive which focuses not on Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence but rather on his perspectival
view of truth. For Nietzsche, eternal recurrence is a thought experiment, one whose
ultimate goal is affirmation. When he writes in The Gay Science of the demon who
announces, “This life as you live it and have lived it you will have to live once again, and
innumerable times again,” we must also accept the second part of this demonic
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proclamation, namely that “there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy
and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must
return to you” (194). For Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence represents an attempt to
affirm life in spite of its horrors. If a single moment in life renders it worth repeating
eternally, that makes the sorrow bearable as well. This view is somewhat at odds with
the Tralfamadorian philosophy of selectivity, though. As the aliens explain the horrors of
existence to Billy Pilgrim: “There isn’t anything we can do to [moments of horror and
tragedy], so we simply don’t look at them. We ignore them. We spend eternity looking
at pleasant moments—like today at the zoo. Isn’t this a nice moment” (150).
Perspective, then, determines which moments are worth looking at. For Vonnegut,
eternal recurrence isn’t an act of affirming life in its totality, but instead affirming its
selective moments. This, of course, is a type of perspectivism.
Robert Solomon succinctly defines Nietzsche’s perspectivism as “the view that all
doctrines and dilemmas are only partial and limited by a particular point of view” (183).
For Nietzsche, if somewhat grandiosely, this provincializes all philosophy up to the time
that he wrote by rendering it a matter of perspective. Nowhere is this more evident than
his preface to Beyond Good and Evil. “Supposing truth is a woman,” he writes. “What
then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were
dogmatists, have been inexpert about women” (1). Clumsy misogynistic metaphor aside,
Nietzsche uses these words to launch into his prelude to a philosophy of the future, a
doctrine which dynamically sets itself apart from the history of philosophy up to that
moment. Nietzsche’s challenge is offering a forward-looking philosophical perspective
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which doesn’t fall into the traps of perspectivism. Whether he succeeds or not is beyond
the scope of this project, but those are the stakes.
More directly, Nietzsche offers his view of perspectivism in The Will to Power,
where he writes: “Against positivism, which halts at phenomena—‘There are only
facts’—I would say: No this is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We
cannot establish any fact ‘in itself’: perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing” (267).
Thus, Nietzsche opens up the possibility of an individualistic, perspectival creation not
just of truth, but of the world. This view is in keeping with Vonnegut’s admonition to
select moments worthy of making life bearable, even if doing so is based in illusion.
Billy Pilgrim, for instance, adopts Tralfamadorian philosophy and refuses to “look at”
those moments which he finds particularly painful (i.e. the execution of Edgar Derby for
stealing a teapot in Dresden). They exist, certainly, but by ignoring them, Billy is able to
construct a reality based on the moments he finds pleasurable.
More practically, Vonnegut incorporates this selectivity into his non-fiction as
well, nowhere more so than in his graduation addresses, many of which are assembled in
If This Isn’t Nice, What Is: The Graduation Speeches and Other Words to Live By. The
title of this collection, offered by editor Dan Wakefield, serves to contextualize Vonnegut
squarely in the realm of philosophy. “Words to Live By” suggests knowledge which can
improve the quality of daily life, and indeed, this is what Vonnegut attempts to do
repeatedly in his addresses and speeches, much more directly than he does through his
novels, where he tends to work in metaphor. What the speeches, once anthologized,
allow readers is the luxury of repetition. Surely if Vonnegut incorporated information
more than once, and repeatedly over a period of years, it says something about the value
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placed on this information, at least for Vonnegut. Consistently, one idea unites these
addresses. As Vonnegut himself acknowledges in a 1999 graduation speech at Agnes
Scott College, “Every graduation pep talk I’ve every given has ended with words about
my father’s kid brother, Alex Vonnegut. One of the things he found so objectionable
about human beings was that they rarely noticed it when they were happy” (30). Alex’s
advice is simple—regardless of where someone is or what they are doing, they should
always stop to acknowledge and appreciate a pleasant moment whenever one might come
around. “If this [moment] isn’t nice, what is?” Vonnegut suggests we continually ask
ourselves. It is the individual moment, after all, which instills life with meaning. As for
Billy Pilgrim’s happiest moment, it wasn’t his liberation from the Germans or the birth of
his children—it proved to be something much more commonplace. “Later on in life, the
Tralfamadorians would advise Billy to concentrate on the happy moments in life, and to
ignore the unhappy ones—to stare only at the pretty things as eternity failed to go by. If
this sort of selectivity had been possible for Billy, he might have chosen as his happiest
moment his sundrenched snooze in the back of the wagon” (249). Never mind the fact
that the wagon was “coffin-shaped” and was traveling through a firebombed Dresden
littered with the grizzly charred remains of thousands of civilian men, women, and
children. Outside of objective reality, or to use Nietzsche’s term, in the midst of the most
wretched phenomena, Billy is able to construct a blissful moment through perspective
alone. If this isn’t nice, what is?
Nietzsche would almost certainly acknowledge Billy’s happiest moment as
legitimate, precisely the type of experience which is necessary if life is to be affirmed in
light of eternal recurrence. Would he consider it “true,” though? Perhaps a better
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question is what is truth within Nietzsche’s framework? The opening paragraph of “On
Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” includes an uncharacteristically somber
description of humanity’s place in the cosmos as Nietzsche describes “how purposeless
and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature.” As he elaborates, “there were
eternities during which it did not exist; and when it has disappeared again, nothing will
have happened” (141). Central to Nietzsche’s philosophical project is creating a
framework within which the individual can affirm existence, particularly after the death
of God, or, metaphorically, without the metaphysical illusion of a reward elsewhere.
Within the essay, Nietzsche draws an important distinction between truth and knowledge.
Truth, he argues, “is only desired by human beings in a … limited sense. They deserve
the pleasant, life-preserving consequences of truth; they are indifferent to pure knowledge
if it has no consequences, but they are actually harmful towards truths which may be
harmful or destructive” (143). “What, then, is truth?” he asks. “A mobile army of
metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms … after they have been in use for a long
time, [they] strike people as firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths are
illusions of which we have forgotten they are illusions” (146). Within the same text,
however, he concedes that such illusions do (or at the very least can) contribute to one’s
overall well-being: “But human beings have an unconquerable urge to let themselves be
deceived, and they are as if enchanted with happiness when the bard recites epic fairytales as if they were true” (151). While Nietzsche’s “free spirit” might feel compelled to
work through to the absolute reality behind such illusions where possible, self-deception
can be a powerful tool for most of us, and even Nietzsche himself engaged in it, as
evidenced by his creation of the free spirits when he “needed them.”
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Matthew Gannon’s “Vonnegut on Truth and Aesthetics in a Nonmoral Sense”
offers an extremely insightful reading of Breakfast of Champions which is informed by
Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lying in a Nonmoral Sense.” As he states: “Though
Nietzsche wrote a century before Vonnegut, his concerns for language, truth, and human
understanding are remarkably similar.” Gannon’s focus is largely limited to Breakfast of
Champions. I would argue that “On Truth and Lying in a Nonmoral Sense” can be
usefully applied more broadly to Vonnegut in an ontological sense. Vonnegut’s work is
filled with characters who deceive themselves and others, and far from being disdainful
of such delusional self-deception, Vonnegut champions, as long as is not done
maliciously (as is the case in Galapagos, which we will explore later in this chapter).
From his perspective, not only is such self-deception helpful, but it is at times essential.
Towards the end of Cat’s Cradle, John, the novel’s narrator, encounters the
following couplet in The Books of Bokonon:
Midget, midget, midget, how he struts and winks
For he knows a man’s as big as what he hopes and thinks! (284).
As light as this verse is on the surface, careful analysis reveals it to serve as a microcosm
for the entire novel. Clearly a man is not literally as big as he hopes and thinks, yet this is
precisely the type of untruth that little Newt Hoenikker needs in order for life to become
bearable. For, Vonnegut, this is religion’s duty and deception’s greatest achievement.
Cat’s Cradle certainly offers Vonnegut’s definitive outlook regarding foma
(which he defines in Wampeters, Foma & Granfalloons as “harmless untruths, intended
to comfort simple souls” [xiii]), and a large portion of this chapter will be devoted to a
careful reading of this seminal work. Bokononism is admittedly a fictitious religion, yet
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it orders reality in useful ways, and this is important to Vonnegut (and his characters).
Towards the end of the text, Dr. von Koenigswald states, “I agree with one Bokononist
idea. I agree that all religions, including Bokononism, are nothing but lies.” When asked
if he has a problem engaging with that which he does not believe, he replies, “I am a very
bad scientist. I will do anything to make a human feel better, even if it is unscientific”
(219).
Vonnegut routinely bought into foma in his own life as well. In his 1980 Sermon
at St. Clement’s Episcopal Church, Vonnegut describes himself as “a Christ-worshipping
agnostic” (Palm Sunday 298), whereas at other times he also refers to himself as a
Unitarian Universalist” (Fates Worse Than Death 157). In a Weekly Guardian
interview, he defines perfect happiness as “imagining that something somewhere wants
us to like it here” (Fates Worse Than Death 15).
In Timequake, Vonnegut’s final novel, he returns to the subject of religion, noting
“how comforting and encouraging the make-believe of religion can be for common folk”
(121). A critical difference between Nietzsche and Vonnegut becomes clear here.
Whereas Nietzsche is focused with distancing the elite (that is, the Free Spirit, the
Ubermensch) from the masses, Vonnegut is primarily concerned with acting as a
metaphoric shepherd to the “herd.”
Another of Nietzsche’s central philosophical and epistemological concerns is
providing a framework within which the individual can both rationalize (and ultimately
justify) existence and “say yes” to life. For Nietzsche, in the wake of the Enlightenment
and the death of God which followed, life is here, and the hope of a divine elsewhere is
both futile and wrongheaded. In The Gay Science, he contextualizes the existential
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stakes of modernity as such: “New battles.—After Buddha was dead, they still showed
his shadow in the cave for centuries—a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but
given the way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his
shadow. –And we—we must still defeat his shadow as well!” (109). The “free spirit”
Nietzsche envisions in Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay Science is the
individual who is capable of defeating said shadow and affirming life as a thing in itself,
for its own sake, even if the thing-in-itself if tainted by perspective. Doing so, ultimately,
requires a personal reimagining on a truly transformative scale.
Finally, Nietzsche and Vonnegut share artistic sensibilities which are worth
exploring as well. Ansell Pearson and Large describe Nietzsche’s method of writing by
noting, “his stylistic ideal … is the paradoxical one of ‘ridendo dicere severum’(‘saying
what is somber through what is laughable’), and these two modes, the somber and the
sunny, are mischievously intertwined in his philosophy” (xxx). Consider section 205 of
Human, All Too Human: “There are writers who, by representing the impossible as
possible and speaking of morality and genius as though both were merely a matter of
wanting them, a mere whim and caprice, evoke a feeling of high-spirited freedom, as
though man were standing on tiptoe and compelled to dance for sheer joy” (96).
Ultimately, throughout their careers, both Nietzsche and Vonnegut remained committed
to producing such books. “Being alive” just might be “a crock of shit” (Timequake 3),
but it’s the only game in town.
Finally, in Slaughterhouse-Five, Vonnegut offers a clue to Nietzsche’s significant
influence. As Billy rides through the wreckage of Dresden in a horse-drawn carriage, he
is stopped by a couple who reprimand him for the neglect of the horses. “Billy asked
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them in English what it was they wanted …They made Billy get out of the wagon and
come look at the horses. When Billy saw the condition of his means of transportation, he
burst into tears. He hadn’t cried about anything else in the war” (252). The nod to
Nietzsche here is unmistakable. It well known that Nietzsche’s final act of sanity before
his collapse in Turin in 1889 was to embrace an abused horse. Sue Prideaux vividly
paints the scene in her recent biography I Am Dynamite! A Life of Nietzsche: “On seeing a
cabbie mercilessly beating his horse, Nietzsche broke down. Overwhelmed by
compassion, sobbing at the sight of it, he threw his arms protectively around the horse’s
neck, and collapsed” (330). By deliberately placing the horse scene near the very end of
Slaughterhouse-Five, Vonnegut invites readers to explore the parallels between the novel
and Nietzschean thought.
“The Moment is Structured That Way”: Acceptance Through Reinvention in
Slaughterhouse-Five
“This is the only story of mine whose moral I know,” Vonnegut writes in the
introduction to Mother Night. “We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful
about what we pretend to be” (v). This is Vonnegut at his most quotable, and the
problem with the easily-quotable Vonnegut is it’s far too easy to remove from the
original context. Nietzsche’s aphorisms result in a similar problem. Brevity may be the
soul of wit, but pithiness can be as much a curse as a blessing. Soundbites, by their very
nature, lack context, and while they make for interesting bumper stickers and tattoos, they
are easily distorted. Nietzsche encountered this problem when his thought was adopted
by Nazis in the decades after his death, and Vonnegut, with far less at stake, ran into this
issue with censors, school boards, and the far right throughout his career.
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In context, however, this moral has much more to offer. Mother Night was first
published in 1961, yet the introduction was written for the 1966 edition. What’s
important here is that Vonnegut’s introduction was written three years before the
publication of Slaughterhouse-Five, when the novel was near completion. “So It Goes,”
Slaughterhouse-Five’s narrative mantra which appears every time something tragic
happens, actually first appears in this 1966 introduction (viii). It’s appearance here
establishes a direct thematic connection between the two novels, and while Vonnegut’s
moral applies directly to Howard W. Campbell Jr., Mother Night’s protagonist, I would
argue it leads to a better understanding of Billy Pilgrim, and on a larger level,
Slaughterhouse-Five as well. “Pretending” may at times be necessary, but it is a
dangerous proposition. If Billy Pilgrim has a hamartia, it is perhaps that he pretends too
well.
As early as 1972, in the first full-length study of Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse-Five
was already being treated as a culturally significant novel. Here, Peter Reed perceptively
refers to the novel as a career retrospective of sorts, a summing of Vonnegut’s relatively
young career to date, in which he brings together many of the other things he has talked
about in his first five novels (172). Charles Shields, in his biography, attributes the
novel’s popularity to its publication during the Vietnam war (249), a time when anti-war
sentiment was part of the zeitgeist. While this might explain the book’s popularity, it
doesn’t quite explain its appeal. In his valuable Kurt Vonnegut Remembered, Jim
O’Loughlin describes the way in which Slaughterhouse-Five transformed Vonnegut into
an instant “celebrity” (65), a figure so popular that readers began making “pilgrimages”
to his West Barnstable residence just to talk to (or catch a glimpse of) the writer (256).
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More importantly, however, the completion of Slaughterhouse-Five proved to be
an important personal milestone for Vonnegut. He affirms Reed’s assessment in a 1973
Playboy interview with David Standish, noting, “Well, I felt after I finished
Slaughterhouse-Five that I didn’t have to write anymore if I didn’t want to. It was the
end of some sort of career” (Conversations 107). What ended for Vonnegut with the
completion of the novel was a decades-long struggle to tell the story, truthfully (“All this
happened, more or less”), of his experiences as an American POW in Dresden during
World War II. The problem he encountered was in trying to make sense out of the utterly
nonsensical. In his personal introduction, which serves not as preface but Chapter 1,
Vonnegut inserts himself into the novel, and in doing so, he gives voice to two
conflicting drives which exist throughout the text—his desire to render wholesale murder
meaningful while telling the truth. Perhaps Vonnegut’s greatest achievement is writing
truthfully and intelligently about the horrors of war even though “there is nothing
intelligent to say about a massacre” (24).
Vonnegut proved to be unable to remove himself from the historical events which
unfold at the core of the novel. He serves as not only a narrator but as an observer to the
horrific firebombing of Dresden, and his authorial presence is literal. For instance, after
capture, “An American near Billy wailed that he had excreted everything but his brains.
Moments later he said. ‘There they go, there they go.’ He meant his brains. That was I.
That was me. That was the author of this book” (160). This is but one of many examples
of Vonnegut popping up as a participant within the novel. Tellingly, Vonnegut never
appears as heroic—quite the opposite. He is always lurking in the background of the
narrative, excreting his brains out here, dialing a wrong number there, refusing to make
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himself a hero (or even a major participant) in the text. In The Cambridge Companion to
the Literature of Word War II, Marina MacKay suggests that the literature of the war is
most effective when it strives to recreate “the real experiences of real people” (3). Even
more, “The most important claim literature can make on our historical imaginations is to
show how things felt at the time” (3). As Vonnegut announces in the opening of his later
novel, Slapstick, “This is the closest I will ever come to writing an autobiography. It is
about what life feels like to me” (1). His presence in Slaughterhouse-Five both
exemplifies MacKay’s expressionistic claim about the literature of the period and
anticipates the increasingly significant role Vonnegut will go on to play as a character
within his own post-Slaughterhouse-Five novels. When Vonnegut promised the wife of
his fellow POW Bernard V. O’Hare that “there won’t be a part for Frank Sinatra or John
Wayne [in the novel”] (19), he remained true to his word. By depicting himself as a latenight drunk dialer with bad breath who shits his brains out on the sidelines of the
narrative, Vonnegut captures the spirit of what war (and life after) felt like.
While Slaughterhouse-Five is an intensely gritty and authentic war narrative,
more importantly, it is about what war feels like, particularly for Billy Pilgrim, the
novel’s protagonist. Billy is a war veteran who, like Vonnegut, is captured during the
Battle of the Bulge, survives the firebombing of Dresden, and then goes on to lead a
productive, prosperous, and troubled life. On a calm night in 1967, he is kidnapped by
aliens and placed in a zoo-like dome in their home planet, Tralfamadore. In time, he is
given a partner by the Tralfamadorians in Montana Wildhack, and they reproduce and
live happily ever after in outer space, far away from the troubles of Earth. Billy has
become “unstuck in time.” In other words, he experiences life in a series of
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chronologically-unlinked (but intricately connected) moments. Vonnegut explains the
process like this: “Billy has gone to sleep a senile widower and awakened on his wedding
day. He has walked through a door in 1955 and come out another one in 1941. He has
gone back through that door to find himself in 1963” (29). And so on. This is post-war
reality for Billy Pilgrim.
Yet, Billy’s reality is not objective reality. Rather, it is a protective illusion he
adopts in order to cope with reality. Whether Slaughterhouse-Five is in fact a science
fiction novel is very much a matter of debate. Do the Tralfamadorians really exist? Does
Billy really become unstuck in time? Given Vonnegut’s earlier work (particularly The
Sirens of Titan in which Mars actually does wage a war on Earth, and in which Salo, an
alien from Tralfamadore truly does exist), it is a logical conclusion to assume that the
answer to both questions is yes. However, a close reading of the novel suggests that
Billy’s Tralfamadorian captivity is nothing more than a figment of his imagination, a
reality which he has constructed for himself to escape the struggles of daily life. To
illustrate, consider the permanent residence he is provided on Tralfamadore: “They
carried him to a cabin where he was strapped to a yellow BarcaLounger which they had
stolen from a Sears Roebuck warehouse. The hold of the saucer was crammed with other
stolen merchandise, which would be used to furnish Billy’s artificial habitat in a zoo on
Tralfamadore” (97). A detail that many readers miss appears near the end of the novel.
While in Manhattan to speak on a local radio program, Billy notices four paperback
novels written by Kilgore Trout in the window of a pornographic bookstore. He picks up
one of the books, titled, The Big Board, and instantly discovers it is familiar. “He got a
few paragraphs into it, and he realized he had read it before—years ago, in the veterans’
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hospital. It was about an Earthling man and woman who were kidnapped by extraterrestrials. They were put on display in a zoo on a planet called Zicron-12” (257).
Before leaving the porn shop, Billy catches a glimpse of a headline on an old “girly
magazine”: “What really became of Montana Wildhack?” (261), who has been missing
for a number of years, presumably long dead. Montana’s presence as his companion on
Tralfamadore is nothing more than a fiction, a self-created cure for loneliness.
Subconsciously, at some point Billy evidently caught a headline about her disappearance,
and she ended up a partner-in-captivity in his illusion-based reality.
The most direct evidence Vonnegut offers that the Tralfamadorians are only real
to Billy can be found in his 1973 Playboy interview, in which he acknowledges, “The
science fiction passages in Slaughterhouse-Five are just like the clowns in Shakespeare.
He’d let up a little, bring on a clown or a foolish innkeeper or something like that, before
he’d become serious again. And trips to other planets, science fiction of an obviously
kidding sort, is equivalent to bringing on the clowns every so often to lighten things up”
(Conversations 94). While he may have been using the Tralfamadorian episodes for
comic relief, their role within the structure of the novel is central. In the recent article
“’Spastic in Time’: Time and Disability in Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five,” Adam
Barrows argues that any reading which attempts to discredit the reality of the
Tralfamadorians is misguided since “the novel’s ‘schizophrenic’ temporal structure is not
representing the temporality of mental illness, as the diagnostic reading would have it,
but is rather exposing the ways in which normative time and temporality have been
complicit in the dehumanizing, diagnosing, and disenfranchising of disabled people”
(392). Far from dehumanizing Billy, I suggest that Tralfamadore is intended to be seen as
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an illusion, one which thoroughly humanizes him. For Billy, Tralfamadore serves as an
escape from reality, an act of imagination so powerful that it becomes real, at least for
him. This is illusion at its most powerful, and while Tralfamadore may not exist, it
renders existence meaningful to Billy Pilgrim.
The problem Billy finds with reality is that it is essentially meaningless. In the
previous chapter, we looked at the way Eliot Rosewater found purpose through acts of
charity in God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater. Eliot returns in Slaughterhouse-Five, and he
shares a room with Billy in the mental patient ward of a veterans’ hospital. Here, Eliot
introduces Billy to the novels of Kilgore Trout. “They both found life meaningless,
partly because of that they had seen in the war,” Vonnegut writes. “So they were trying to
re-invent themselves and their universe” (128). This is important because it illustrates the
usefulness of fiction, both as an art and as a self-created reality, in giving meaning to life
(which will be the focus of the next chapter). When Eliot tells his psychiatrist, “I think
you guys are going to have to come up with a lot of wonderful new lies, or people just
aren’t going to want to go on living” (129), he is articulating Vonnegut’s belief that
useful, life-saving truths can be built on a lies. David L. Vanderwerken’s “Kurt
Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five at Forty: Billy Pilgrim—Even More a Man of Our
Times” offers an excellent reading of Billy in today’s context. However, his assertion
that Vonnegut “rejects both Tralfamadorianism and divinely-centered Christianity, while
ambiguously affirming a humanly centered Christianity” (47) is only partially accurate.
I’d agree that Vonnegut rejects Tralfamadorianism as an absolute philosophical
framework, but as I will now illustrate, he certainly offers it as a philosophical
framework worth considering.
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Like many of Vonnegut’s characters, Billy discovers that all of his attempts to
find meaning in life are futile. As Nietzsche might put it, not only is there no way to
objectively know the thing-in-itself, but the thing-in-itself turns out to be unknowable.
“Among the things Billy Pilgrim could not change were the past, the present, and the
future” (77), and once he comes to this realization, he is then able to change his
perspective, not about what life is, but about what it can be. This realization comes in the
form of a radical new way of thinking about time (and life itself) a la the
Tralfamadorians. It’s important to note that Billy first becomes “unstuck” in traditional
time in 1944, during the Battle of the Bulge. Unarmed, under-provisioned, and with a
violent death nearly certain, he tells his companions to go on without him. “Billy wanted
to quit. He was cold, hungry, embarrassed, incompetent” (43). Sitting down in the snow,
he resigns, surrendering himself to his inhospitable surroundings. “Billy Pilgrim had
stopped in the forest. He was leaning against a tree with his eyes closed … This is when
Billy first became unstuck in time” (54). In that moment, Billy finds himself a child
again with his father, who is trying to teach him to swim at the YMCA. Immediately
after that, he is 41 years old in 1965, visiting his mother on her death bed. While many
interpretations of Slaughterhouse-Five attempt to perform psychoanalytic readings of
what triggers certain journeys for Billy, and while this can indeed be fascinating, such is
beyond the scope of our purposes here. What’s of importance is that Billy first comes
“unstuck” and retreats into himself (and into illusion) as a direct response to the horrors
of war. This is precisely how Tralfamadorian time works.
Billy explains the Tralfamadorian concept of time like this: “All moments, past
present, and future, always have existed, always will exist. The Tralfamadorians can
60

look at all the different moments just the way we can look at a stretch of the Rocky
Mountains, for instance. They can see how permanent the moments are, and they can
look at any moment that interests them” (34). In this framework, everything which ever
will happen has already happened. Nothing can change it. The Tralfamadorians even
know how the Universe ends—it is unceremoniously blown-up by simple error when a
Tralfamadorian test pilot is experimenting with new fuel for flying saucers. “If you know
this,” Billy asks, “isn’t there some way you can prevent it?” Yet the question is both
absurd and irrelevant on Tralfamadore because the test pilot “has always pressed [the
ignition button which signals the end of the Universe], and he always will. We always let
him and we always will let him. The moment is structured that way” (149). This is
precisely the perspective which Billy adopts, and the illusion within which he loses
himself.
Two aspects of this illusion are most appealing to Billy Pilgrim, and through
Billy, Vonnegut offers this idea to readers as ways of approaching life, particularly its
grittiest and most unbearable griefs. The first is that there is no rational basis for reality.
When he is abducted by the Tralfamadorians, Billy reasonably asks why he was selected.
“That is a very Earthling question to ask,” he is informed. “Why you? Why us for that
matter? Why anything?” After all, “There is no why” (97). An inherently meaningless
universe, for Billy as for us, makes “why” a moot question. Individual responsibility
follows suit and becomes equally inconsequential for Billy thanks to the Tralfamadorians.
As one Tralfamadorian scolds him, “If I hadn’t spent so much time studying Earthlings, I
wouldn’t have any idea what was meant by ‘free will.’ I’ve visited thirty-one inhabited
planets in the universe, and I have studies reports on one hundred more. Only on Earth is
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there any talk of free will” (109). By choosing to accept free will as meaningless, Billy
no longer has to accept any responsibility, for his actions or the actions of others. This
too is a very Nietzschean idea. In establishing the groundwork for perspectivism in The
Will to Power, Nietzsche argues that “It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives
and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has a
perspective that it would like to compel all other drives to accept as norm” (267). Billy
allows his “needs” to interpret not only his world, but the Universe, and Vonnegut
endorses this illusion as a valid response to modernity.
Perhaps Billy’s most basic need, and the perspectival aspect of Tralfamadorian
time which renders existence meaningful, for him, is selective empowerment. There
have always been wars, and there always will be. The same can be said for an infinite
number of daily tragedies and horrors. Billy’s perspectivism allows him to choose which
moments he inhabits. Consider the words of his Tralfamadorian captor: “Today we [are
at peace]. On other days we have wars as horrible as any you’ve ever seen or read about.
There isn’t anything we can do about them, so we simply don’t look at them. We spend
eternity looking at pleasant moments” (150). Robert Tally’s reading of Tralfamadorian
time as the “cosmology of the eternal return” (79) is absolutely correct in a Nietzschean
sense. Each moment recurs infinitely. Again though, I would argue that it is
perspectivism which gives Billy the control, outside the context of free will, to determine
which moments he chooses to visit eternally. Charles B. Harris’ “Illusion and Absurdity:
The Novels of Kurt Vonnegut” has long been an influential early (1971) essay in
Vonnegut studies, and rightfully so. Along with Reed and Klinkowitz, Harris was among
the first-wave of serious Vonnegut scholars who explored the systemic framework of
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Vonnegut’s world—a world in which characters, themes, and setting reappear in various
novels. Particularly, Harris views Slaughterhouse-Five as a culmination, noting that
Vonnegut’s “novels have progresses from satire to absurdity, from the early protest of
Player Piano to the almost total resignation of Slaughterhouse-Five” (140). From one
perspective, Billy’s retreat into the world of self can be viewed as a resignation of sorts.
However, more broadly, Billy affirms life instead of resigning from it, and in this sense,
he achieves in illusion what other characters in the novel (and more broadly Vonnegut’s
novels in general) can only attempt: contentment and happiness.
Indeed, the other major characters in Slaughterhouse-Five attempt and ultimately
fail in adopting illusions to protect themselves. Consider Roland Weary’s illusion that
during the Battle of the Bulge he and two other infantry scouts become “The Three
Musketeers” who end up as decorated war heroes. The reality is that the scouts ignore
him and abandon him the first chance they get. Weary ends up dying a few days later of
gangrene which sets in after wearing ill-fitting clogs. Consider Paul Lazarro, who creates
the illusion of himself as a renegade with a taste for vengeance—“People fuck with me,
and Jesus Christ are they ever fucking sorry” (176). His reality? “He was tiny, and not
only were his bones and teeth rotten, but his skin was disgusting” (106). Consider poor
Edgar Derby, who constructs the illusion while in Dresden that his wife “needn’t worry,
that the war was nearly over, that he would be home soon” (183). In reality, he would be
dead in a matter of days, a victim in a universe so absurd that a soldier can survive a war
and endure a firebombing only to be executed by a firing squad for taking a teapot from
the charred wreckage of Dresden. Above all, consider Vonnegut a character in his own
novel. Jerome Klinkowitz suggests that “Slaughterhouse-Five is a novel about the author
63

challenging his own process and bringing himself into the center of his fictional activity”
(Kurt Vonnegut 69). Vonnegut brings himself into his fiction precisely because he shares
the struggles of his characters. Elizabeth Abele notes that Vonnegut, as character, “is as
fallible as any of the other characters” (74), and of course this is true. Vonnegut the
character is realistically and authentically rendered in the self-portrait Vonnegut the
author adds on the last page of Breakfast of Champions—wide-eyed with a tear spilling
down his cheek as he confronts the horrors of life. Like Billy Pilgrim, like all of his
characters, Vonnegut is a creator of illusions and a crafter of fictions. It seems only
fitting that Vonnegut the author and Vonnegut the character should have the final word:
“If what Billy Pilgrim learned from the Tralfamadorians is true, that we will all live
forever, no matter how dead we may sometimes seem to be, I am not overjoyed. Still—If
I am going to spend eternity visiting this moment and that, I’m grateful that so many of
those moments are nice” (269). Cat’s Cradle and Galapagos, to which we will now turn,
are similarly concerned with the nature of truth and the power of illusion, and these texts
serve as companions-pieces to Slaughterhouse-Five in that they offer alternative methods
for discovering such “nice moments” in modernity. At the same time, they unveil the
horrors of how we are often creators of our own misery and destruction.
Cat’s Cradle and Galapagos: Apocalypse, Villainy, and the Problem With “Big
Brains”
In his introduction to Happy Birthday, Wanda June, Vonnegut reflects that “one
of the last things [my father] said to me was that I had never written a story with a villain
in it,” and he goes on to explain one of the structural shortcomings of the play is that he
“did not have the balls to make Harold or anybody thoroughly vile” (ix). This realization
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proves to be of lasting importance, because he returns to it years later in Fates Worst
Than Death: “And I have just named the villains in my books, which are never
individuals. The villains again: culture, society, and history” (31). Slaughterhouse-Five
bears this out. He honors his promise to Mary O’Hara, and there isn’t “a part for Frank
Sinatra or John Wayne” in the novel (19). Just as important, though, is that there are also
no parts for Peter Lorre or Edward G. Robinson. Even the (literally) rotten and
senselessly violent Paul Lazzaro is more victim than villain. While Vonnegut depicts the
destruction of much of Western society in Slaughterhouse-Five, in Cat’s Cradle and
Galapagos, he destroys the entire world, not once but twice. And yet, there are no parts
for Lorre or Robinson in these novels either. The problem at the heart of both novels is
humanity. Paul L. Thomas suggests that “when Vonnegut holds a mirror up to us” in
Cat’s Cradle, “it is for us to see more clearly how we persist in failing each other” (38),
but the problem ultimately runs much deeper in both Cat’s Cradle and Galapagos. We
aren’t just failing each other; first and foremost, we are failing ourselves, and in doing so,
we usher in the apocalypse.
Even though Vonnegut goes without mention in David J. Leigh’s Apocalyptic
Patterns in Twentieth-Century Fiction, this useful text helps bring Vonnegut’s
apocalypse—or, more accurately, his apocalypses—into conversation with those of
Walker Percy, Thomas Pynchon, and Don Delillo among others. As Leigh explains:
“Among the themes of apocalyptic literature … are an imminent end-time, a cosmic
catastrophe, a movement from an old to a new age, a struggle between forces of good and
evil (sometimes personified in angels and demons), a desire for the ultimate paradise
(often parallel to an original paradise), the transitional help of God or a messiah, and a
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final judgement and manifestation of the ultimate” (5). This definition explains
Vonnegut’s exclusion from the study, and points to the central way he works outside the
typical conventions of a rather bleak genre. In Vonnegut’s world, there is no God, no
angels or demons, and no final judgement. Even more, terms like good and evil become
problematic, not because of a lack of morality—morality in the form of decency reigns
supreme for Vonnegut—but because of a lack of traditional villains…and by extension,
traditional heroes. Leigh later adds “a quest for transcendence and wholeness” (38) as a
characteristic of apocalyptic literature, and this is present in Vonnegut. What must be
transcended, or, to use Nietzsche’s term, “overcome,” is the self.
The chief obstacle to transcendence in Vonnegut’s world is articulated by
Francine Pefko in Cat’s Cradle. Francine is an important recurring character in
Vonnegut’s fiction. In Breakfast of Champion, she occupies the dual roles of secretary
and mistress to Dwayne Hoover. In Cat’s Cradle, she is a secretary at the General Forge
and Foundry Research Laboratory, manufacturer of the atomic bomb. “You scientists
think too much” she instinctively blurts out, and this is the problem. As Jonah, the
novel’s narrator, observes, “She hated people who thought too much. At that moment,
she struck me as an appropriate representative for almost all mankind” (33).
Throughout the novel, the pinnacle of human achievement, the grandest gesture
which all that “thinking” results in, is the atomic bomb. First published in 1963 during a
time when global tensions were extremely high, and the threat of nuclear destruction was
a daily reality, Cat’s Cradle is as much an anti-nuke novel as Slaughterhouse-Five is an
anti-war novel. Initially, Jonah sets out to write a book called The Day the World Ended,
which would be “an account of what important Americans had done on the day when the
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first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan” (1). He actually ends up writing an
altogether different book about the end of the world—Cat’s Cradle—except this time the
world ends not by way of nuclear war but instead through ice-nine, a newly-invented
substance which is capable of instantly freezing any liquid it comes into contact with.
Ice-nine is created by Dr. Felix Hoenikker, one of the inventers of the atomic bomb in the
world of the novel, after a conversation with a Marine general who was looking for a way
to prevent his troops from spending so much time crawling through mud and marshes.
Surely there must be a way science can remedy such a messy problem, he pleads. The
result is ice-nine, and after Dr. Hoenikker’s sudden death, his three children divide the
only known trace of the substance amongst themselves. This becomes their bargaining
chip with life…and with fate.
In short order, the three unremarkable children of the world-famous doctor find
themselves leading the good life, yet they are lives based on illusion. Their possession of
ice-nine gives them access to the things they want most—lonely Newt experiences an
erotic tryst with a Ukrainian dancing midget; emotionally-isolated Angela soon finds
herself married to a handsome, successful businessman; socially-awkward Frank
becomes major general and second in command to the dictator of The Republic of San
Lorenzo. Like their father, all three children are incredibly bright. On some level they
must realize that all the good fortune which comes their way has less to do with them
than it does with their possession of ice-nine, a substance with infinite possibilities. And
yet they cling to the illusion that they are responsible for their outcomes. This is a perfect
microcosm of the types of deception most of us engage in daily. We’d like to believe that
we are responsible for our own successes, that the people who love us do so for no other
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reason than that they see something remarkable and unique within us, something which
makes us lovable as a thing-in-itself. Of course, reality complicates this notion, and
every reality is based on numerous truths. Telling ourselves that we are responsible our
own fates is an illusion, but it’s an important one.
Bokononism, a religion based entirely on lies, is the religion on the island of San
Lorenzo because the lies people were telling themselves in their daily impoverished lives
had lost their potency. Remember Eliot Rosewater’s assessment in Slaughterhouse-Five:
“I think you guys are going to have to come up with a lot of wonderful new lies, or
people just aren’t going to want to go on living” (129). This is precisely what Lionel
Boyd Johnson does when he christens himself Bokonon and creates an entire religion to
fill the existential void articulated by Rosewater. This religion’s chief text, The Books of
Bokonon, is added to daily, as necessity dictates. Johnson/Bokonon, a native of Tobago,
washes up on the shores of San Lorenzo through a series of coincidental events.
“Johnson had developed a conviction that something was trying to get him somewhere
for some reason” (105), and his religion becomes his attempt to make life make sense for
him. There is no greater practitioner of Bokonon, and there is no one who needs it more,
than Bokonon himself.
In a practical way, Bokonon can be read as a representation of Vonnegut in Cat’s
Cradle much as Kilgore Trout serves as a proxy in Slaughterhouse-Five and elsewhere.
Like Bokonon, Vonnegut is making it all up as he goes along, and his writing reveals a
systematic attempt to make sense out of his own life. This is, of course, evidenced by his
appearance within his own texts, whether as a character in the narratives
(Slaughterhouse-Five, Breakfast of Champions, Timequake) or the crafter of the
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autobiographical introductions which lead in to the narratives (Mother Night, Slapstick,
Deadeye Dick, Jailbird). Bokononism is Vonnegut’s second major attempt at creating a
religion—in The Sirens of Titan, discussed in chapter one, he invents The Church of God
the Utterly Indifferent, and it too attempts to make sense of modernity. Like
Bokononism, it is based entirely on lies as well, but, as Vonnegut would clarify, they are
“useful” lies, and that makes all the difference. In fact, Vonnegut directly makes the
reader an accomplice at the outset of Cat’s Cradle, where, through Jonah, he warns,
“Anyone unable to understand how a useful religion can be founded on lies will not
understand this book” (5-6). To understand Cat’s Cradle, then, requires an
understanding of the necessities of the foma, or harmless lies, which make up a religion
whose sacred text begins with the following line: “All the true things I am about to tell
you are shameless lies” (5).
Bokononism is created to provide comfort and joy, two commodities in short
supply in the world of the novel. As Jonah explains the religion, “Truth was the enemy
of the people, because truth was so terrible, so Bokonon made it his business to provide
people with better and better lies” (172). In this sense, Bokonon is distinctly antiNietzschean. Remember the proclamation in The Gay Science: “God is dead; but given
the way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow.
–And we—we must still defeat his shadow as well!” (109). God may be dead, but rather
than defeating his shadow, Bokonon wishes to preserve it for a simple reason—people
need it. Vonnegut certainly understood this. 2005’s A Man Without a Country allows
Vonnegut to offer his final word in many of his ongoing preoccupations. Here, he quotes
Marx’s well-known assessment that “religion is the opium of the people.”
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However, he

adds, “Marx said that back in 1844, when opium and opium derivatives were the only
effective painkillers anyone could take. Marx had taken them himself. He was grateful
for the temporary relief they had given him. He was simply noticing, and surely not
condemning, the fact that religion could also be comforting to those in economic or social
distress” (12). For Vonnegut, religion may be an anodyne, but it is a necessary one, and
from his perspective, accepting comforting illusion is much more important than seeking
absolute truth. As Bokonon writes in one of the Calypsos for his holy book:
I wanted all things
To seem to make sense,
So we all could be happy, yes,
Instead of tense.
And I made up lies
So that they all fit nice,
And I made this sad world
A par-a-dise (127)
Yet tension must exist, even in paradise. This is why Bokonon, in collaboration
with the Corporal Earl McCabe, decided to have Bokononism banned. “It was the belief
of Bokonon that good societies could be built only by pitting good against evil, and by
keeping the tension between the two high at all times” (102). This tension is fed by the
illusion that Bokonon is an outlaw, and that his religion is banned. When Jonah arrives at
San Lorenzo to write a story of Julian Castle, an eccentric millionaire who founded a free
hospital in “the jungle” of the island, he notices a sign in the airport: “ANYBODY
CAUGHT PRACTICING BOKONONISM IN SAN LORENZO WILL DIE ON THE
HOOK” (134). No one was ever intended to die for practicing this religion, and its
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forbidden-ness is as artificial as its most sacred tenets. It’s perspective, not truth, which
matters in San Lorenzo.
Leonard Mustazza’s reading of Cat’s Cradle in Forever Pursuing Genesis
highlights the importance of invention and fabrication within the novel. Lionel Boyd
Johnson invents Bokonon/Bokononism in the same way that Dr. Felix Hoenikker invents
the atomic-bomb and ice-nine. According to Mustazza,“However, they seem to have
little or no control over the outcomes of their inventions, nor do they take much
responsibility for those inventions” (76). While this assessment is certainly true in the
case of Dr. Hoenikker, Bokonon does take responsibility for his creation, as much as is
possible anyway. Within Bokononism, there is only one holy object, one thing which us
unequivocally sacred: “Man. That’s all. Just man” (211). After ice-nine destroys the
world through a series of comical, completely unpredictable accidents, Jonah, one of the
few survivors, encounters Bokonon in the icy tundra, and he is contemplating the final
sentence of The Books of Bokonon, which he has just drafted. Importantly, the final
sentence of the holy book is also the last sentence of Jonah’s book (and Vonnegut’s
novel): “If I were a younger man, I would write a history of human stupidity; and I would
climb to the top of Mount McCabe and lie down on my back with my history for a
pillow; and I would take from the ground some of the blue-white poison that makes
statues of men; and I would make a statue of myself, lying on by back, grinning horribly,
and thumbing my nose at You Know Who” (287). Bokonon ultimately realizes how little
control he has, over his religion or his own life. He places humanity at the center of his
teaching, and makes the human a sacred object. In the end, though, he realizes that this
too is illusion, and humanity is ultimately responsible for its own destruction. That
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doesn’t stop him from thumbing his nose at God in defiance, though, and this final act of
rebellion suggests the importance of his invention. For Nietzsche, the problem with
religion, especially Christianity, is its promise of an elsewhere. As he writes in Human,
All Too Human, “one could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that it
was a being-other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being other” (15). Bokononism’s
greatest achievement is that it makes the “being-other” accessible here, now. In the end,
it is ill-equipped to keep humanity from killing itself and destroying the world, but it
makes life more bearable in the moment, and that is a significant accomplishment in and
of itself. For Vonnegut, it’s not succeeding which matters most—it’s trying in the first
place.
Over twenty years later, Vonnegut revisits the apocalypse again in 1985’s
Galapagos. Robert Tally considers it “Vonnegut’s most hopeful novel” (xx), but I would
suggest it is in many ways his coldest and bleakest. It is certainly his most anti-human,
and indeed, the only way which the human is able to survive is to evolve into furry seallike creatures with flippers. I suggest that Galapagos serves as a companion to Cat’s
Cradle not because both texts focus on end-of-the-world scenarios but instead because if
Cat’s Cradle is a novel about illusion and self-deception, Galapagos is a novel about
what happens in the absence of these necessities. Galapagos takes place in a world
wholly devoid of the comforts of Bokononism…or comforts of any kind beyond
technology, commerce, and gadgetry. Donald Morse suggests that Vonnegut is at his
best when he “offers alternatives for American society” and acts as “an agent for change”
(3-4), and I couldn’t agree more. Galapagos is so haunting because there are no
alternatives available, and change is only possible through biological evolution. From a
72

Nietzschean perspective, not only is God dead in the novel, but his shadow has been
“defeated” as well.
In large part, it seems the overall tone of Galapagos is influenced by the
extremely difficult personal circumstances under which it was written. In Fates Worse
Than Death, Vonnegut describes a failed suicide attempt: “I was carted off to the
Emergency Room of St. Vincent’s Hospital in the middle of the night to be pumped out.
I had tried to kill myself. It wasn’t a cry for help. It wasn’t a nervous breakdown … No
more jokes and no more coffee and no more cigarettes: I wanted out of here” (181).
Vonnegut directly references his suicide attempt in a March 22, 1984, letter to Walter
Miller: “As Offit may or may not have told you, I was in the short-termer nut-ward at
Saint Vincent’s … Now I’m an outpatient, allowed to carry matches again” (Letters 301).
A month later, in a letter to Peter Reed, he writes, “The Darwinian novel, Galapagos, has
been a perfect son-of-a-bitch to write” (Letters 303). The correspondence before and
after his letter to Walter Miller show Vonnegut struggling with finishing Galapagos. I
mention this here because one of the central arguments I wish to advance with this
dissertation is one of Vonnegut’s central preoccupations was himself, and this is the place
from which his philosophy stems. At the heart of his work is a desire to make life make
sense, not just for his characters and his readers, but for himself. While it would be
conjecture to try to connect Mary Hepburn’s suicide attempt in the novel to Vonnegut’s
own in 1984, we can establish that he was dealing with the same existential impulse to
end his life as his character.
For Mary Hepburn, the decision to commit suicide does not come easily.
Vonnegut painstakingly explores her suicide attempt in great detail. As he writes, “The
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widow Mary Hepburn, who had been taking all her meals in her room, was curing her
own brain sotto voce for the advice it was giving her, which was to commit suicide. ‘You
are my enemy,’ she whispered. ‘Why would I want to carry such a terrible enemy inside
of me?’” (25-6). A sentiment which best describes the mood of the novel is uttered not
by Mary but her husband, Roy, who, on his deathbed, says to a dying dog: “So long, old
pal. You’re going to a different world now. It’s sure to be a better one, since no other
world could be as bad as this one is” (42).
What’s so chilling is that suicide makes so much sense in the world of Galapagos.
The novel is narrated by a decapitated ghost—Leon Trout, Kilgore Trout’s son—from the
vantage point of exactly one million years in the future, looking back on 1986 A.D. as the
beginning of the end of the world and humanity as we know it. A handful of characters
are set to embark on The Nature Cruise of the Century aboard a ship aptly named Bahia
de Darwin. Before the ship can set sail from Guayaquil, a disastrous financial calamity
signals the collapse of the global economy, and pandemonium is followed by an
apocalypse. Leon, the headless ghost narrator, is much more concerned with Bahia de
Darwin’s passengers, and his focus, like Vonnegut’s, remains squarely on the human.
This in itself is significant, for Galapagos is not a story about how the world ended but
about how people survived…and evolved. Bahia de Darwin becomes “A Second Noah’s
Ark,” which Leon muses would be a fitting title for his story.
Just as in Cat’s Cradle, humanity is directly responsible for its own destruction.
Galapagos reads at times like an accusatory indictment against humanity though. Leon,
in his phantasmagoric omnipotence, realizes this: “But the planet a million years ago was
as moist and nourishing as it is today—and unique, in that respect in the entire Milky
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Way. All that had changed was people’s opinion of the place” (25). In other words,
people’s perspective had changed, and this is due to the antagonist of the novel—“big
brains.”
Many Vonnegut novels have a chorus of sorts, an ironic phrase or idea or even a
joke which is repeated throughout the text to establish a central point. SlaughterhouseFive provides the most representative example with “So it goes,” but “Hi ho” serves a
similar purpose in Slapstick. In the A Man Without a Country, he dispenses with subtlety
entirely and even goes so far as to announce, “And I realize some of you may have
trouble deciding whether I am kidding or not. So from now on, I will tell you when I’m
kidding” (23), and “I’m kidding” then becomes the chorus. In Galapagos, humankind’s
“big brain” acts as the novel’s mantra, but it lacks the sense of closure provided by “So it
goes” or the absurdity of “Hi ho.” Instead, it offers a near-constant reminder that
humanity is responsible for its own undoing.
Francine Pefko’s admonition in Cat’s Cradle--“You scientists think too much”—
is fully realized in Galapagos. More precisely, it’s not so much that people think too
much but rather that they think in the wrong way. “So I raise the question, although there
is nobody around to answer it: Can it be doubted that three-kilogram big brains were once
nearly fatal defects in the evolution of the human race?” the ghost of Leon Trout asks,
before providing the answer—“This was a very innocent planet, except for those great
big brains” (9). Evolution takes care of this problem in time. “This sort of confusion
would be impossible in the present day, since nobody has a name anymore—or a
profession, or a life story to tell. All that anybody has in the way of reputation anymore
is an odor which, from birth to death, cannot be modified. People are who they are, and
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that is that” (104). Darwinistically-speaking, evolution operates on a basic principle—in
order to survive, a species will adopt to its environment by shedding the traits which are
most harmful and developing the traits which are most needed. In the seal-like future,
“pretending” is no longer required. The problem first posed in Mother Night thus
becomes moot—“We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful what we pretend
to be.”
Yet pretending and adopting a perspectival illusion are not the same. Many of the
characters in Galapagos pretend to be something other than what they are—Willard
Flemming is actually James Wait, a “notoriously successful swindler” (8) working on a
hustle incognito; Andrew MacIntosh is a morally-shady financier to offer but two
examples. Pretending, though, is a way of advancing their own selfish agendas, and
serve as microcosms of the corrupt selfish schemes which trigger the financial crises that
bring about the end of the world. As Leon puts it: “Even at this late date, I am still full of
rage at a natural order which would have permitted the evolution of something as
distracting and irrelevant and disruptive as those great big brains of a million years ago.
If they had told the truth, then I could see some point in everybody’s having one. But
these things lied all the time” (189).
The limitations of the brain is a recurring theme in Vonnegut. In his Playboy
interview from a decade earlier, he tells David Standish: “And everything is a lie, because
our brains are two-bit computers, and we can’t get very high-grade truths out of them.
But as far as improving the human condition goes, our minds are certainly up to that.
That’s what they were designed to do. And we have the freedom to make up comforting
lies. But we don’t do enough of it” (Conversations 77). Galapagos is the full realization
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of this idea, for Vonnegut presents a world in which there are no comforting lies, and as
such, nothing standing between the human and the wretchedness brought about by its
own big brain.
In “Humane Harmony: Environmentalism and Culture in Vonnegut’s Writings,”
Said Mentak suggests that “in Galapagos, it is the human race and its damage to the
environment that anger [Vonnegut] most” (282). This is undeniably true, yet at the same
time, environmental degradation is just one of the many charges that Vonnegut brings
against humanity. Overall, the text at times reads like an indictment against the human
condition. A bright future is possible (consider the ways in which Mandarax could be
used to bridge global communication gaps, for instance), but humanity’s big brain finds a
way to make the world uninhabitable and inhospitable. For instance, the global market
collapse is a case in point: “The financial crisis, which could never happen today, was
simply the latest in a series of murderous twentieth-century catastrophes which had
originated entirely in human brains” (25). Throughout the novel, Vonnegut then offers a
litany of evils caused by big brains. War, of course, is a human creation, and Leon Trout
explains that “during my entire lifetime, there wasn’t a day when somewhere on the
planet, there weren’t at least three wars going on” (156-7). Slavery too is an entirely
human injustice. “Now, there is a big brain idea I haven’t heard much about lately:
slavery. How could you ever hold somebody in bondage with nothing but your flippers
and your mouth” (192). If there is a bright spot in Galapagos, it is evolution that saves
humanity from itself by making famine, war, and slavery biologically impossible.
What’s troubling, though, is that humanity must transcend the human and become
something else entirely in order to become cured of these evils.
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Leon Trout, as narrator, ultimately does something which Vonnegut, as we have
seen, was unable to do—identify a villain in his tale. “Again, I trot on stage the only real
villain in my story—the oversize human brain” (296). Galapagos is Vonnegut at his
most relentless, and the novel offers his most urgent warning. To find the true value of
Tralfamadorian escape or Bokononistic illusion, we need look no further than the
hopeless future depicted Galapagos.

In conclusion, Slaughterhouse-Five, Cat’s Cradle, and Galapagos serve as
examples of Vonnegut’s ongoing engagement with the world, and his work represents an
attempt to instill meaning into a life lived in the shadow of sorrow and suffering. Such
engagement showcases his insistence that the good life is possible, and that life can be
good. That said, his focus in these novels is largely on affirmation at the individual level,
and this presents a particular limitation. Todd Davis’s excellent study Kurt Vonnegut’s
Crusade focuses on the social dimensions of Vonnegut’s work. “Vonnegut’s main
theme,” Davis argues, “remains his call to common decency and his hope that we will
learn to respect one another before we destroy ourselves and the planet” (11). Such
communal “hope” is largely missing in Slaughterhouse-Five, Cat’s Cradle, and
Galapagos because they focus so much on individual perspective, which is isolating even
at best. Billy Pilgrim is perfectly happy on Tralfamadore, but his captivity is a lonely
one, and his happiness is based in illusion. For all the comforts that Bokononism can
offer, the religion’s foma aren’t enough to save the world from ice-nine. Ultimately, the
“big brains” which lead to the destruction of humanity are overcome, but at what cost?
Perspectivism is powerful, but it is almost always provincial. Alexander Nehamas
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articulates the problem of Nietzschean perspectivism: “If every view is only an
interpretation, and if, as perspectivism holds, there are no independent facts against
which various interpretations can be compared […] then it may be impossible to decide if
any interpretation is or is not correct” (2). The same charge can’t, however, be leveled at
illusion-based perspectivism in Vonnegut’s work. It matters very little whether
Tralfamadore is real or if Bokonon is full of shit—these lies, these illusions, these
perspectives—make life bearable. They don’t, however, make the world a better place
beyond the self, and they prove insufficient at preventing loneliness, war, or the
apocalypse. Illusion is a necessity, but in and of itself, it isn’t a definitive answer. In
order to transcend the individual, illusion must be shared, and only then can it become
transformative on a communal level. The next two chapters will explore this process by
looking at how artistic creation (chapter three) and community by way of artificial
extended families (chapter four) are essential components of illusion (or perspective)
sharing which lead to the good life in Vonnegut’s work.
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CHAPTER III:
BETTER LIVING THROUGH ART: VONNEGUT AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE
NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
In 1997’s Timequake, his last published novel, Vonnegut begins and ends his
opening chapter with two assertions, both of which articulate two organizing themes
which run throughout his fiction— “Being alive is a crock of shit” (3) and “a plausible
mission of artists is to make people appreciate being alive at least a little bit” (1). Just as
in his preface to 1968’s Welcome to the Monkey House he shares the realization that “the
two main themes of my novels were stated by my siblings: ‘Here I am cleaning the shit
off of practically everything’ and ‘No pain’” (xiv), I’d argue that the above two
observations which bookend Timequake’s first chapter also represent his lifelong
commitment to showing how art and aesthetic experience occupy a position of profound
significance in his worldview.
Throughout his work, Vonnegut describes existence as in dualistic terms, life
being a state in which the self is frequently divided. The true self, which he often refers
to as the soul, remains at odds with the flesh, or as he repeatedly calls it, the meat. He
describes himself as follows: “I am six feet two and weigh nearly two hundred pounds
and am badly coordinated, expect when I swim. All that borrowed meat does the
writing” (Monkey House xiii). Almost twenty years later, in Bluebeard, Rabo
Karabekian describes his own corporeal predicament: “My soul knows my meat is doing
bad things, and is embarrassed. But my meat just keeps right on doing bad things” (273)
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Such division of self is a (and, I would argue, the) defining aspect of Arthur
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. For Schopenhauer, existence is ruled by the will, and to be
human is to be driven by forces and appetites which are not only beyond one’s control
but often beyond one’s comprehension as well. Gunter Zoller uses the term
“phenomenological dualism” to define this dichotomy, which he suggests “is
supplemented by a monistic doctrine regarding the deep structure of the self that
underlies the latter’s division into will and body” (28). If all of Vonnegut’s protagonists,
from Paul Proteus to Billy Pilgrim to Kilgore Trout, share a single personality trait, it is
that their journeys are characterized by their attempts to navigate and negotiate the
phenomenological dualism of the meat and the soul.
In “Vonnegut’s Melancholy,” critic Kathryn Hume charts a convincing list of the
“presuppositions” which serve as uniting themes in Vonnegut’s fiction. Her analysis
includes randomness, helplessness, absurdity, and loneliness. To this list I would add
self-alienation. In Vonnegut’s world, his characters’ struggle with life and the cosmos is
second only to their struggles with themselves. Hume is correct is noting that
Vonnegut’s universe is one in which “people cannot control their circumstances” (229),
but fundamentally, being ill-equipped to understand, let alone control, themselves is at
the root of his characters’ struggles. Hume goes on to suggest that “Virtually none of
Vonnegut’s characters enjoy life” (235), and this is certainly true. However,
transcendence is always a possibility in Vonnegut’s world, and as for Schopenhauer,
aesthetic experience is unique in its ability to “make people appreciate being alive at least
a little bit” (Timequake 1).
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In this chapter I will be offering a reading of Deadeye Dick and Bluebeard,
Vonnegut’s novels which deal most explicitly with art through the lens of
Schopenhauerean aesthetic theory. While all of Vonnegut’s novels explore the nature of
art, either directly or indirectly, Deadeye Dick and Bluebeard are particularly unique in
that they offer a singularly cohesive aesthetic perspective. In that sense, when Deadeye
Dick and Bluebeard are brought into conversation with one another, the privileged role
that Vonnegut assigns artistic creation and aesthetic experience becomes clear. To date,
the definitive study of Vonnegut’s aesthetic outlook is David Andrews’ “Vonnegut and
Aesthetic Humanism.” Andrews argues that “Vonnegut’s belief that aesthetic experience
should be a communal activity designed to increase human kindness” (41) ultimately
provides an answer to the question: “what are the arts for?” (18, 41). By offering an
analysis of Vonnegut’s fiction in the context of Schopenhauer’s philosophical system, I
propose an alternate reading. At the outset, I offer two caveats: 1). My position is not
that Vonnegut modeled his aesthetic perspective on Schopenhauer’s philosophy but
rather that his unique aesthetic sensibilities are in the Schopenhauerean tradition. 2).
Vonnegut’s theory of aesthetics, like Schopenhauer’s, is ultimately limited. In both
views, art allows for temporary rather than sustained transcendence, and as such it is
unable to offer lasting escape from the horrors of existence. In her introduction to The
Pessimist’s Handbook, Hazel Barnes’ observation that “our condition is incurable. What
is required is a total salvation which may enable us to cease being ourselves” (viii) could
just as easily be applied to Vonnegut’s worldview as to Schopenhauer's. While both
Schopenhauer and Vonnegut could be accused, fairly, of offering a bleak view of the
human experience, they are staunch advocates of the transformative power of art, and
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while it may ultimately be incapable of delivering the type of salvation Barnes describes,
it can give meaning, if not overall purpose, to life. In short, for Vonnegut, the good life
might not be possible through art alone, but any life lived well is one in which the arts
play a central role.
Schopenhauer’s Aesthetics
In order to fully appreciate the complexity of Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory, it
is first necessary to understand his concept of the will. He offers both theories in his
seminal two-volume masterwork The World as Will and Representation, and while a
some of his (in)famous ideas come from the later Parerga and Paralipomena, the full
scope of Schopenhauer’s views on aesthetics can be found in The World as Will and
Representation. “But the word will,” he writes, “is to reveal to us the innermost essence
of everything in nature” and “every force in nature [can] be conceived as will” (World as
Will I 111). For Schopenhauer, will is the driving force which stands at the center of his
system, and the natural world is governed by this impulse, which he calls the “thing-initself” (World as Will I 110). In this sense, everything from sunsets to volcanic eruptions,
from fruit falling in orchards to black holes, can be understood as manifestations of the
will.
Similarly, Schopenhauer places will at the center of his view of human experience
as well. After all, “the world in which we live and have our being is, by its whole nature,
through and through will” (World as Will I 162). The problem with being governed by
the will is that it is both unavoidable and unknowable, and even at best, it renders life,
and the self, unknowable, at least to a point. That’s not to say that humanity doesn’t have
free will. Yet the will supersedes consciousness, and since it is largely unknowable, so
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too is existence. Schopenhauer most clearly articulates this existential dilemma as
follows: “Every person invariably has purposes and motives by which he guides his
conduct; and he is always able to give an account of his particular actions. But if he were
asked why he wills generally, or why in general he wills to exist, he would have no
answer; indeed, the question would seem to him absurd” (World as Will I 163). Will,
then, is the force that animates the world and pushes it forward, but it is so fundamentally
innate that it is difficult to articulate and rationalize. In Schopenhauer and the Wild Years
of Philosophy, Rudiger Safranski suggests that in the strictest sense, “will was a primary,
vital striving and movement which, in the borderline case, might become aware of itself
and which only then acquired the awareness of an aim, an intention, a purpose” (205).
Even in these unique instances, however, such aim doesn’t encompass the thrust of the
will in its totality. At a basic level, then, for Schopenhauer, to be human is to be
governed by a set of forces which are in most cases beyond the grasp of total
comprehension.
The problem is that the will is never satisfied, and it can never be satiated. There
is no end of willing, and this is the source of existential tension which complicates
existence. Volume II of The World as Will and Representation, which supplements the
main argument built in the first volume, paints a much bleaker view of the will. Here, he
argues that “Since, on the contrary, the will wills life absolutely and for all time, it
exhibits itself at the same time as sexual impulse which has an endless series of
generations in view” (II 568). The sexual metaphor is certainly fitting. Lust, expressed
in the sexual act, isn’t fulfilled through experience. Rather, desire is momentarily
quenched, but after a brief metaphorical and literal refractory period, it returns, seeking
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more of the same. Hunger offers another way of understanding the will. A great meal is
momentarily satisfying, but soon the individual is hungry again, regardless of the quality
or quantity of the meal. Existence for Schopenhauer is a virtually uninterrupted
metaphorical journey of horniness and hungriness, forever and ever.
Another extended example Schopenhauer offers for the will at work is his theory
of the will-to-life. This applies not only to humanity but more broadly to every aspect of
the universe. “Every glance at the world, to explain which is the task of the philosopher,
confirms and establishes that the will-to-live, far from being an arbitrary hypostasis or
even an empty expression, is the only true description of the world’s innermost nature”
(World as Will II 350). This will-to-life becomes cruel and more than a little ironic in
light of the fact that “the cares and troubles of life are out of all proportion to the yield or
profit from it” (World as Will II 354). Vonnegut most directly offers his take on the willto-life conundrum in Breakfast of Champions, where he describes Kilgore Trout’s
existential dilemma as follows: “I1 had given him a life not worth living, but I had also
given him an iron will to live” (72). In the clutches of such a paradox, existence becomes
cruelly ironic. Indeed, from this perspective life becomes a prolonged exercise in
frustration, yet one which we are compelled to endure. For both Schopenhauer and
Vonnegut, the game may be rigged, but to be human is to be driven by the desire to stay
at the table for as long as possible. The dice may be loaded and the deck stacked, but
after all, “it’s the only game in town” (Timequake 188).

1

The commonly used Delta and Dial paperbacks both carry a significant typo here and
mistakenly feature “It” in place of “I” here, which fundamentally changes the meaning of
this line. The Delacorte hardback offers the correct version.
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Trout’s will-to-live amidst the wreckage of a life frequently not worth living is a
predicament Vonnegut was intimately familiar with himself. In Keeping Literary
Company, Jerome Klinkowitz offers a haunting account of Vonnegut’s presence at an
Iowa City party during the 1960s in which Vonnegut “began to mutter, ‘I want…I
want…’ before breaking off incoherently. Later, Gordy Menninga, Klinkowitz’s friend,
added: “’He said he wanted to be dead” (34-5). Vonnegut’s daughter, Nanette, offers an
intimate glimpse of a fear she carried through life in her revealing introduction to We Are
What We Pretend to Be: First and Last Works, writing that she “worried that he would
not answer the door and I might find him dead. Growing up, suicide was always
considered a possible and even logical outcome of my father’s life. But my father always
answered the door, and I usually found him in the act of writing” (xi). To paint too bleak
a picture of Vonnegut’s disposition would be both unfair and inaccurate. The tributes
and personal reflections which fill Happy Birthday, Kurt Vonnegut, a festschrift
commissioned by Jill Krementz, or Jim O’Loughlin’s richly illuminating recent Kurt
Vonnegut Remembered reveal that he was warm, compassionate, charitable, and above
all, funny and charming. It is worth noting, however, that like many of his characters,
Vonnegut frequently found himself struggling through the “striving, suffering, and
erring” (World as Will II 573) which dominate Schopenhauer’s will-centric universe.
In the face of this struggle, Vonnegut remained aware of his audience, and the
sense of obligation towards his readers is ever-present. He recounts a defining moment
in his career as a public speaker during which “a circuit breaker in my head snapped out”
(Wampeters xiii).

After delivering an address before the Library of Congress, a member

of the audience asked, “You are a leader of American young people. What right do you
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have to teach them to be so cynical and pessimistic?” (Wampeters xiv), and this had a
profound impact on Vonnegut. He realized that he was expounding on problems for
which he was ill-equipped to offer solutions, and this troubled him. In this sense, he
differs from Schopenhauer considerably. I would argue that the central weakness to be
found in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is its lack of a solution to the horrors of existence.
After meticulously building his argument that to be human is to be ruled by will, he
explains that “our state or condition is rather something that it were better should not be”
(World as Will II 577). Yet he offers nothing practical to fill this void. Camus’ resistance
and Nietzsche’s affirmation are wholly absent in Schopenhauer’s work. Suicide for
Schopenhauer is not only understandable, but “it is obvious there is nothing in the world
a man has more incontestable right to than [choosing to end] his own life” (Essays and
Aphorisms 77). In this framework, suffering can only be momentarily suspended, and this
is the ultimate value of art for Schopenhauer.
Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetic experience makes allowances for natural
beauty, but primary it focuses on artistic contemplation, which results in a state of “bliss
and peace of mind…free from all willing” (World as Will I 212). The transcendental
qualities of this experience, peppered with 19th century terms like “sublime,” are
obviously of their time, but “bliss” aside, what’s of importance here is the notion that art
allows the individual to momentarily transcend the self. If human suffering comes from
the will, the value of aesthetic contemplation is that it allows for “pure, will-less”
experience (World as Will I 212). As Cheryl Foster describes it, for Schopenhauer,
“aesthetic contemplation as a means of achieving objective, intuitive cognition serves as
a source for meaning in life” (214). Art is privileged in Schopenhauer’s estimation
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because it is the site at which this meaning is constructed. “The pleasure of everything
beautiful, the consolation afforded by art,” he explains, allows the individual to
momentarily “forget the cares of this life,” which is otherwise “constant suffering, and is
partly woeful, partly fearful” (World as Will I 267). The central limitation is that once the
artistic encounter is over, the insatiable will once again reigns supreme and unchecked.
The cycle never ends.
In “Schopenhauer’s Pessimism,” Christopher Janaway carefully constructs the
thoughtful argument that the bleakness at the heart of Schopenhauer’s work is incredibly
nuanced, and that ultimately, “a pessimistic description of life is compatible with an
affirmation of it” (335). One of Janaway’s most important contribution to Schopenhauer
studies, in this essay, in his entry in Oxford’s Past Masters series, and as general editor of
multi-volume Cambridge Edition of Schopenhauer’s work, is in charting this complex
relationship between the self and the world. As he notes in his Past Masters monograph:
“Schopenhauer’s philosophical pessimism resides in two connected theses: that for each
individual it would have been better not to have been born, and that the world as a whole
is the worst of all possible worlds,” (96). However, he goes on to suggest,
“Schopenhauer’s arguments for these extreme pessimist doctrines therefore fail to
convince” (97) which he supports by asserting that the presence of suffering doesn’t
render life without value and reward. This is undeniably true, of course, but it also draws
attention to the unavoidable despair found at the core of Schopenhauer’s work.
Kathryn Hume’s “Vonnegut’s Melancholy” serves as a fascinating companion
piece to Janaway’s “Schopenhauer’s Pessimism,” and she too nuances the sense of
despair which is found in much of Vonnegut’s work. Vonnegut “is pessimistic about
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government and social organization,” she convincingly illustrates. However, her assertion
that “the reasons for the melancholy become clearer when you ask how Vonnegut feels
about people. Basically, he seems unable to believe in them or work up any strong
emotions over them” (235) doesn’t fully take into account the genuine sense of
humanistic purpose which is central to all of Vonnegut’s fiction. To be human in
Vonnegut’s world is to be vulnerable and frequently alone in an absurd universe devoid
of any meaning, but one of the aims of this dissertation is to show how he continually
attempts, to “bring chaos to order” (Breakfast 215) for his characters, for himself, and for
his readers. Two-thirds of the way through Breakfast of Champions, he interrupts the
narrative to declare, “there is no order in the world around us, [so] we must adapt
ourselves to the requirements of chaos instead. It is hard to adapt to chaos, but it can be
done. I am living proof of that: It can be done” (215). For Vonnegut, adapting the chaos
involves reconciling daily life with the central obstacle to contentment which he finds at
the core of human experience—not will, but embarrassment.
Will, Embarrassment, and Aesthetic Experience
So how does Schopenhauer’s will factor into Vonnegut’s philosophical system?
For the answer, we must turn to Vonnegut’s nonfiction, which offers some of his most
personal writing. His essays, articles, and commencement addresses allow him to speak
candidly on any number of issues, and as such, the significance of Vonnegut’s substantial
body of nonfiction cannot be overstated. Palm Sunday and Fates Worse Than Death help
bring the novels into conversation with each other, and the autobiographical connective
tissue of these works help situate the themes explored within the novels in the context of
his own life. While these texts serve as anthologies of articles, speeches, commencement
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addresses, such previously published/delivered material is connected by intensively
personal, often revealing asides and observations. Vonnegut refers to Palm Sunday as a
“new literary form” for which “a new name should be created.” He proposes blivit, “a
word which during my adolescence we defined by peers as ‘two pounds of shit in a onepound bag’” (xi-ii). In Vonnegut in Fact, The Public Spokesmanship of Personal Fiction,
Jerome Klinkowitz offers the first comprehensive study of Vonnegut’s non-fiction.
“Vonnegut’s own method,” he explains, “implicit in his fiction and explicit in his public
spokesmanship, is to organize ideas and images so that a space can be opened for a
freedom of fresher thought” (9). Such organization, of course, is a life’s work,
particularly when it involves not only adapting to chaos but also “bring[ing] chaos to
order” (Breakfast of Champions 215).
The chaos which resides at the core of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is that
unfulfillment precedes essence. The all-consuming will renders life a perpetual state of
frustration in which “every enjoyment is always only half an enjoyment, every
gratification introduces its own disturbance, every relief new worries and troubles”
(World as Will II 577). In Vonnegut’s framework, this cellular sense of frustration is
driven rather by deep-rooted embarrassment. He devotes an entire chapter to the subject
in 1981’s Palm Sunday, where he writes:
A friend of mine once spoke to me about what he called the “existential hum,” the
uneasiness which keeps us moving, which never allows us to feel entirely at ease.
He had tried heroin once. He said he understood at once the seduction of that
narcotic. For the first time in his life, he was not annoyed by the existential hum.
I would describe the hum which is with me all the time as embarrassment. I have
somehow disgraced myself (169).
The language Vonnegut uses here is deliberately philosophical. The existential hum in
question is ongoing and largely inescapable—it is a feeling which “is with me all the
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time.” In the rest of the chapter, he candidly discusses how embarrassment has
overshadowed significant moments and events in his life. For example, his uncle Alex,
to whom Vonnegut dedicated The Sirens of Titan, refused to read the novel. His aunt
Ella, who owned a bookstore here in Louisville, refused to carry his books because “she
found them degenerate” (169). The dissolution of his first marriage was so painful to
him, in part, because he was only the second Vonnegut to be divorced since his family
arrived in America. “So I am embarrassed about the failure of my first marriage. I am
embarrassed by my older relatives’ responses to my books. But I was embarrassed before
I was married or had written a book” (172). At the same time, he explains that his
embarrassment stems from a much deeper and more personal source. “A bad dream I
have dreamed for as long as I can remember may hold the clue. In that dream, I know
that I have murdered an old woman a long time ago. I have led an exemplary life ever
since” (172-3). Charles Berryman, who has written extensively on the connection
between Vonnegut’s life and work, suggests that this particular dream shapes and informs
“all five of his novels from Slaughterhouse-Five to Deadeye Dick” (96). Vonnegut offers
no psychoanalytic interpretation as to what this dream may signify, and he never
explicitly mentions it again. However, he saw this dream as a key to understanding the
life-long feeling of embarrassment, and he would go on to explore the themes of murder,
guilt, and embarrassment in Deadeye Dick, a novel which is certainly in part an attempt
to work through this recurring nightmare.
Vonnegut also reflects on the existential hum of embarrassment in a 1980 address
delivered at the First Parish Unitarian Church in Cambridge Massachusetts.
Interestingly, he uses the language of dreams here as well. “This is only a dream,” he
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explains. “I know that this is only a dream. I have had it before. It is a dream of cosmic
embarrassment. I stand before a large and nicely dressed audience. I have promised to
speak on the most profound and poetic of all human concerns—the dignity of human
nature. Only a maniac would make such a grandiose promise, but that is what I have
done—in this dream” (Palm Sunday 192). In many ways, this short speech serves as a
microcosm of Vonnegut’s entire career of bringing “chaos to order.” Dignity, after all, is
the antithesis of embarrassment, and this is the tension which runs throughout
Vonnegut’s work. If life is “a crock of shit,” how can it have meaning? More to the
point, how can the individual experience dignity in the face of cosmic embarrassment?
Vonnegut’s correspondence offers another clue to understanding this paradox. It
also adds an eerie metaphysical component to both his work and his philosophical
outlook. In a 1972 letter to his first wife Jane, he randomly adds, “I still believe that a
dog is going to kill me, and it scares me—and it pisses me off” (192). This is the only
published mention of this particular fear. However, fast forward to March 14, 2007, the
day of the accidental fall which would lead to his death: “Outside the brownstone, as he
and Flour [his dog] reached the bottom steps, the little dog spun around to see if he was
coming. He tripped over her leash, pitched forward full-length, and struck the right side
of his face on the sidewalk, losing consciousness instantly” (Shields 415). Vonnegut
never again regained consciousness and died on April 11, 2007. For over 35 years (at
least), he harbored the fear that he would be killed by a dog, only to have this fate
tragically (if indirectly) realized. This fear partially explains the cosmic embarrassment
which was part of Vonnegut’s worldview. Edgar Derby surviving the firebombing of
Dresden only to be executed for stealing a teapot from the wreckage in Slaughterhouse92

Five is not only tragic—it is a fate lacking in dignity, and as such, it is an embarrassment.
The same could be said of Vonnegut ultimately. Surviving Dresden’s firebombing,
innumerable personal tragedies, and a failed suicide attempt to ultimately be killed by a
dog isn’t just ironic—it’s cosmically cruel. As Vonnegut reminds us in his 1991
autobiographical collage, there are indeed Fates Worse Than Death.
Repeatedly, Vonnegut returns to the idea of embarrassment in his novels, and it is
one of the defining traits present in virtually all of his protagonists. Consider Billy
Pilgrim’s absurd uniform in Slaughterhouse-Five, Eliot Rosewater’s inability to accept
his reality in God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, Malachi Constant’s intergalactic wanderings
in The Sirens of Titan, or Howard W. Campbell Jr.’s war crimes in Mother Night. The
trait they all share is chronic embarrassment, not because of what they’ve done so much
as who they are. In Hocus Pocus, Eugene Debs Hartke arrives at the following
realization, and it could be spoken just as easily by any of these characters: “How
embarrassing to be human” (309). In large part, Vonnegut becomes a character in his
own fiction again and again not just as a postmodern conceit or simply because he was
jumping on the metafictional bandwagon which became normalized in the 1970s but
rather because the line separating fiction and non-fiction becomes increasingly blurred
throughout his career. The novels become more personal. This culminates with his final
novel, Timequake, where he is the protagonist as much as his alter ego, Kilgore Trout.
When he writes in the opening chapter, “It appears to me that most highly evolved
Earthling creatures find being alive embarrassing or much worse” (1) he is writing about
himself as much as any of the other fictional/real “characters” which populate the novel.
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Ultimately, cosmic embarrassment for Vonnegut occupies the role that will does
for Schopenhauer. It is a source of near-constant existential discomfort and the chief
obstacle to contentment. Unfortunately, for both Vonnegut and Schopenhauer, the
condition is terminal. For the will, “its desires are unlimited, its claims inexhaustible, and
every satisfied desire gives birth to a new one. No possible satisfaction in the world could
suffice to still its craving, set a final goal to its demands, and fill the bottomless pit of its
heart” (World as Will II 573). Two interviews conducted in the last two years of his life
offer glimpses of Vonnegut at his most Schopenhauerean. “Absurd is too weak a word,”
he told David Nason of The Australian in 2005. “I find life preposterous.” Around the
same time, in an aborted interview with Tasha Robinson which she describes as “my
greatest professional appointment to date,” Vonnegut spoke for ten minutes about “how
mankind is doomed. We have to hope. There is no future. We’ve ruined our
environment and ruined ourselves” before cancelling the interview altogether, calling it
“too lugubrious” to continue. Both Nason and Robinson conclude, unfairly so, that
Vonnegut had given in to despair at the end of his life. This same misguided notion
serves as perhaps the single greatest limitation of Charles Shields’ biography. Other
interviews and appearances from the same era as the Nason/Robinson interviews show
Vonnegut to be both enthusiastic and hopeful—see his Daily Show appearance or J.
Rentilly’s and Heather Augustyn’s interviews collected in The Last Interview and Other
Conversations. That said, gloom and pessimism can be found throughout Vonnegut’s
work. Again, my goal here is not to suggest that the antecedents of Vonnegut’s
“existential hum” can be traced back to Schopenhauer. Rather, I wish to explore how
contentment and happiness are not inalienable rights for either Schopenhauer or
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Vonnegut. In a world of suffering and chaos, they must be constantly negotiated. Just as
aesthetic experience allows the individual to transcend the will for Schopenhauer, it plays
an equally-important role in Vonnegut’s philosophical framework in that it allows the
individual to transcend the embarrassment of being alive. The failed novelist Paul
Slazinger’s assertion in Bluebeard that “the human condition can be summed up in just
one word, and this is the word: Embarrassment” (14) is best understood in the context
that he, like Rabo Karabekian, no longer engages with art, and in Vonnegut’s world, this
removes the possibility of transcendence.
Transcending the “Shit” of Life
More than serving as an alter ego of sorts for Vonnegut himself, Kilgore Trout in
many ways serves as the definitive character in Vonnegut’s fiction, an everyman of sorts
tasked with navigating the absurdities of modernity. While fame, fortune, comfort, and
success elude him for most of his life, he succeeds where Eliot Rosewater, Billy Pilgrim,
Dwayne Hoover, and, with the exception of Rabo Karabekian, the rest of Vonnegut’s
protagonists fail—he adapts to the “requirements of chaos” (Breakfast of Champions
215). When he writes in Timequake that Trout “could tune out the crock of shit being
alive was as long as he was scribbling, head down, with a ballpoint pen on a yellow legal
pad” (8), Vonnegut is offering the culmination of a line of thought he’s explored since the
beginning of his career. Work, religion, illusion, and being “busy, busy, busy” serve as
mere distractions, whereas aesthetic creation leads to something much more profoundly
transcendental. “I think that life is no way to treat an animal, and not just people, but
pigs and chickens, too. Life just hurts too much,” he said during a lecture a 2004 address
at Eastern Washington University, before adding, “But when you stop to think about it,
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only a nutcase would want to be a human being, if he or she had a choice. Such
treacherous, untrustworthy, lying, and greedy animals we are” (If This Isn’t Nice 48-9).
This is Vonnegut at his most Schopenhauerean, but it also encapsulates his systematic
view of the universe and the human condition. The fault is in both the stars and
ourselves. It is into this paradox that Vonnegut introduces an aesthetic theory not in
which art comes galivanting to the rescue and saves the day, but rather, where art allows
the individual to momentarily bring chaos to order by making “at least one little part of
[the universe] exactly as it should be” (If This Isn’t Nice 86).
The extreme importance of art in Vonnegut’s work and in his personal life cannot
be overstated. For example, in a personal aside in Timequake, he describes his “knack for
finding in great books, some of them very funny books, reason enough to feel honored to
be alive, no matter what else may be going on” (182). As for Schopenhauer, artistic
experience offers both escape and transcendence for Vonnegut. In his introduction to
Bagambo Snuff Box, he compares short fiction to “Buddhist catnaps” in explaining the
commonalities between stories and Buddhist meditation, both of which allow the
individual to momentarily forget the problems of the world (6).
Much more so than Schopenhauer, however, Vonnegut establishes a pronounced
distinction between aesthetic experience and aesthetic creation. He repeatedly refers to
creation as an act of “becoming” (Like Shaking Hands 33). For instance, in a 1972 letter
to Jose and Maria Donoso, Vonnegut writes about his depression, explaining, “My
understanding is that I am so odd emotionally and socially that I had better live alone for
the rest of my days.” However, he adds, “I still have life in me as an artist” (Letters 191).
This candidly-unflattering admission is far from uncharacteristic. In many ways, it serves
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as a microcosm of a position Vonnegut (and many of his protagonists) give voice to
repeatedly—namely, art’s ability to offer respite in the midst of isolation and personal
catastrophe. David Andrews convincingly argues that “Insofar as art forges a bond
between creator and perceiver...art’s communicative function is most important to
Vonnegut” (19). Indeed, for Vonnegut, artistic creation serves not only as a way to live
with isolation but also a way to overcome it. It is in Fates Worse Than Death where he
muses most directly on the interplay between readers and writers: “Literature, unlike any
other art form, requires those who enjoy it to be performers. Reading is a performance,
and anything a writer can do to make this difficult activity easier is a benefit to all
concerned. Why write a symphony, so to speak, which can’t be played by the New York
Philharmonic?” (55). For Vonnegut, writing is an act of engagement, a method for
entering into a collaborative performance with the reader. In this way, artistic creation
serves as the ultimate form of aesthetic experience, allowing the artist to meaningfully
connect with others. As we will see in the next chapter, creation in and of itself is
insufficient in Vonnegut’s framework for overcoming isolation—a more traditionally
direct form of community is needed for this—but art is always an act of engagement for
Vonnegut.
Yet engagement itself is not the ultimate aim of art for Vonnegut. For that matter,
neither is sharing a particular message (the didactic model) or even making a living (the
commercial model). That’s not to say Vonnegut didn’t see the need for both. Dave
Eggers praises the “moral instruction” which runs through much of Vonnegut’s fiction,
particularly the early short stories (While Mortals Sleep viii), and Vonnegut himself has
written and spoken at length about the frequent critical accusations that he has built a
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career “pervert[ing] art for money” (Palm Sunday 94). To be sure, over the course of his
career, Vonnegut’s fiction became both more directly instructive and more commercially
viable, even, paradoxically, while it became more experimental and more personal. Yet
these aspects are secondary—for Vonnegut, an artist’s ultimate reward is in the act of
creation. “The arts are not a way to make a living,” he writes in A Man Without a
Country. “They are a very human way of making life more bearable. Practicing an art,
no matter how well or badly, is a way to make your soul grow, for heaven’s sake. Sing in
the shower. Dance to the radio. Tell stories. Write a poem to a friend, even a lousy
poem. Do this as well as you possibly can. You will get an enormous reward. You will
have created something” (24). It is creation that makes art rewarding or fulfilling for
Vonnegut more than anything else.
What is the value of art, then, in Vonnegut’s philosophical framework? As we
have seen, it serves two purposes, both of which are intricately interwoven: it “bring[s]
chaos to order” (Breakfast of Champions 215) and it “mak[es] life more bearable” (A
Man Without 24). As such, art exists not so much for its own sake, but primarily, for the
sake of the artist. In fact, whether the art ever finds an audience is in some ways
irrelevant—creation is the site at which the work of art takes on meaning. To illustrate
this point, Vonnegut repeatedly returns to the idea of the writer/artist who creates without
the possibility of an audience. In Cat’s Cradle, for instance, the narrator, Jonah, is
writing a book about the end of the world after the world has ended, at which point there
is no one left to read the book. It’s no accident that Jonah ends his book with an
encounter with Bokonon, who shrugs and hands him the last sentence of The Book of
Bokonon on a scrap of paper. For Jonah and Bokonon, it’s the act of writing which is its
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own reward precisely because it allows them to make sense of the chaos which surrounds
them. Similarly, in Slapstick, Wilbur-Daffodil-11 Swain finds himself writing a book
addressed simply to “To Whom It May Concern” after the world has been ravaged by the
mysterious Green Death. “And who will read all this?” he asks (27). Not only is there no
audience, but there can be no audience in the world of the novel. The writing itself is an
act of ordering and its own reward.
The author-with-no-audience motif is employed most directly in Galapagos. As
we saw in the previous chapter, Galapagos is a novel about the end of the humanity
which is narrated by a ghost. Importantly, it too is presented in the form of a text. “And
by golly if I haven’t become a writer, too, scribbling away like Father, without the
slightest hint that there might be a reader somewhere. There isn’t one. There can’t be”
(280), explains the narrator, Leon Trout, near the end of the novel. Just because there can
be no reader, however, doesn’t mean that there can be no text. It is the act of creation
which allows Leon to render meaningful what he sees and experiences. Even though he
concludes, “I have written these words in air—with the tip of the index finder of my left
hand, which is also air” (318), this doesn’t diminish the value of the work he has created
in the least. Art may be ephemeral, but aesthetic experience and artistic creation are
invaluable. On this point Schopenhauer and Vonnegut would undoubtably agree.
Having established Vonnegut’s view of aesthetics, we will now turn to two
underappreciated late-period novels, both of which are joined by a singular aesthetic
theory. When brough into conversation, 1982’s Deadeye Dick and 1987’s Bluebeard
reveal themselves to be Vonnegut’s novels of aesthetics, both of which offer variations of
transcendental aesthetic experience and artistic creation in the Schopenhauerean tradition.
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Deadeye Dick: Saving Pianos from Termites
Along with Slapstick, which we will explore in chapter four, Deadeye Dick is
among Vonnegut’s most tragically underrated novels. It is also one of the most
frequently misread. Overall, it is certainly among the most directly personal of
Vonnegut’s novels, and if Slapstick is Vonnegut’s attempt to capture “what life feels like
to me” (1), Deadeye Dick is his attempt to render shame, guilt, and embarrassment
intelligible in the most personal terms possible. In the preface, Vonnegut announces that
he will “explain the main symbols of the book” (xii). The “unappreciated, empty arts
center,” for example, “is my head as my sixtieth birthday beckons me” and “the neutered
pharmacist who tells the tale is my declining sexuality” (xii-xiii). Among this analysis,
however, is the following line, which shapes and informs any reading of the novel: “The
crime [Rudy Waltz, the novel’s narrator] committed in childhood is all the bad things I
have done” (xiii). Deadeye Dick turns out to be a novel which is obsessively fixated on
Rudy’s childhood’s crime as it is the defining event of his life, the single act which colors
the lens through which everything else is viewed. In this sense, given Vonnegut’s
prefatory analysis, the novel is also Vonnegut’s attempt to come to terms with the guilt of
his own past. Simply put, Rudy Waltz’s narrative of shame and embarrassment offers an
important insight into what life “feels like” for Vonnegut, and the parallels between how
Rudy and Vonnegut cope with life are unmistakable. If for no other reason, Deadeye
Dick is an essential novel for understanding the full scope of Vonnegut’s philosophical
project.
Deadeye Dick is a novel in two parts—the first part focuses on how Rudy Waltz
accidentally becomes a murderer at the age of twelve; the second is how he attempts to
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make sense of life afterwards—more specifically, how he uses art to transcend the agony
of life, thereby overcoming a personal history dominated by almost unbearable guilt and
shame. Two critical perspectives help frame the rather unusual place the novel occupies
in Vonnegut’s oeuvre. Benjamin DeMott treats Deadeye Dick as an amusing but
altogether unremarkable novel, noting that “the book’s tone, content, arrangements and
assumptions nowhere diverge from this writer’s norms” (246). By insisting on reading
Deadeye Dick within the larger context of Vonnegut’s body of work, he misses the
profoundly personal dimensions of the novel. This is a highly unusual novel by
Vonnegut’s standards, and it’s his first major work to maturely explore art not as escape
but as legitimate coping mechanism. Loree Rackstraw conversely argues that “Deadeye
Dick will likely stand as Vonnegut’s most tightly crafted and complex work to date”
(“The Vonnegut Cosmos” 54), which is perhaps too generous an assessment. Given the
narrative and stylistic innovations of Slaughterhouse-Five and Breakfast of Champions,
Rackstraw’s position is somewhat overstated. By Vonnegut standards, Deadeye Eye isn’t
a particularly engaging novel. The characters are thinly-drawn, none more so that the
protagonist, Rudy Waltz. This is due to Vonnegut breaking one of his long-established
rules of fiction writing—“Every character should want something, even if it is only a
glass of water” (Bagombo 12). No character in all of Vonnegut wants less than Rudy
Waltz, whose life philosophy can summed up as follows: “I don’t really belong on this
particular planet” (199). His story is one of extreme withdrawal, and given the firstperson narration, readers spend over 250 pages looking at the world through the eyes of a
self-described “emotional neuter.” Try as he might, Rudy can’t get it up for existence,
his perpetual metaphoric impotence serving as a chronic condition.
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Throughout the novel, Vonnegut attempts to show how art can give meaning to
life. The event which dominates Rudy’s life is the accidental double murder of a woman
and child on Mother’s Day, 1944, when Rudy was twelve years old. Apropos of nothing,
Rudy ascends to the cupola in his ancestral home and randomly discharges his father’s
Springfield .30-06 into the air, seemingly without even thinking. Inadvertently, the bullet
travels eight blocks and strikes the pregnant Eloise Metzger between the eyes as she
vacuums her apartment, killing her and her unborn child instantly. Like Camus’
Meursault, Rudy is completely incapable of offering an explanation of what made him
fire the rifle that morning, yet the freakish accident transforms the child into “a notorious
murderer known as ‘Deadeye Dick’” (23), a cruel nickname for someone skilled with a
firearm which follows Rudy throughout his life. Upon becoming Deadeye Dick, Rudy
Waltz effectively ceases to exist. The child grows into a man who is defined not by the
sum of his actions but rather by a particularly heinous accidental mishap from his youth.
Decades later, while serving as a third-shift pharmacist at an all-night drugstore in town,
Rudy is continuously reminded of his past, what he has done, and who he is. “Hardly a
night passed that some young person, feeling wonderfully daring and witty, no doubt,
would telephone and ask me if I was Deadeye Dick. I always was. I always will be”
(141). In short, Rudy is Deadeye Dick, not just to the residents of Midland City, but also
to himself.
It's significant that Rudy describes his initial reaction to the double murder as
embarrassment. “Because of my age,” he explains, “I could not be prosecuted…So I felt
safe, although embarrassed” (83). Shame and guilt are inextricably woven into the fabric
of Rudy’s daily life, but above all is a sense of embarrassment which he unable to shake.
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As noted earlier, for Vonnegut, embarrassment is “the hum which is with me all the time”
(Palm Sunday 169), and given his life-long recurring dream of murdering a woman in the
past (Palm Sunday 172-3), the parallels between Rudy’s existential dilemma and
Vonnegut’s own become clear. In this way, Deadeye Dick is a novel very much about an
individual’s attempt to come to terms not just with the past, but existence altogether and
at the same time Vonnegut’s own attempt to explore his own existential angst.
Like so many of Vonnegut’s protagonists, Rudy attempts to escape reality by
retreating from it. “The is my principle objection to life, I think,” he suggests early in the
novel. “It is too easy, when alive, to make perfectly horrible mistakes” (6). To avoid
making mistakes, he removes himself from life through physical and emotional
detachment. He repeatedly refers to himself as a “neuter” in the novel, and the term
carries both physical and psychological connotations. Sex, both as a means of pleasure
and as an act of shared intimacy, is something which Rudy chooses to deny himself.
More to the point, intimacy is something which he feels himself unworthy of and thus
unable to experience. He uses the word “egregious” to describe the state of neuterdom,
which he defines, with a nod to Nietzsche, as “outside the herd” (150). For Rudy,
existence is, above all, egregious. His tragedy is not that he chooses to be a neuter but
that he doesn’t know how to be anything else. In Schopenhauerian terms, Rudy’s
existence is pure will, a prolonged exercise in unfulfillment.
This is where art factors into the novel. For Rudy, life can only be understood in
aesthetic terms. He fully realizes Nietzsche’s notion of becoming a “poet of the self” in
the most reductively literal way. “I have a trick for dealing with all my worst memories.
I insist that they are plays. The characters are actors. The speeches and movements are
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stylized… I am in the presence of art” (94). His narrative is continuously interrupted by
these internal dramas, moments of artistic creation which he fashions to make sense of
key events in his life. The act of creation provides Rudy with relief outside of himself,
giving him authority over artificial internalized narratives in a way he is incapable of
commanding in life. In Schopenhauerean terms, aesthetic experience provides fleeting
“bliss and peace of mind…free from all willing” (World as Will I 212) while artistic
creation allows him to bend the past to his will. Examples of Rudy’s fashioning the past
into plays in his head include “Duplex,” which tells the story of his role in the dissolution
of his brother Felix’s marriage, and an untitled play in which Celia Hoover, former town
beauty and eventual wife of Dwayne Hoover, runs amok in the pharmacy because Rudy
won’t issue her pills without a prescription. What these plays allow Rudy to do is
momentarily not be Deadeye Dick, if only in his own mind. As such, they provide, in
Schopenhauer’s framework, an escape from the self.
Tragically, Rudy ultimately forms a problematic relationship with art. His
awareness that he “always will be” (141) Deadeye Dick is unshakable, and rather than
attempt to establish his identity as Rudy Waltz, he passively accepts the identity of
Deadeye Dick. For him, art offers momentary respite but no lasting escape. This last
point is particularly important because with Deadeye Dick Vonnegut is interested in art’s
ability to improve the quality of human life. This is a concern which will dominate his
work in the final decades of his career. In Deadeye Dick, Vonnegut is suggesting that art
can make life worth living, but unlike in previous novels (Mother Night, God Bless You,
Mr. Rosewater, Slaughterhouse-Five, Breakfast of Champions) here he advances the
position that life cannot be lived in purely aesthetic terms. A life well-lived, Vonnegut
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suggests, requires both community and engagement (as we shall see in chapter four), and
Rudy has neither.
Throughout the novel, Rudy repeatedly explains life as being a peephole, “the
idea of birth’s being an opening peephole, and of death’s being when the peephole closes
again” (81). The space between the opening and the closing is where living takes place,
when the “eye” of existence is momentarily opened. David Cowart argues that the
peephole is “the novel’s most prominent metaphor” (181) in “Culture and Anarchy:
Vonnegut’s Later Career,” and this clearly shapes his reading of Deadeye Dick, which he
calls a “cheerless” (181) novel set in “an environmental chaos that Rudy can do virtually
nothing to alleviate” (182). Given Rudy’s repeated insistence that death is little more
than the closing of one’s peephole, Cowart’s reading is convincing. However, the central
metaphor of the novel is not the peephole but rather “the termites and the piano,” one of
Vonnegut’s most carefully-crafted and self-contained parables. Just before her death, and
with her brain ravaged by tumors, Rudy’s mother shares the story from her childhood of
“walking into the music room of her father’s mansion, which she had believed to be
indestructible as a little girl, and seeing what looked like foam, boiling out of the floor
and a baseboard near a grand piano, and out of the legs and keyboard of the piano itself”
(248). The foam turned out to be “billions and billions” of termites, and when her father
kicks the piano leg, it “crumpled like it was made out of cardboard. The piano fell down”
(248). This memory is haunted by the insistence that “Nobody had played the piano for
years. If somebody had played it, maybe it would have driven the bugs out of there”
(248). This image perfectly encapsulates Vonnegut’s theory of aesthetics. It’s not enough
to simply own a piano; it’s necessary to play the damn thing. Rudy’s tragedy is that he
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disappears into art, much like the termites into the piano, without fully exploring the
instrument’s potential.
Rudy’s life-as-drama approach to existence is capped by his belief that “if a
person survives as ordinary span of sixty years or more, there is every chance that his or
her life as a shapely story has ended, and all that remains to be experienced is epilogue”
(235). Clearly, he is incapable of viewing life in anything but aesthetic term, and this is
the source of his anguish. Rather than serving as the protagonist in his own narrative, he
becomes an antagonist, a role which he passively accepts. We must remember that
Vonnegut wrote Deadeye Dick “as my sixtieth birthday beckons me” (xiii). David
Cowart’s dismissal of the novel as “undistinguished” (181) is the critical norm, but such
readings don’t take into account the complex Rudy/Vonnegut parallel, even though
Vonnegut emphatically establishes it in the preface. Deadeye Dick is ultimately a novel
in which Vonnegut is trying to convince himself that there is more to life than epilogue
on the eve of his sixtieth birthday. In this sense, Vonnegut himself is a much a character
in the text as Rudy Waltz, and Deadeye Dick is every bit as metafictional as Breakfast of
Champions, the experimental novel Vonnegut coincidentally wrote a decade earlier as
“my fiftieth-birthday present to myself” (4). Rudy’s tragedy is that he falls into epilogue
at the age of 12, never to return again. In the end, Vonnegut’s achievement in Deadeye
Dick is that perched on the edge of epilogue himself, he refused to go, gently or
otherwise, into that good night. Rather than letting the termites eat the piano from the
inside out, he chooses to play, to compose, and the novel itself is more than a work of
fiction—it is an act of Schopenhauerean defiance in a world of will. In Bluebeard,
Vonnegut takes this theme of defiance even further.
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From Breakfast of Champions to Bluebeard: Seeing Through “The Mist of Objective
and Subjective Contingencies”
If, as we have seen, Deadeye Dick is one of Vonnegut’s most personal novels,
1987’s Bluebeard is certainly his most directly aesthetic. Here, art is used not as motif
but instead as focal point. Bluebeard is a novel about art, and more to the point, it is a
novel about an individual’s promethean relationship to art over the course of several
decades. In Rabo Karabekian, Vonnegut creates a recurring character who is no less
important to his philosophical project than Kilgore Trout. Specifically, Rabo appears
briefly in Deadeye Dick and the earlier Breakfast of Champions, illustrating Vonnegut’s
growing preoccupation with art in the second half of his career. Thomas F. Marvin
perceptibly parallels Rabo’s transition from abstract to realistic art as being
representational of the style Vonnegut adopts for the novel, noting that in Bluebeard
“Vonnegut revisits his major themes in a realistic mode and reaffirms that fundamental
importance of telling a good story” (136), and this is certainly true, but the parallels
between Rabo and Vonnegut don’t stop there. As for Vonnegut himself, existence is an
ongoing state of embarrassment for Rabo. Paul Slazinger, failed artist and best friend to
Rabo, says that “the human condition can be summed up in just one word, and this is the
word: Embarrassment” (Bluebeard 14). Remembering Vonnegut’s personal admission
from Palm Sunday that “I would describe the hum which is with me all the time as
embarrassment” (169), my goal here is explore how Rabo’s successful attempt at
transcending “embarrassment” (or Schopenhauerean “will”) mirrors Vonnegut’s attempt
to do the same through aesthetic creation.

107

For Schopenhauer, “the world in which we live and have our being is, by its
whole nature, through and through will” (World as Will I 162), yet “the great problem of
historical painting…is to present, immediately and for perception, the Idea in which the
will reaches the highest degree of its objectification” (World as Will I 220). In this sense,
art becomes representational by necessity. As the Idea is rendered in perceptible terms, it
tells us something about both the world and our place in it. It is precisely this type of
discovery that Rabo attempts in Bluebeard. The novel’s subtitle is The Autobiography of
Rabo Karabekian (1916-1988), a detail which makes the novel not just a narrative but an
act of artistic creation in itself. Like Howard W. Campbell Jr. (Mother Night), Jonah
(Cat’s Cradle), Wilbur Daffodil-11 Swain (Slapstick), Leon Trout (Galapagos) and
Eugene Debs Hartke (Hocus Pocus), Rabo is actively creating and aesthetically shaping
rather than passively relating his narrative. While on the surface, Bluebeard is the
autobiography of a failed artist, one who no longer practices his craft—“I don’t paint at
all anymore” (11) he emphatically suggests at the outset of the novel—at the same time,
it is the story of a painter who ultimately becomes an artist in Schopenhauerean terms.
The aim of art for Schopenhauer is clear: “Every work of art really endeavors to
show us life and things as they are in reality; but these things cannot be grasped directly
by everyone through the mist of objective and subjective contingencies. Art takes away
the mist” (World as Will II 407). By transcending will, and thus the self, the work of art
allows the artist to see through—and beyond—the mist, catching a fleeting glimpse of the
thing-in-itself, the Ideal. Over the course of three novels, Rabo Karabekian learns to
develop this relationship with art, and as I intend to show, it is precisely this relationship
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which Vonnegut both sought in his own work and advocated as the ultimate aim of
artistic creation.
Rabo first appears in Breakfast of Champions, where he is attending a celebration
in honor of the opening of the Mildred Barry Memorial Center for the Arts. His recent
painting, The Temptation of Saint Anthony, had recently been purchased for the Barry
Memorial Center, and Vonnegut interrupts the narrative flow of the novel to add, “It was
a scandal what the painting cost…Midland City was outraged. So was I” (213). To call
the painting minimalist or abstract would be to give it too much credit. It consists of
nothing more than a single vertical orange stripe of reflecting tape applied to a canvas of
green wall paint. What offends Vonnegut, though, is not the work’s jarring simplicity or
the outrageous price it fetched, but rather Rabo’s relationship with and to his creation.
When novelist Beatrice Keedsler admits to Rabo from her neighboring barstool, “This is
a dreadful confession, but I don’t even know who Saint Anthony was,” before asking,
“Who was he, and why should anybody have wanted to tempt him?,” he replies, “I don’t
know, and I would hate to find out” (214). As a creator, Rabo has a completely
disingenuous relationship with his work. Rather than taking away the Schopenhauerean
mist, his creation remains shrouded in it. For a second time, Vonnegut interrupts to
narrative structure of the novel to note that Rabo “was in my opinion a vain and weak and
trashy man, no artist at all,” (225), allowing him to offer not just an assessment but an
aesthetic judgment of both Rabo and his work. What’s significant here is Vonnegut’s
dismissal of a particular type of aesthetic perspective. Rabo creates, and he makes a
tremendous amount of money for his work, but for Vonnegut, this does not an artist
make. Rabo’s grave aesthetic transgression is that he is completely alienated from, and
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unchanged by, his own work. It signifies nothing other than itself, and in this sense, his
“product” is purely commercial.
Both Rabo and “The Temptation of Saint Anthony” turn up fleetingly in Deadeye
Dick when the Rudy’s mother is outraged at The Barry Memorial Center’s acquisition of
the painting. In an irate letter to the local paper, she calls “The Temptation of Saint
Anthony” “an insult…to the memory of every serious artist who ever lived” (213), an
assessment Vonnegut is in complete agreement with. This scene allows him to juxtapose
two distinct approaches to aesthetic creation. One of Vonnegut’s most longstanding
aesthetic principles, which he articulates most directly in 1976’s Slapstick and again
1999’s Bagombo Snuff Box, is that audience awareness is essential to creation. “Any
creation which has any wholeness and harmoniousness,” he writes in the preface to
Slapstick, “was made by an artist with an audience of one in mind” (17). Over two
decades later, in offering his rules of creative writing at the end of his career in Bagombo
Snuff Box, he suggests that it is necessary to “Write to please just one person” (12). What
these passages illustrate is just how consistent Vonnegut’s aesthetic philosophy remained
throughout the second half of his career, and they provide a framework for assessing the
achievements of Rudy Waltz and Rabo Karabekian. With the exception of his play
Katmandu, which had a disastrous premiere on Broadway, the rest of Rudy’s plays are
written in his mind, for an audience of one—Rudy himself. Rabo, in sharp contrast, is
creating with only a mass audience (and the resulting commercial rewards) in mind,
which is tantamount to disaster for Vonnegut. “If you open a window and make love to
the world, so to speak, your story will get pneumonia” (Bagambo 12).
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In defense of “The Temptation of Saint Anthony,” Rabo argues, “I now give you
my word of honor that the picture your city owns shows everything about life which truly
matters, with nothing left out. It is a picture of the awareness of every animal. It is the
immaterial core of every animal, the ‘I am’ to which all messages are sent” (Breakfast
226). The fact that the painting is nonsensical, and that Rabo has no interest in
discovering who Saint Anthony is fully encapsulates his worldview. Existence is abstract
and unknowable for Rabo, and what’s more, he has no interest in making sense of it. His
proclamation that “Our awareness is all that is alive and maybe sacred in any of us” (226)
is tragic in light of the fact that he lacks awareness about the nature of his own work. For
Rabo, creation, which for Vonnegut is an act of discovery, is little more than resigning to
the Schopenhauerean mist which clouds perception.
Bluebeard’s dramatic tension lies in charting Rabo’s transformation from artistic
charlatan to aesthetic craftsman who creates in the midst Schopenhauer’s mist, and this is
the novel’s chief concern. “In the paintings which have greatness birth and death are
always there” (91) Rabo writes in his autobiography, and his failure as an artist is that in
spite of acclaim and financial success, these qualities have been wholly absent in his
work throughout his career. Lawrence R. Broer astutely uses the term “esthetics of
renewal” to describe “the existential possibilities of authoring one’s own identity in life
as art” (74), and he sees this exploration as being central to Vonnegut’s novels which
begin with Slapstick, making up the body of work he refers to Vonnegut’s “second
career” (74). I’d suggest, however, that Rabo is more directly authoring his own identity
in art. Rabo’s failure as an artist is specifically attributable to the fact that he has spent
his life hiding in and being altogether missing from his own work. Early on, “I
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discovered something as powerful and irresponsible as shooting up with heroin: if I
started laying on just one color of paint to a huge canvas, I could make the whole world
drop away” (154). Like shooting up, art created in this fashion is a means of escape, an
act of hiding, from both the world and the self. Perhaps much of Rabo’s success is linked
to identification on the part of the audience with escaping in this way. That’s not to
minimize the value in and importance of escapist art. For every Guernica, perhaps the
world needs a Rosebud Cottage to balance the Apollonian and Dionysian dimensions of
the art world, and there is certainly enough creative space for both Picasso and Thomas
Kincade to build empires. Yet for Vonnegut, as for Schopenhauer, if art is to be
transformative, and thus an integral component of the good life, it must allow the artist
and the audience to see through the mist.
The impetus for Rabo’s aesthetic evolution is that his work has no lasting impact.
Literally. It consumes itself. Due to a chemical reaction between his canvases, the
acrylic tape, and the Sateen Dure-Luxe paint which were his creative hallmarks, his
paintings “destroy themselves” in an act of metaphoric aesthetic suicide. His legacy,
such as it is, it erased and his paintings are reduced over time to puddles and stains on the
floors of the museums and homes which house them. Rabo’s mistake is in choosing the
wrong “materials” for his art, not only in his career, but much more damningly,
throughout his life as well.
A perspective which Vonnegut goes to great lengths to articulate through Rabo’s
transformation is that for art to have merit, and for it to have lasting impact and value, it
must be created from the proper metaphoric “materials.” In his 1977 Paris Review
interview, Vonnegut states that “I think it can be refreshing if a creator of literature has
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something on his mind other than the history of literature so far. Literature should not
disappear up its own asshole, so to speak” (Palm Sunday 94), and with Bluebeard, he
extends this idea to the visual arts. Any work of art, from a text to a painting to a
sculpture, loses primacy when it takes itself too seriously, or, too use Vonnegut’s term,
when it becomes intentionally epiphanic. Rabo’s friend, the painter Terry Kitchen,
introduces him the value of the non-epiphanic moment: “That is a perfect description of a
non-epiphany,” Kitchen explains, “that rarest of moments, when God Almighty lets go of
the scruff of your neck and lets you be human for a little while” (184). These rare
autonomous moments allow the individual to exist outside the context of will, God, or
any other organizing cosmic principle, and serve as counterpoints to the fleeting moments
of “aesthetic contemplation” Schopenhauer describes as “pure, will-less knowing”
(World as Will I 212).
Before he can paint his metaphoric and literal masterpiece, Vonnegut first
requires Rabo to confront his own failures, both as an artist as a person. Late in the
novel, in describing how he imagines his entry will read in the Big Book on Judgement
Day, he offers the following nakedly candid self-assessment:
Solider: Excellent.
Husband and Father: Floparroo.
Serious artist: Floparroo. (258)
These twin realizations are not accidental. Vonnegut is deliberate in establishing that just
as having a partner and children does not make someone a success as a husband or father,
achieving critical and commercial success does not equal artistic value. To this end,
Rabo’s perceived interpretation of how he views his legacy is further revealed in his
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estimation of how he might be remembered with the following imaginary dictionary
definition:
kara.a.bek.i.an (kar-a-‘bek-e-an), n. (from Rabo Karabekian, U.S. 20th cent.
painter). Fiasco in which a person causes total destruction of own work and
reputation through stupidity, carelessness or both. (286)
Rabo’s own self-assessment matters much more, of course, than how the dictionaries of
the future will remember him, yet he is tortured by thoughts of his own legacy and how
little he has actually accomplished. He realizes that he is responsible for his own failure
and that he is the creator of his own misery. “I can’t help it,” he tells Terry Kitchen.
“My soul knows my meat is doing bad things, and is embarrassed. But my meat just
keeps right on doing bad dumb things” (273). This is an inevitability to which Vonnegut
himself could relate. In a 1987 interview with Allen and Smith conducted just after
Bluebeard’s release, Vonnegut establishes a direct parallel between his own work and
Rabo Karabekian’s art: “He becomes a dominant person in my life after I’ve written
enough about him. And what he did was, in fact, all he could do. It was his only option,
and that’s the way I feel about my work, too. I’m a certain kind of flower, and that’s just
how I’m going to bloom. There isn’t much that can be done about it” (Conversations
265). And yet the “soul” and the “meat” can be brought into harmony to overcome the
all-consuming mist of embarrassment which Vonnegut, like so many of his characters,
spent his life trying to work through. There is more to the self than either meat or will.
As for Schopenhauer, art plays a privileged role in laying the foundation for this
harmony.
Ultimately, it’s precisely this relationship between soul and meat, between life
and art, which Vonnegut is exploring throughout Bluebeard. This relationship is much
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more central to the novel than the art itself. Donald E. Morse offers a thought-provoking
reading of the novel, pointing out that “Vonnegut advocates in Bluebeard that the true
artist employ technique to serve human beings and their feelings—whether it be putting
paint on canvas or putting words on paper” (148). Morse correctly establishes the
parallel between Rabo and Vonnegut. At the same time, however, Vonnegut is also
suggesting that art must first “serve” the artist before it can have an impact on an
audience. After all, Rabo is Bluebeard the pirate because his final painting is kept
completely locked-up in the potato barn on his property, and his instructions are that no
one is to open the door to see what’s inside. The dramatic tension of the novel/his
autobiography lies in whether his muse, successful writer Circe Berman—or us, as
readers—will be allowed to see what’s on the side of the forbidden door. At the end of
the novel, when he unlocks the door and shares “Now It’s the Women’s Turn,” his final
work with Circe, and the readers of his autobiography, he rectifies the central problem
which has plagued his work—for the first time, he is fully present in his work,
metaphorically and literally. The painting depicts, in Rabo’s own words, “where I was
when the sun came up the day the Second World War ended in Europe” (298), and
sprawled across an enormous canvas is a cast of 5, 219 characters, including Rabo
himself. The spare abstraction of “The Temptation of Saint Anthony” has given way to a
final work so realistic that “it might have been a photograph” (298). Farrell argues that
“Now it’s the Women’s Turn” is actually the “culmination of art.” As she explains,
“Although an impossible feat in the real world, Vonnegut has imagined a painting that
depicts all of life, that is somehow equivalent to life itself” (109). This is absolutely true.
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At the same time, the “success” of the work lies in Rabo being present in his own work,
and as such, part of the very life he is depicting.

“My father believed in Art…” Nannette Vonnegut writes in her introduction to
Kurt Vonnegut: Drawings. “Whether it was music, literature, theater, or the visual arts,
he believed practicing art saved lives” (10). His ongoing advocacy of the arts, in his
work and throughout his life, is central to his philosophical project. For Vonnegut, as for
Schopenhauer, a life well-lived must involve aesthetic experience and artistic creation.
Yet while art may provide momentary respite from will (Schopenhauer) and
embarrassment (Vonnegut), it is incapable of providing lasting escape. This is the
primary limitation of both Schopenhauer’s and Vonnegut’s theories of aesthetics.
Schopenhauer goes all-in on art, and the principle problem with aesthetic experience is
that it doesn’t last. For him, the will can never be overcome. Vonnegut differs from
Schopenhauer in that he suggests while artistic creation is an essential part of a well-lived
life, it is but one of several necessary elements. “Life is no damn good,” the generally
jovial bandleader George M Helmholtz declares in “The Kid Nobody Could Handle,” and
as we have seen, this is a realization which Vonnegut struggled with for much of his life.
How can art make a difference? Vonnegut allows the bandleader to provide the answer
as well. “Our aim is to make the world more beautiful than it was when it came into it. It
can be done. You can do it” (Monkey House 283). How do we do this? Saving the
piano from the termites is a good start, and there’s one way to do it. We must play. As
Vonnegut repeatedly suggested in his speaking engagements around the country,
“Practicing an art, no matter how well or badly, is a way to make your soul grow” (A
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Man Without 24). Schopenhauer’s insistence that “life by no means presents itself as a
gift to be enjoyed, but as a task, a drudgery, to be worked through” (World as Will II 357)
may prove to be accurate in the final analysis, but certainly no more so than Vonnegut’s
belief that “we are here on Earth to fart around” (Timequake 219). Chaos can be brought
to order. For Vonnegut, art is what allows us to see through the Schopenhauerean mist,
and as we will see in the next chapter, this clarity of vision is essential, not just for the
good life, but for establishing meaningful communities as well.
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CHAPTER IV:
“LONESOME NO MORE!”: VONNEGUT’S EXTENDED FAMILY MODEL
AS EXISTENTIAL DIASPORIC COMMUNITY
In Vonnegut’s final published interview, conducted a month before his death at
84, he spoke about what he saw as “the great American disease”: loneliness. “We no
longer have extended family. But I had one [as a child]. There were lots of Vonneguts in
the phone book … and I was surrounded by relatives all the time. It was heaven” (Last
Interview 166-7). It’s altogether fitting that Vonnegut should introduce extended family
as a topic of conversation in his final interview insofar as the notion served as his primary
preoccupation throughout the second half of his career.
Much has been written about Vonnegut’s experience as a German prisoner of war
in Dresden during the Second World War and its corresponding influence on his fiction;
to date, surprisingly little has been written about Vonnegut’s trip to Biafra in January of
1970 in the final moments of the ill-fated republic. The savagery, brutality, horror and
sense of community he witnessed there would profoundly shape his work, his philosophy,
and his life afterwards. This chapter will explore the ways in which Vonnegut’s advocacy
of Americans’ need for large “extended families,” which first appears in 1974’s
Wampeters, Foma & Granfaloons and remains a consistent theme all the way through
2007’s A Man Without a County, is a direct response to his Biafran experience. If, as
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many critics suggest, Dresden is the key to understanding Vonnegut’s SlaughterhouseFive (and more generally, the bulk of his pre-1969 work), Biafra, I would argue, is the
key to understanding what he wrote afterwards during the second half of his career.
Vonnegut’s concept of the extended family can best be understood when examined
through the lens of diasporic theory. The sense of community which emerges from
Vonnegut’s diasporic artificial extended family is central to overcoming loneliness and
leading a productive life, and the extended family is one of Vonnegut’s most stronglyadvocated requirements for the good life in modernity.
Mother Night: Nationless Inclinations from a Citizen of Nowhere
Vonnegut’s earliest extended exploration of community and identity is Mother
Night, a novel first published in 1961 and written nearly a decade before his
transformative Biafran experience. Said Mentak suggests that it’s in Vonnegut’s final
published book, 2005’s A Man Without a Country, where Vonnegut “defines himself in
terms of national space” (287), and this is certainly true. Written over four decades
earlier, Mother Night serves as a companion piece for A Man Without a Country in that
the novel’s protagonist, Howard W. Campbell Jr, is wholly incapable of defining himself
in terms of national space. An American expatriate who becomes an Allied spy during
World War II, he too is a man without a country. More to the point, he is a man without
a community, without a family, without an ideological diaspora, and the lack thereof
renders life meaningless and ultimately unbearable for him. I offer the following reading
of Mother Night here because it showcases Vonnegut’s attempt to work through “the
great American disease of loneliness” (Last Interview 166) before he had been
transformed by his Biafran experience or developed his prescriptive cure (artificial
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extended families) a decade later. In this sense, it serves as a companion to both Slapstick
and Timequake. Just as Deadeye Dick and Bluebeard are Vonnegut’s aesthetic novels
(chapter three), Mother Night, Slapstick, and Timequake form a trilogy of texts designed
to address and combat loneliness2.
On the surface, Mother Night is Campbell’s confession, written from an Israeli
jail while awaiting trial for his war crimes. Even among the early Vonnegut novels, it is
relatively straightforward and plot-driven. Yet like Vonnegut’s frequently derided prose
style, Mother Night is deceptively simple. “This is the only story of mine whose moral I
know,” Vonnegut writes in the introduction to the 1966 edition, before adding one of his
most quotable (and unfairly-reductive) Nietzsche-like adages: “We are what we pretend
to be, so we must be careful what we pretend to be” (v). Of course, this moral does sum
up Campbell’s tragedy. In becoming such a wholly effective undercover spy, and by
broadcasting coded messages to the Allies over propaganda-laced radio broadcasts,
Campbell does promote the perverse cause of the Third Reich. As Werner Noth, Berlin
police chief and his father-in-law, informs him on their last meeting, whether he is a spy
or not is incidental, “Because you could never have served the enemy as well as you
served us. I realized that almost all the ideas that I hold now, that make me unashamed of
anything I may have felt or done as a Nazi, came not from Hitler, not from Goebbels, not
from Himmler-but from you” (99).

As an aside, I fully realize that “loneliness” isn’t the most sophisticated or philosophical
word choice, and “alienation” might conjure more attention in academic circles, but I use
it nonetheless in this chapter for two reasons: 1) loneliness, not alienation, is the term
Vonnegut used again and again, and 2) just as importantly, it is the right word in the end
for the condition Vonnegut’s characters encounter.
2
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Throughout the novel, Vonnegut is much less interested in Campbell’s guilt or
innocence than in the provincial philosophical perspective through which he views both
the world and his place in it. Yet many critics focus on the creative and rhetorical aspects
of his confessions…and for good reason. Farrell, for instance, suggests that “Campbell’s
life as a double agent is simply wishful thinking on his part, a lie he tells to justify his
own reprehensible behavior” (“’A Convenient Reality’” 228). Similarly, Freese refers to
Campbell as “a highly unreliable narrator,” one who “is apparently also an advanced
schizophrenic who can sanely assess the degree of his schizophrenia, and a man who can
alternately explain his behavior by claiming that he is mentally ill and by convincingly
insisting that in contrast to others he is not at all insane” (150). My goal here is not to
challenge the convincing arguments made by either Farrell or Freese; rather, I’d like to
propose an alternative reading of the novel, one in which the questions of Campbell’s
guilt, innocence, and ultimate responsibility are secondary to what I see as his singular
tragic flaw-- his inability to be part of anything outside of and larger than himself.
“I am an American by birth, a Nazi by reputation, and a nationless person by
inclination,” (1) Campbell defines himself in the opening paragraph, and over the course
of his confessions/the novel, he offers neither defense nor justification for this nationlessness. He simply presents it as fact. It is who he is. When he matter-of-factly informs
Frank Wirtanen, his “Blue Fairy Godmother” who recruits him to covertly serve the
Allied cause at the outset of the war, that “Nationalities just don’t interest me a much as
they probably should,” (35), he acknowledges this as a source of personal failure. He
should be more interested in the world outside himself, and on an immediate level, he
realizes it. When asked if he hates America, he replies, “That would be as silly as loving
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it. It’s impossible for me to get emotional about it, because real estate doesn’t interest
me. No doubt it’s a great flaw in my personality, but I can’t think it terms of boundaries”
(133). When he is branded by the Republic of Israel as “a citizen of nowhere” (160), the
accusation is undeniably true, and he makes no attempt to deny it. He truly is a citizen of
nowhere.
And yet Campbell does find a nation of sorts to which he is willing to pledge
allegiance—his “Nation of Two” with Helga, his wife. At one point he imagines a play
about his all-consuming love for Helga: “It was going to show how a pair of lovers in a
world gone mad could survive by being loyal only to a nation composed of themselves—
a nation of two” (34). The love becomes a drug for him, one which numbs out everything
beyond the confines of his own bedroom. “My narcotic was what had got me through the
war; it was an ability to let my emotions be stirred by only one thing—my love for Helga.
This concentration of my emotions on so small an area had begun as a young lover’s
happy illusion…and finally became the axis about which my thoughts revolved” (47).
Tally uses the term “sexual solipsism,” which he defines as “a merging of two bodies that
excludes the rest of the world” (46), to describe the marriage. “In turning away from any
notion of nationhood beyond the romantic and erotic love the two shared,” Tally
suggests, “Campbell tries to triumphantly alienate himself from his fellow man” (46).
Yet such alienation isn’t possible, and this is precisely Vonnegut’s point. The “Nation of
Two” fails because there is no other possible outcome. Borders and boundaries are
temporary, and the flesh is subject to decay. Decades later, in A Man Without a Country,
Vonnegut would articulate the inherent limitations of all “Nations of Two”: “When a
couple has an argument nowadays, they may think it’s about money or power or sex or
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how to raise their kids or whatever. What they’re really saying to each other, though,
without realizing it, is this: ‘You are not enough people!’” (48). Ultimately, “A husband,
a wife, and some kids is not a family,” he adds. “It’s a terribly vulnerable survival unit”
(48).
Campbell’s nationless existence, experienced from his misguided survival unit,
makes him one of Vonnegut’s most tragic and sympathetic protagonists. He is a study on
the ravaging effects of loneliness. At one point, he interrupts the narrative of his
confessions to address his former friend, Heinz Schildknecht: “Hello, out there, Heinz, in
case you read this. I was really fond of you, to the extent that I am capable of being fond
of anybody” (118). Campbell’s suicide in the last sentence of the novel is inevitable, and
his story could hardly end any other way. His is an existence without human connection
or cultural identity.
For Vonnegut, culture is necessary, and life becomes unbearable without it. “I
have no culture,” Vonnegut writes in the preface to Breakfast of Champions, “no human
harmony in my brains. I can’t live without a culture anymore” (5). Each of Vonnegut’s
post-Slaughterhouse-Five novels, of which Breakfast of Champions is the first, focus on
not just why community is essential for the good life, but more importantly, how
communities can be formed and nurtured. What brought about this change in focus? In
December of 1969, Vonnegut received a unique invitation from his friend, fellow novelist
Vance Bourjaily, to accompany him on a trip to Biafra. The trip was arranged and
sponsored by Miriam Reik. As Vonnegut explains in “Biafra: A People Betrayed,” an
uncharacteristically somber article he originally wrote for McCall’s, “She was head of a
pro-Biafran committee and had already flown several American writers into Biafra”
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(143). The purpose of the trip (and Reik’s committee for that matter) was to draw
attention to and support for Biafran independence. She asked Vonnegut to write about
what he experienced and saw, which he did. What she couldn’t have known, and neither
could Vonnegut, was his experience would define and shape the rest of his career.
Vonnegut in Biafra: Filiation, Affiliation, and the Origins of the Artificial Extended
Family Model
Vonnegut’s trip, it’s important to note, came at the very end of Biafran
independence. He landed on January 3, 1970 and flew out on January 9. The republic
fell to Nigeria on January 17, so the conditions, admittedly, were at their most deplorable.
Yet it is genuine admiration, not pity, which punctuates “Biafra: A People Betrayed.”
“[Biafran] General Ojukwu gave us a clue, I think, as to why the Biafrans were able to
endure so much so long without bitterness: They all had the emotional and spiritual
strength that an enormous family can give. We asked the general to tell us about his
family, and he answered that it was three thousand members strong” (149-150).
Especially remarkable to Vonnegut was that General Ojukwu knew every single member
of his immense family by name. The beauty of the Biafran family model is that it
provided each person with a deeply rooted support system, a genuine diasporic
community, even in times of wretched poverty.
Shields describes Vonnegut’s arrival as follows: “As Vonnegut and Bourjaily
stepped down from the plane, Ibo children surged forward crying ‘Hello, Father, Hello!’
Most [of the children] had huge rounded bellies, discolored hair, running sores, and
everted rectums that swung like pink snouts between their legs” (268). The children were
starving to death. As Vonnegut himself describes the encounter in his article, “I admire
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Miriam, though I am not grateful for the trip she gave me. It was like a free trip to
Auschwitz when the ovens were going full blast. I now feel lousy all the time” (143-4).
The comparison to Auschwitz is particularly important given Vonnegut’s cultural
heritage and World War II experiences. Yet what he experienced, and what he later
celebrated, was human beauty in the midst of a living hell.
In Biafra he found a potential solution for the plague of existence in the modern
world: loneliness. The answer was simple: diasporic community, or, as he called it,
extended family. He elaborates on this this notion in his 1974 commencement address at
Hobart and William Smith Colleges, stating, “What should young people do with their
lives today? Many things obviously. But the most daring thing is to create stable
communities in which the terrible disease of loneliness can be cured” (Palm Sunday 180).
Vonnegut’s graduations speeches and nonfiction from the 1970s onward are filled with
similar admonitions in which he encourages youth to build communities. As Vonnegut
lamented in a Playboy interview from 1973:
Until recent times, you know, human beings usually had a permanent community
of relatives. They had dozens of homes to go to. So when a married couple had a
fight, one or the other could go to a house three doors down and stay with a close
relative until he was feeling tender again. Or if a kid got so fed up with his
parents that he couldn’t stand it, he could march over to his uncle’s for a while.
And this is no longer possible. Each family is locked into its little box. The
neighbors aren’t relatives. There aren’t other houses where people can go to and
be cared for. When Nixon is pondering what’s happening to America … the
answer is perfectly simple. We’re lonesome. We don’t have enough friends and
relatives anymore. And we would if we lived in real communities.
(Conversations 79-80)
While it’s possible to read Vonnegut’s plea for community as a yearning to return to the
Indianapolis of his youth—an Indianapolis populated by Vonneguts—a much closer
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parallel is the Biafra of General Ojukwu, one consisting of thousands of family members
living together in diasporic harmony.
In the fame which followed the publication of Slaughterhouse-Five, and in
response to his 1970 trip to Biafra, Vonnegut found himself wrestling a particular kind of
familial and cultural rootlessness. In 1973’s Breakfast of Champions, his muchanticipated follow-up to Slaughterhouse-Five, he freely writes about his severe
depression, suggesting that “this book is my fiftieth-birthday present to myself. I feel as
though I am crossing the spine of a roof—having ascended one slope” (4). Indeed,
Breakfast of Champions is a far more personal book than Slaughterhouse-Five or
anything he had written up to that point. The financial success brought about by his
“Dresden book” was liberating in that it allowed him to write what he wanted, how he
wanted, when he wanted. “Well, I felt after I finished Slaughterhouse-Five that I didn’t
have to write at all anymore if I didn’t want to. It was the end of some sort of career
(Conversations 107). Success may have brought him creative autonomy, but it failed to
bring him either contentment or a sense of community.
Case in point—1971’s Happy Birthday, Wanda June. I mention this text again
here for a couple of reasons. First, and this is important—for a fleeting moment in 1970,
Vonnegut swore off fiction entirely and vowed to devote the rest of his career to drama.
As he told his older brother Bernard at the time, “I’m writing a play. It’s plays from now
on” (Happy Birthday vii). Secondly, Vonnegut turned to theater in an attempt at both
personal and familial recreation at the height of his career. As he explains in the
introduction: “This play is what I did when I was forty-seven years old—when my six
children were children no more. It was a time of change, of good-bye and good-bye and
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good-bye. My big house was becoming a museum of vanished childhoods—of vanished
young manhood as well. I was drinking more and arguing a lot and I had to get out of
that house. [With the play] I was writing myself a new family and a new early manhood”
(vii). He adds in a 1973 interview with Frank McLaughlin, “Every American author my
age has tried a play sometime between the ages of 40 and 60. This is because of
loneliness. Families disperse, children become grown, and somewhere during that time
writing is an extremely lonesome business” (Conversations 71). From this 1970 onward,
Vonnegut’s fiction similarly searches for ways to overcome loneliness. In his preface to
1974’s Wampeters, Foma & Granfaloons, Vonnegut drops his characteristically sardonic
mask for a moment and candidly announces his plan: “My long-range schemes have to do
with providing all Americans with artificial extended families of a thousand members or
more. Only when we have overcome loneliness can we begin to share wealth and work
more freely. I honestly believe we will have those families by-and-by, and I hope they
will become international” (xxii). Slapstick, his next novel, is a comedic attempt to
illustrate the need for such families.
Edward Said’s distinction between cultural filiation and affiliation is a key critical
concept which can help contextualize Vonnegut’s extended family within the framework
of diasporic theory. In “Secular Criticism,” Said defines culture as “an environment,
process, and hegemony in which individuals (in their private circumstances) and their
works are embedded” (8). The central limitation of culture, however, is that it
“dominates from above without at the same time being available to everything and
everyone it dominates” (9). Said argues that Western culture is inherently Eurocentric
and that these Eurocentric values are used to alienate and disenfranchise those who do not
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subscribe to them. The outsider, in other words, is destined to remain an outsider,
creating the necessity for creating new cultures. Vonnegut refers to this phenomenon as
“the dot” in “Biafra: A People Betrayed,” where he writes, “Those intellectuals had once
fanned out all over Nigeria, where they had been envied and lynched and massacred. So
they retreated to their homeland, to the dot” (148). The “dot” may be a tiny spot on a
map, but philosophically speaking, it is an ideological homeland at the same time.
While filiation and affiliation are terms Said uses in the context of literary
criticism, they can just as easily be used in a broader cultural sense. Simply put, filiation
is a matter of birth or nationality; affiliation can be based on “social and political
conviction, economic and historical circumstances, voluntary effort, and willed
deliberation” (25). In this sense, an individual can belong to a culture by filiation but not
by affiliation (and vice versa). As an example, in the prologue to Slapstick, Vonnegut
describes how he and his older brother Bernard, both “belong to artificial extended
families which allow [them] to claim relatives all over the world.” As he writes: “He is a
brother to scientists everywhere. I am a brother to writers everywhere” (5). Even an
“artificial” extended family, Vonnegut seems to be suggesting, one based on something
as arbitrary as vocation, has all the makings of a culture.
Much to that end, the existential center for much of Vonnegut’s work is formed
by his attempt to make sense of life outside of traditional Western culture. Breakfast of
Champions finds him wrestling with this very issue. As he writes in the introduction: “I
have no culture, no humane harmony in my brains. I can’t live without a culture
anymore” (5). Vonnegut’s problem here is one of affiliative alienation, the very
condition he proposes to rectify with extended families.
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Interestingly, Wole Soyinka offers a contrasting view of culture in “Between Self
and System: The Artist in Search of Liberation,” which he defines as “a rather assertive
environment in which one exists, willy-nilly-at all times and in all places. If there were
an escape from it, it could be ignored” (40). From Soyinka’s perspective, culture is
inevitable. While this may be true in a strict sense, if Avtar Brah is correct and borders
are metaphoric, culture can be defined intellectually as well as geographically.
For Vonnegut, Biafra’s greatest (if ultimately short-lived) achievement was the
creation of an autonomous ideological “homeland” consisting of extended families within
the broader context of Nigerian culture. In Vonnegut’s Hobart and William Smith
Colleges graduation speech, he adds, “[Biafran citizens] could look out for one another,
without any help from the central government, because every Biafran was a member of
an extended family. Some Biafrans had thousands of relatives or more” (Palm Sunday
187). What’s important about this speech, other than reflecting the deep influence the
Biafran experience had on his thought in the 1970s, is that it documents Vonnegut’s first
usage of the term “extended family.” With Slapstick, published two years later, he would
go on to employ the term in his fiction.
Slapstick: Diasporic Community and Artificial Extended Families
First, to address the elephant in the room—by almost any standard imaginable,
Slapstick isn’t Vonnegut’s most cohesive or successful novel. In his own assessment of
his work from Palm Sunday, one in which he issued a grade to each novel, he assigned a
“D” to Slapstick. It is a strange novel, more of an extended dream than a logically
coherent narrative. As Stanley Schatt writes, “Vonnegut’s tone [in the novel] lies
somewhere between the cosmic detachment in Cat’s Cradle and the frenzied involvement
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in Breakfast of Champions” (117). Much like Happy Birthday, Wanda June, Slapstick is
an anomaly, an unusual text which, at least on the surface, is an outlier among the rest of
Vonnegut’s work. Perhaps because of this very reason, it has yielded some of the most
diverse, provocative, consistently original criticism of any of Vonnegut’s major works.
For instance, Sumner, tracing the autobiographical references in the novel’s prologue,
suggests that the relationship between Wilber and Eliza Swain is based largely on
Vonnegut’s sense of survivor’s guilt after the death of his sister, Alice. “It is primordial
feeling he was never able to shake,” Sumner writes. “In terms of worldly success, why
her and not me?” (175). He goes on to argue that of all Vonnegut’s novels, Slapstick
most closely resembles a fully-realized version of a Kilgore Trout text brought to life,
ultimately critiquing it by adding, “Perhaps it had been a mistake to dismiss his alter ego
Kilgore Trout as a vehicle for such fantasies” (186).
Taking a different approach altogether, and exploring Vonnegut’s humor as a way
of addressing the “serious intellectual concerns” (59) of modernity, Beck focuses on the
physical aspects of the novel, where the self is explored as a freakish, alien construction.
“Long noses, wild hair, elongated bodies, collapsed bodies, over-/undersized genitalia, or
animal-like physiognomy: the bodies in physical comedy are not those of classic
aesthetics but are rather ‘grotesque’” (61), he writes, suggesting, finally, that this is a
metaphor for the sense of bone-deep otherness the characters experience. “The
characters are plagued by their bodies and bodily functions, so that the century’s turmoil
receives a physical corporality from which there is no escape” (63). And yet, at the very
core of the novel is the possibility of escape, and that will be my focus here. Slapstick is
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Vonnegut’s most direct attempt in fiction for creating the framework for extended
families, the diasporic communities he wishes all Americans to be part of.
What is diaspora? This is a question which James Clifford spends a good deal of
time wrestling with his in seminal “Diasporas.” The answer is far from simple. An
essential element of any diasporic community is “an experience of displacement” which
results in “constructing homes away from home” (302). By way of Safron, Ong, and
Gilroy, Clifford explores the term in different contexts—the “ideal” Jewish diaspora, the
black British diaspora, etc. Ultimately, Clifford suggests, sharing a “real or symbiotic
homeland” is not necessary; neither is “the projection from a specific origin” (306). On a
basic level, Clifford defines the term as “dispersed networks of peoples who share
common historical experiences of dispossession, displacement” (309) before
acknowledging that a static and precise definition is not possible (310). Diasporic
communities, after all, vary widely from one to the next, and to become too prescriptive
is to run the risk of exclusion. What’s important, here, at least as far as Vonnegut is
concerned, is that a diasporic community need not necessarily share ancestral/cultural
roots or a particular destination. The journey, one which is always figurative for
Vonnegut, can be metaphoric.
Similarly, Avtar Brah’s “Diaspora, Border, and Transnational Identities” works
towards meaningfully defining the term as well. If Clifford focuses more on the
importance of routes to diasporic communities, Brah is much more interested in the
roots. For Brah, “at the heart of the notion of diaspora is the image of a journey” and
“diasporic journeys are about settling down, about putting roots elsewhere” (616).
Additionally, borders figure prominently in diasporic theory, and Brah argues that
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borders are “arbitrary constructions” which are “always metaphoric” (625).” A crucial
area where she differs from Clifford, however, is that “a homing desire is not the same
thing as a desire for a homeland” (614-615). With these definitions of diaspora in mind,
with the reminder of the chapter I will explore Vonnegut’s artificial extended family as a
metaphoric diasporic community, one with both roots and routes in modernity.
Slapstick’s protagonist, Dr. Wilbur Daffodil-11 Swain, is the current King of
Manhattan and the former President of the United States. At the time of the novel’s
opening, American has been devastated by plague, a mysterious “Green Death” which
has wiped out most of the population, leaving only a few scattered survivors behind in a
post-apocalyptic wasteland. The narrative consists of a lengthy autobiography written by
Swain. In his prologue, Vonnegut explains, “This is the closest I will ever come to
writing an autobiography. It is about what life feels like to me” (1). Two points become
apparent. 1) Vonnegut is directly establishing a parallel between himself and Swain—
they are both, after all, writing autobiographies—and 2) to borrow Augé’s term,
American culture had become a meaningless “non-place” for Vonnegut. Swain, like
Vonnegut, has no home, no culture, no point of direction. In other words, they have no
diasporic community like what Vonnegut had given witness to in Biafra. The loneliness
and despair he describes literally in Breakfast of Champions becomes a metaphoric
plague in Slapstick. As such, I would argue the only way to read the novel is
allegorically.
Swain describes himself and his twin sister, Eliza, as “monsters,” born “so ugly
that our parents were ashamed” (29). This sense of ugliness, however, has less to do with
their abnormal height and extra fingers, toes, and nipples than it does with their parents’
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reactions to and limited interactions with them. The children are “entombed” (32) in a
mansion filled with servants, orchards, and secret chambers and only visited by their
parents once a year, on their birthdays. The paradox is that while all of their physical
needs are met, none of their emotional needs are attended to. In time, this leads to
emotional aloofness. In describing his mother, Swain observes, “And, while I never
learned to love her, or to love anyone for that matter, I did admire her unwavering
decency towards one and all” (73). Here, Swain is giving voice to a sentiment Vonnegut
himself explores in the prologue, where he writes that love “does not seem that important
to me…I wish that people who are conventionally supposed to love each other would say
to each other, when they fight, ‘Please—a little less love, and a little more common
decency’” (2). Swain’s parents end up marginalizing their children and making them feel
like (as opposed to merely looking like) monsters not because they don’t love them, but
rather, because they prove incapable of showing them common decency.
Like Howard Campbell, Swine is a member of an ill-fated nation of two with
Eliza. “The two of us not only a single mind but a thoroughly populated universe,” (60)
he writes. When they are separated after revealing their intelligence, he explains, “Thus
did Eliza and I destroy our Paradise—our nation of two” (77). In describing this
relationship, Vonnegut again explores the inherent limitations of all such nations. To
return to his dot metaphor for Biafra, the dot continuously shrinks. Yet the homelands
and nations are two different things entirely. Anthropologist Daniel Jordan Smith has
written extensively on the Igbo and the lasting impact of the Biafran diaspora in Nigeria.
As he states in “Legacies of Biafra: Marriage, ‘Home People,’ and Reproduction Among
the Igbo of Nigeria,” “Some of the most powerful aspects of Igbo culture and
133

demography are reinforced through the production and circulation of collective memories
of Biafra” (30). Even after the fall of the republic, Biafra remains a homeland through
shared experience and collective memory, even though the dot no longer has geographic
reality on any map. Such is Swain’s nation of two with Eliza, and his attempt to create
the shared communities they imagined as children involves forging “artificial” extended
family among the disposed masses who share no collective homeland.
Ultimately, Swain becomes President of the United States with a very simple
campaign. Indeed, his platform consists of a single idea-- “Lonesome No More!” Like
Vonnegut, he sees loneliness as the great American disease, so he enacts a ludicrous
scheme for reorganizing America into thousands of artificial extended families. Each
citizen is given a new name. The middle name consists of a randomly selected noun,
followed by a number between one and twenty. For instance, let’s take the protagonist.
Everyone with Daffodil for a middle name is his cousin; everyone with Dafodil-11 as a
middle name is his sibling. While it seems absurd, Swain’s “anti-loneliness plan” proves
to be wildly popular because it allows people to be part of something larger than
themselves. For instance, someone can walk into a random bar anywhere in America and
bond with a fellow “Uranium.” “Raspberries” and “Chipmunks” are all given an
artificial extended families of brothers and sisters in every city. How do these families
serve one another? “By watering their houseplants while they are away; by taking care of
their babies so they could get out of the house for an hour or two; by telling them the
name of a truly painless dentist; by mailing a letter for them; by keeping them company
on a scary visit to the doctor; by visiting them in jail or a hospital” (195). And so on. If,
as Brah suggests, borders can be “arbitrary constructions” (625), so too can families.
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Mengouchi and Mouro borrow Deleuze and Guattari’s term assemblage, which
they define as “a collection of multiplicities that are brought together in an act of
reterritorialization, thus giving life to an idea or an identity that never existed before”
(410) to describe Wilber and Eliza Swain, who they suggest “represent a marginalized
group” (413). More broadly, however, assemblage perfectly defines artificial extended
families as well. Mengouchi and Mouro go on to argue that “The two siblings
deterritorialize the traditional sense of family because it abandoned them and denied them
love; hence the new stratum that later becomes a nation-wide system” (419). I would add
that this (re)deterritorialized familial space is based directly on the Igbo family model
Vonnegut encountered in Biafra. As Vonnegut writes in “Biafra: A People Betrayed”:
“Families met often, men and women alike, to vote on family matters. When war came
along, there was no conscription. The family decided who should go. In happier times,
the families voted on who should go to college—to study what and where. Then
everybody chipped in for clothes and transportation and tuition” (150). In Slapstick,
Vonnegut similarly creates and describes in detail a family meeting which takes place
among the Daffodils in, of all places, Indianapolis, the homeland of Vonnegut’s own
dispersed extended family. “With a little luck, I might have become Chairperson of the
meeting,” Swain writes, “although I had been in town for less than a day. The
Chairperson was chosen by lot from all assembled. And the winner of the drawing that
night was an eleven-year-old black girl named Dorothy Daffodil-7 Garland” (242). The
fact that Dorothy leads the meeting so effectively while commanding unconditional
respect from her relatives illustrates the absence of racism, sexism, and ageism with the
artificial extended family model, much as these boundaries were nonfactors among the

135

Biafran families, where men and women made decisions as equals. Also, as in the
Biafran family meeting Vonnegut describes, among the Daffodils, “The most pressing
business [during the meeting] had to do with selecting four replacements for the fallen
Daffodils in the army” (243). The Daffodils, like the Igbo Vonnegut encountered, vote
on who will go to war to fight for the family.
Ultimately, Slapstick is more than abstract allegory—it’s also satire. By offering
such an absurd solution to the problem of loneliness, Vonnegut is encouraging his readers
to find practical alternatives by creating communities and joining families, artificial or
otherwise. Over his next few novels, Vonnegut continued to explore the need for
extended families, and in speeches throughout the 70s and 80s, he advocated compassion,
kindness, and understanding. Towards the very end of his career, however, particularly in
his final novel, he would return to these themes with a renewed sense of excitement.
Timequake: Implications in an Enormous Implication At Last
In Timequake, which, finally, serves as a summing-up for Vonnegut’s career as a
novelist, he adds four new Amendments to the Constitution which succinctly summarize
what he’s spent the previous five decades advocating in thirteen previous novels and
countless short stories, essays, interviews, and commencement addresses:
Article XXVIII: Every newborn shall be sincerely welcomed and cared for until
maturity.
Article XXIX: Every adult who needs it shall be given meaningful work to do, at
a living wage. (176)
Article XXX: Every person, upon reaching a statuary age of puberty, shall be
declared an adult in a solemn public ritual, during which he or she must welcome
his or her new responsibilities to the community, and their attendant dignities.
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Article XXXI: Every effort shall be made to make every person feel that he or
she will be sorely missed when he or she is gone.
Such essential elements in an ideal diet for the human spirit, of course, can be
provided convincingly only by extended families (202)
It’s no accident that Timequake is Vonnegut’s final novel. He announces in the
prologue that “my last book is done” (xvii), and throughout the text, he makes repeated
references to his career as a novelist coming to a close. In this sense, the novel serves as
Vonnegut’s attempt to lend cohesion to his body of work, or, to use Dave Eggers’ term,
which he offers in his forward to Complete Stories, to bring “moral clarity” to “a knotted
world” (xiii). Paradoxically, as a swan song, Timequake is one of Vonnegut’s least
accessible novels. Davis describes it as “a published novel within a memoir within a
failed, unpublished novel within a sociological tract (replete with strong admonitions
about ways to live ethically)” (133), and to be sure this is accurate, if perhaps a bit
semantically overcomplicated. Timequake is all of these forms. Yet that’s only part of it.
In Kurt Vonnegut’s America, Jerome Klinkowitz offers a decidedly different take:
“Vonnegut infuses the narrative’s making with a sense of himself, not just the writer of it
all (which would be metafictional, a stylistic exercise at best) but as an identifiable
person with values and beliefs” (112). Another way of thinking about Timequake is that
Vonnegut isn’t simply in the novel—he is the novel. He, as much as Kilgore Trout, is the
protagonist, and Timequake is his story. Just as it was necessary to develop a new form
in order to create the autobiographical collage that is Palm Sunday (Vonnegut named it
“blivit”(xii), so too does Timequake require it’s own form.
Structure aside, Timequake charts a singular journey, namely Kilgore Trout’s
journey from a life where “being alive is a crock of shit” (3) “on a planet where the
smartest animals hate being alive” (5) to acceptance of being “teensy-weensy
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implications in an enormous implication” (28). In other words, by novel’s end, Trout
achieves what was unattainable to Howard Campbell and never full-realized by Wilbur
Swain—an extended family as part of a metaphoric diasporic community.
Avtar Brah’s work can help contexualize Trout’s transformation. Brah’s chief
contribution to diasporic theory is the notion of a diasporic space, which she proposes
and defines as “the point at which boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging
and otherness, of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are contested” (632). The importance of this concept is
that it doesn’t make a journey a required trait; a group/community in a diasporic space
can “stay put” and at the same time have its autonomy recognized (and ideally
accepted/respected) by the larger culture of which it is a part. When Trout attests that, “If
I hadn’t learned to live without a culture and a society, acculturation would have broken
my heart a thousand times” (33), he takes a misguided approach to what culture is and
isn’t. Prior to his heroic actions after the end of the timequake for which the novel is
named, he in fact did exist without a culture, yet this resulted in him existing without a
community as well. As we saw in the previous chapter, for Vonnegut, artistic creation is
a method for transcending the horrors of daily life, and Trout “could tune out the crock of
shit being alive was as long as he was [writing], head down, with a ballpoint pen on a
yellow legal pad” (8). At the same time, Trout is homeless, has no cultural or national
identity, and has been “throwing away stories instead of offering them to publications”
for over twenty years (53). There are no boundaries of inclusion or exclusion in Trout’s
world precisely because he chooses not to engage. In this sense, Trout rejects even the
possibility of Brah’s “us.”
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Trout’s decision to discard rather than share his stories contrasts sharply with
what Vonnegut establishes as humanity’s central responsibility. As he writes,
“Humanists try to behave decently and honorably without expectation of rewards and
punishments in the afterlife. The creator of the Universe has been to us unknowable so
far. We serve as well as we can the highest abstraction of which we have some
understanding, which is our community” (82). Community is reality. In “Global
Journeys: From Transnationalism to Diaspora,” Nadja Johnson suggests that diasporic
identity is always in a state of change, and “this identity, though in constant fluctuation,
eventually results in a sense of belonging to a common identity” (48). Drawing from
Clifford, Brah, and Johnson, the requisite elements for a group to be considered a
diasporic community include a sense of displacement, a journey (be it geographical or
ideological), and the establishment of “roots” in the midst of cultural/social otherness.
These metaphoric roots can be manifested in an attempt to improve the quality of daily
life. For Vonnegut, this was Trout’s greatest achievement, and his own ultimate goal.
“The basis of every great advertisement is a credible promise. Jesus promised better
times in the afterlife. Trout was promising the same thing in the here and now” (179).
When Monica Pepper, a minor character in the novel, spray paints “Fuck Art” on the
door of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, she is making a statement about the
ultimate limits of art; when Trout removes a painting from the wall and prepares to
weaponize it to destroy a ringing smoke alarm, he is using art to make the world a better
place. “At least I could make that little part of the Universe exactly as it should be,” he
says when he describes how he carefully replaced the painting and ensured that it was
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hanging straight. “I was grateful for the opportunity to do that” (179). Art is as practical
as it is ornamental, and it plays a privileged role in Vonnegut’s worldview.
Throughout Timequake, Vonnegut returns to his insistent argument for the
necessity of community. As he writes towards the end of the novel: “Yes, and Trout
harped on the need for extended families, and I still do, because it is so obvious that we,
because we are human, need them as much as we need proteins and carbohydrates and
fats and vitamins and essential minerals” (200). Vonnegut also returns to Biafra in the
final pages of his final novel, reminding readers one last time to consider the Biafran
model for family. “I was in southern Nigeria in 1970, at the very end of the Biafran War
there, on the Biafran side, the losing side, the mostly Ibo side…I met an Ibo father of a
new baby. He had four hundred relatives! Even with a losing war going on, he and his
wife were about to go on a trip, introducing the baby to all its relatives” (201). This
echoes and helps contextualize Trout’s rather crude assertion earlier in the novel that “In
my entire career as a writer, I created only one living, breathing, three-dimensional
character. I did it with my ding-dong in a birth canal” (72). In fathering his son, Leon,
Trout contributed to his community, an act which Vonnegut regards as his greatest
achievement.
The novel ends in a triumphant celebration, a clambake which takes place on the
beach at Xanadu, a writers’ resort in Rhode Island. Trout is the guest of honor, and by
giving his alter-ego, rather than himself, such a prestigious position, Vonnegut allows his
work to take center stage. In a Capra-esque finale, virtually everyone who played a role
in Vonnegut’s career as a writer is present. Close friends and critics Jerome Klinkowitz,
Asa Pieratt, Loree Rackstraw, Robert Weide, and Marc Leeds are there, and so are Nick
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Nolte and Kevin McCarthy, both of whom acted in adaptations of Vonnegut’s work; they
are joined by teachers and classmates from Shortridge High School who file in next to Jill
Krementz, Knox Berger, Don Farber, Sidney Offit beside look-alikes for the dead who
helped define Vonnegut’s career, among them his father, his “war buddy” Bernard V.
O’Hare, his first wife, Jane, and Ida Young, the nanny who helped raise him in
Indianapolis. Earlier in the novel, Vonnegut refers to the far-spread family and friends
from his Indianapolis youth as a “Diaspora!” (152), and in the final pages of his final
novel, his entire diasporic community is brought together for a magical moment of
communal revelry. Taylor suggests that Timequake offers “a celebration of literature…as
a bulwark against loneliness and absurdity, and as a fertile ground for the cultivation of
new selves and new histories.” At the same time, as the novel--and Vonnegut’s career—
conclude—it is also a celebration of community and an acknowledgement that art and
community are inseparable. Trout’s pleas for Vonnegut to “Make me young, make me
young, make me young!” (302) at the end of Breakfast of Champions go unanswered.
Instead, Vonnegut offers his most famous character and alter ego a gift more important,
and certainly more lasting, than youth when he explains that the cast of characters
assembled for the clambake “all wanted Trout to feel that he was home at last, and a vital
member of an extended family” (228). Finally, and for the first time in his life, Trout
realizes that he truly is an implication in an enormous implication. At last, Trout’s
journey is complete, and Vonnegut provides him with an extended family, a culture, and
a metaphoric homeland.
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In closing, Vonnegut frequently writes about his training as a cultural
anthropologist, and his work in this field deserves exploration. A goal of this chapter,
and this dissertation as a whole, is to advance Vonnegut studies in this under-explored
direction. Notions of nations and cultures and families abound in his work. In fact, as he
argues in his contribution to 1995’s An Unsentimental Education: Writers and Chicago,
“My ironic distance as a novelist has a lot to do with having been an anthropology
student. Anthropology made me a cultural relativist, which is what everybody ought to
be. People the world over out to be taught, seriously, that culture is a gadget, and that
one culture is as arbitrary as another” (If This Isn’t Nice 150). Not only is culture
arbitrary, but to Vonnegut, it is an act of creation as well. More importantly, it is a
human construct, with the emphasis always squarely on the human. “After going through
the war and all, I thought man was the thing to study” (If This Isn’t Nice 148). In that
respect, his focus remained unchanged, throughout both his life and his career.
A testament to Vonnegut’s sensitivity as a cultural anthropologist can be found in
his keen awareness of diasporic theory. In Timequake, he actually refers to the far-spread
family and friends from his Indianapolis youth as a “Diaspora!” (152) and this is certainly
no accident. “Yes, and a dream of taking better care of our people [is futile] without some
scheme for giving us the support and companionship of extended families, within which
sharing and compassion are more plausible than in an enormous nation” (190) he writes
towards the end of his final novel, and the antecedent of this conviction can be found in
1954’s “Adam,” one of his earliest published short stories. After Heinz Knechtmann, a
Holocaust survivor, receives the ecstatic news that his wife has just given birth to a
healthy son, he searches futilely for someone to join him in celebrating the miracle of
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human life, only to be met with indifference and disdain. “There are too many of us,” he
mumbles alone, “and we are all too far apart” (313). Reducing this gap between self and
other through the formation of artificial extended families, similar to what he found in
Biafra in the dying days of a doomed republic, proved to be one of the chief goals of his
philosophical project. In the end, he may have been A Man Without a County, but he
certainly had a culture and a diaspora.
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CONCLUSION:
KURT VONNEGUT, NAME-GIVER
Playboy: “In some of your books—especially The Sirens of Titan and SlaughterhouseFive—there’s a serious notion that all moments in time exist simultaneously, which
implies that the future can’t be changed by an act of will in the present. How does a
desire to improve things fit with that?
Vonnegut: “Understand, of course, that everything I say is horseshit.”
1973 Interview (Conversations 77)
Vonnegut contextualizes Slaughterhouse-Five in the final chapter by placing the
novel in a particular historical context—his own. “Robert Kennedy, whose summer
home is two miles from the home I live in all year round, was shot two night ago. He
died last night. So it goes. Martin Luther King was shot a month ago. He died, too. So it
goes. And every day my Government gives me a count of corpses created by military
science in Vietnam. So it goes” (268). By bringing his most celebrated novel into
conversation with a precise historical moment, Vonnegut reveals both the immediacy and
timelessness of his work.
In the early spring of 2022, faced with today’s realities, how would Vonnegut
have responded to the following headlines?
The planet is ravaged by a virus which continues to mutate. To date, over six
million people have died from COVID-19. According to the World Health Organization,
as of this morning, the exact number is 6, 047, 653. So it goes.
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Last month, Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. The day before yesterday, UN
Secretary General Antonio Guterres made headlines when he matter-of-factly stated
potential nuclear conflict is “now back within the realm of possibility.” So it goes.
Vonnegut lamented towards the end of his life, “The last thing I ever wanted was
to be alive when the three most powerful people on the whole planet would be named
Bush, Dick, and Colon” (A Man Without a Country 40). Mercifully, he didn’t hang
around long enough to hear the Access Hollywood tape where a soon-to-be elected
president instructed another Bush to “grab ‘em by the pussy”…or to experience an
America where such a statement is not only accepted but also immortalized on t-shirts
and trucker hats from sea to shining sea. So it goes.
These are strange times. It’s altogether fitting that readers are (re)turning to
Vonnegut and that his work is receiving both increased attention and renewed critical
interest. After all, viruses, despotic dictators, the threat of nuclear annihilation, and
incompetent presidents abound in Vonnegut’s fiction and non-fiction alike.
In September of 2020, Ryan North and Albert Monteys released a wildly popular
and critically lauded graphic novel adaptation of Slaughterhouse-Five. So it goes. Three
months later, Edith Vonnegut published Love Kurt, The Vonnegut Love Letters 19411945, which offers an intensely personal account of Vonnegut as a young soldier and
lover. Last November, long-time Vonnegut friend and confidant Robert Weide released
Unstuck in Time, a documentary four decades in the making about KV’s life and legacy
on American literature and culture. That same month, Tom Roston published The
Writer’s Crusade: Kurt Vonnegut and the Many Lives of Slaughterhouse-Five, a
fascinating text which uses archival research to construct what is in many ways a
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biography of Vonnegut’s most famous novel. Slated for an October 2022 release by
Seven Stories Press, Christina Jarvis’s Lucky Mud & Other Foma: A Field Guide to Kurt
Vonnegut’s Planetary Citizenship promises “a deep dive into Kurt Vonnegut’s oeuvre
and legacy, illuminating his unique perspective on environmental stewardship and our
shared connections as humans, Earthlings, and stardust.” Contextualizing this influx of
critical and popular attention is the 2017 release of Jerome Klinkowitz and Dan
Wakefield’s invaluable Kurt Vonnegut: Complete Stories (2017) which joins all of
Vonnegut’s previously published shorter fiction with additional stories recently unearthed
from the vast Lilly Library archives. So it goes. These texts, released during a pandemic,
reveal the ongoing relevance of Kurt Vonnegut more than a decade after his death. On a
deeper level, at a time when the daily headlines read like Vonnegut novels with the
apocalyptic undertones cranked up to eleven, renewed interest in Vonnegut also reveals
the comfort in someone, somewhere, reminding us that, “I feel and think much as you do,
care about many of the same things you care about…You are not alone” (Timequake
221).
In 1990’s Critical Essays on Kurt Vonnegut, Robert Merrill predicts, “I suspect
that Vonnegut criticism is about to undergo a marked resurgence” (22). Almost 20 years
later, in New Critical Essays on Kurt Vonnegut, David Simmons argues that “With the
death of Vonnegut in 2007, now seems like an appropriate time to set about reassessing
the author’s extensive body of work” (xi). In post-Trump America, Vonnegut is entering
a new phase a critical reassessment.
My aim in this dissertation has been to offer a new reading of Kurt Vonnegut’s
work, one which uses philosophy and diasporic theory to contextualize his body of work
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firmly in modernity. Like Nietzsche before him, Vonnegut’s philosophical project is one
of saying yes to life in a defiant response to Camus’ “one truly serious philosophical
problem”-- suicide. Vonnegut suggests in a 1980 interview that, “The most horrible
hypocrisy or the most terrifying hypocrisy or the most tragic hypocrisy at the center of
life, I think, which no one dares mention, is that human beings don’t like life much”
(Conversations 232). This belief informs and unites all of his work. “Do you realize that
all great literature,” he asks in A Man Without a Country, is “about what a bummer it is to
be a human being?” (9). At the same time, “a plausible mission of artists is to make
people appreciate being alive at least a little bit” (Timequake 1). For Vonnegut, the good
life is precisely that—being able to appreciate being alive just a little bit, if only once in a
while. Purpose, foma, art, and community make this possible in Vonnegut’s systemic
critique of daily life. In the preceding chapters, my goal has been to bring Vonnegut into
conversation with Camus, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and diasporic theory to illustrate the
philosophical achievement of his life-long project.
Vonnegut’s popularity, cultural influence, and lasting legacy stem in large part
from his philosophical originality. Nietzsche defines originality in The Gay Science as
the ability “to see something that still has no name; that still cannot be named even
though it is lying right there before everyone’s eyes. The way people usually are, it takes
a name to make something visible at all. –Those with originality have usually been the
name-givers” (151). Philosophically speaking, what makes Vonnegut “original” in a
Nietzschean sense is not his (post)modern style, unique plots, or metafictional narratives,
but rather his life-long attempt to give name to the maladies of modernity. For Vonnegut,
purposelessness, embarrassment, hopelessness, shame, and loneliness are serious
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philosophical problems, and his work represents a systematic and incredibly cohesive
attempt to combat them.
Robert Morace suggests that Vonnegut’s unified vision is the result of his
“weaving individual works into a larger extended family of fictions,” and “if you’ve read
one Vonnegut book, you’ve read them all, or will” (156). Morace rightly points out the
singularity of vision which guides all of Vonnegut’s work. All of Vonnegut’s characters
are all engaged in the same battle: daily life. Connecting each narrative is Vonnegut
himself, not just the creator of but also a character within his own fictions. It’s
Vonnegut, after all, who, to borrow Henry James’ term, is the string the pearls are strung
on. No one suffers more in all of Vonnegut than Vonnegut himself. No one laughs more
either. His readers experience life with him, as it happens, because his work is ultimately
about him, and he is telling a single story—his own. So many of Vonnegut’s novels are
fictional autobiographies dressed up as novels. Mother Night, Cat’s Cradle, Slapstick,
Deadeye Dick, Galapagos, Bluebeard, and Hocus Pocus are autobiographies of
tragically-flawed characters who are trying to make sense out of life. Kilgore Trout’s
stories are attempts to work towards the same goal. In the end, Vonnegut offers such a
place of privilege to autobiographers because he himself is one. The lines between
fiction and non-fiction become increasingly blurred throughout Vonnegut’s career, to the
point his final novel, Timequake, and his final work of non-fiction, A Man Without a
Country, are at times difficult to differentiate. Like Palm Sunday, they too are blivits. In
“The Death of the Author,” Barthes suggests that the conventional, widely-practiced
notion of authorship is problematic and in need of reconsideration. The “author” as a
concept is a product of modernity and a result of post-Renaissance humanism. The
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central problem Barthes finds with contemporary criticism is this: “The image of
literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centered on the author, his
person, his life, his tastes, his passions […] The explanation of a work is always sought
in the man or woman who produced it” (1466). Benjamin Widdis provocatively
problematizes Barthes contentions in Obscure Invitations. His view of authorship (which
he applies to literature, non-fiction, and film) is that the author never really died at all.
As he explains, “the most cursory examination of the arts pages of our newspapers, the
profiles in glossy magazines, the discussions abounding online and on the radio and on
the road … indicates that we have never stopped caring about authors” (3). He refers to
the author as an “intentional being,” one whose identity is constructed from both texts
and the media. Few authors are as intentionally present as Vonnegut, and in the later
books particularly, the text and the author are one and the same.
What unifies Vonnegut’s philosophical project is his stubbornly-persistent attempt
to answer a single question, the one Kilgore Trout found scrawled on the men’s room
wall of a porn theater, the question with which this dissertation opens: what is the
purpose of life? “What mankind hoped to learn,” Vonnegut writes in 1959’s The Sirens
of Titan, “was who was actually in charge of all creation, and what all creation was all
about” (1). In 1973’s Breakfast of Champions, Dwayne Hoover has a single request
when asked what he wants most: “Tell me what life is all about” (169). At the end of his
life and career, Vonnegut was still in search of an answer, and in 2005’s A Man Without
A Country, he states, “When you get to my age, if you get to my age, and if you have
reproduced, you will find yourself asking your own children, who are themselves middleaged, ‘What is life all about?’” (65-66). This is the question which Vonnegut set out to
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answer. To that end, Vonnegut’s work offers a guide to a “good life” in modernity, one
based on foundational principles of resistance, harmless self-deception, artistic creation,
and community. That’s not to say, however, that he found existence any easier than the
rest of us. To use Widdis’ term, Vonnegut’s “intentional” presence in his work offers an
example of his life-long struggle. He makes his mother’s suicide, his experiences in
Dresden, and the tragic death of his sister part of his work. As readers, we experience the
dissolution of his marriage, his struggles with depression, his declining libido, and his
suicide attempt as they happen to him, not because they inform his work, but because
they are written into the work itself. According to Jim Adams, Vonnegut’s nephew who
he raised after the death of his sister, “there was a definite disconnect between the kind of
guy you would imagine Kurt must be from the tone of his books…and the reality of his
behavior on a daily basis. He was a complicated, difficult man…I think he admired the
idea of love, community, and family from a distance, but he couldn’t deal with the
complicated emotional elements they included” (Shields 214-15). Throughout his life, he
struggled with the very principles he advocated, reminding us that the good life is
possible, but it is always an act of negotiation between the self and the world.

In his prologue to 1979’s Jailbird, Vonnegut recounts a letter he’d recently
received from John Figler, a high school student who suggested he could sum up the
totality of Vonnegut’s work with a single sentence: “Love may fail, but courtesy will
prevail” (2). “This seems true to me,” Vonnegut writes, “and complete. So I am now in
the abashed condition…of realizing that I needn’t have bothered to write several books.
A seven-word telegram could have done the job. Seriously” (2). Near the end of the
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novel, Walter Starbuck suggests, “We are here for no purpose, unless we can invent one.
Of that I am sure” (301). Such is the challenge Vonnegut sets before us. Just as
importantly, it is the challenge he set before himself. With purpose, foma, art, and
community, Vonnegut tells, us, virtually anything can be bearable. Even modernity.
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